



A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE ROLE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SAYYID BROTHERS

ABSTRACT
OF THE
THESIS

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

IN

HISTORY

BY

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ALIGARH (INDIA)

2008

ABSTRACT

It has been frequently stated that the Mughal monarchy ran into a deep crisis after the death of the last great emperor, Aurangzeb in 1707. The crisis was thought to have found its expression in the succession of ever 'inferior', weak emperors who disgraced the public esteem of the ruling house. The lack of an indisputable order of succession not only split the power of the dynastic family and divided the Mughal nobility among themselves, but the frequent struggles for the throne in the early eighteenth century plunged the entire society into war causing permanent political conflict and long-term devastation of the Imperial finances and the economy as a whole.

This work proposes that the egotistical claims to power of 'unfit' candidates and the unsound motives of their 'greedy' and 'evil-minded' supporters subverted the idea of an unchallengeable imperial authority in the person of the emperor, and the loss of his authority eroded to the same degree the unity of the Empire.

Indeed, the wars of succession between Aurangzeb's three sons lasted almost two years. Bahadur Shah's early death in 1712 was then instantly followed by a new war from which, after the short reign of Jahandar Shah, Farrukh Siyar emerged as the winner. With the help of the

Saiyid brothers he ascended the throne in 1713 and his reign was accompanied by so-called Civil Wars among the various factions at court. After his murder in 1719, two puppet kings were put on the throne whose reigns lasted only a few months. Before the accession of Mohammad Shah in 1719, four wars of succession had been fought which, according to Zahiruddin Mallick, “proved a serious drain on the financial resources of the government. Every war entailed great diversion of resources to military uses, putting a severe strain upon the already depleted treasury. The disaster of battle and plunder told heavily on all classes. Problems of post-war adjustments deepened the economic crisis which had for long gripped the Empire”.

It is quite clear that the wars following the death of Aurangzeb temporarily gave rise to intense conflicts and increased tensions within the realm; any short-term power vacuum at the centre immediately developed into factional struggles among the nobility.

Although the Mughal dynasty was not replaced, the position of the emperor at the centre was *de facto* altered in a way ‘denaturalized’ during the first decades of the eighteenth century, as politics at the Mughal court in Delhi took on a new form and significance. Growing factionalism increasingly undermined the supreme authority of the emperor, but his loss of control over court politics was not in essence due

to individual, personal failures but denoted a shift in the relative weight of his power vis-à-vis that of factions of the nobility.

Faction building among nobles and their involvement in court politics were no new phenomena in the Mughal Empire. In their position as administrators and upholders of imperial power, the highest nobles as well as lower imperial officers in the localities had at all times been involved with politics, and individual nobles had always pursued their interests at the royal court in one form or another within the framework of the central political institution. The building of larger and more coordinated groups of nobles, or factions had occurred mainly at times of dispute over the Mughal succession. The formation of factions around princely contestants for the throne had been an integral part in the process of power bargaining in disputes or full blown wars of succession; at no time in the past, however, had this threatened or seriously challenged the dominance of the central power. Once the successor to the throne had been finally decided the imperial policy of reconciliation had integrated the opposing sections – with the result that the groupings, in this compact form, rapidly dissolved.

If we compare this pattern with the situation emerging from the late seventeenth century, onwards it appears that the main characteristics of the old kind of the faction had been its transitory nature and the major

difference to later factions must be sought in the establishment of much firmer, permanent groupings within the nobility.

The present work shall be elaborating upon the Barha Saiyids, who came to exercise their power in a forceful way in a period between 1713 to 1720. This group being headed by two brothers Abdullah Khan and Husani Ali Khan forms the crux of the present study.

The second chapter, deals with the background of these Barha Saiyids, where they came from, where they first settled and spread to different parts of Punjab and Western U.P. what role did they play in the Mughal nobility right from Akbar till Aurangzeb, their bravery in many battles they fought, and their role in suppressing many revolts against Mughal empire, especially the suppression of Mirzas in Gujrat at the time of Akbar, is the hallmark of the said chapter. Later on, at the time of Jahangir's accession, the Barhas along with Shaikh Farid Bukhari played a decisive role. Again at the time of Khurram rebellion, the Barhas were used by the Mughal Emperor. The war of succession at the illness of Shahjahan gave the Barhas to exploit the opportunity. So we can conclude that the Barhas remained in the thick of things throughout the Mughal Empire, thereby negating the view point that the famous Saiyid brothers were upstart who came to enjoy supreme position out of nowhere.

Chapter three deals with the war of succession following the death of Bahadur Shah in 1712 between his four sons Jahandar Shah, Azim-ush-Shan, Rafi-ush-Shan and Shah Jahan was dominated by the attempts of the Asad-Khan-Zulfiqar Khan faction to finally secure the post of *wazir* denied to them by Bahadur Shah. The strongest candidate for the throne, Azim-ush Shan, was militarily and politically outmanoeuvred by an alliance between the three other brothers arranged by Zulfiqar Khan. Jahandar Shah was formally declared emperor one month after Bahadur Shah's death in March 1712. After the death in battle of the two remaining active contestants Zulfiqar Khan became *wazir* and assumed unprecedented powers and privileges formerly assigned exclusively to royal princes.

Zulfiqar Khan's *wizarat* was marked by a distinct policy of conciliation towards the Rajputs and the Marathas on the one hand, and a refusal to reintegrate the adherents of the defeated princes on the other. However, his rise to power not only threatened the authority of the emperor, but further alienated the faction around Chin Qulich Khan. Additional divisions occurred when smaller groups of Courtiers around the emperor tried to undermine the powerful position of Zulfiqar Khan. When the remaining claimant to the throne, Azim-ush-Shan's son Farrukh Siyar began his campaign against Jahandar Shah, the reigning

emperor and his *wazir* were unable either to pay the long overdue wages of their troops or to win the full support of the old nobility. Both contributed to the defeat of Jahandar Shah and Zulfiqar Khan in the battle of January 1713, after which Farrukh Siyar occupied the throne.

Chapter four and five deal with Farrukh Siyar's victory which was largely due to the support of the Saiyid brothers, who were appointed to the two highest offices at Court and received dramatic increases in their *mansabs*. The families of the Saiyids of Barha had been in the service of the Mughal Emperors since Akbar's times, but had only recently risen from their relatively obscure *mansabdar* positions to higher ranks and deputies to Farrukh Siyar's father. Abdullah Khan was now made *wazir* and Husain Ali became *mirbakhshi*, which meant that the two key positions at court were now in the hands of one faction. Both brothers received additional governorships in the provinces of Multan and Bihar, which they governed through deputies; their uncle became governor of Ajmer province, and the remaining family and clan members were granted *mansabs*.

Zulfiqar Khan was killed and Asad Khan faction finally eliminated. The Saiyids tried to conciliate the remaining powerful faction of the old nobility around Nizam-ul Mulk, Mohammad Amin Khan and Abdus Samad Khan by appointing Nizam-ul-Mulk to a high mansab and

the governorship of the Deccan. The Deccan position was furnished with considerable additional privileges, introducing a significant degree of provincial independence. Abdus Samad Khan was made governor of Lahore and Muhammad Amin Khan took up the position of second *bakhshi* at court.

Emperor Farrukh Siyar reversed the conciliatory policy of his predecessors towards the Rajputs and entered into lengthy campaigns and negotiations which were eventually undermined by an alliance between the Rajputs and the Saiyid brothers. To counteract the growing power of *wazir*, who appointed their chosen allies to the most important posts, Farrukh Siyar allowed two of his own favourites, the experienced, high rank mansabdars Mir Jumla and Khan-I-Dauran to exercise significant influence and political decisions. Both courtiers, together with Farrukh Siyar himself, subverted the policies introduced by the Saiyids by manipulating administrative practices (such as delaying *farmans* regarding appointments made by ministers and circumventing ministerial signatures), and equipped their own families with high *mansabs* and multiple court and provincial posts. Gradually the *jagirdari* system slipped out of the imperial administration's control, as did negotiations with the Rajputs, the Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs, who all became enmeshed in the dealings of the different factions within and beyond the

imperial Court. The struggle of the emperor against his *wazir* and *mirbakhshi* and the resulting extension of the power of the factions marked the end of the supreme authority of the Mughal emperor.

Increasingly threatened by the other factions at Court, the Saiyids eventually deposed Farrukh Siyar, blinded, imprisoned and finally killed him. Farrukh Siyar's cousin, Rafi-ud-Darjat, son of Rafi-ush-Shan, was put onto the throne in April 1719, following in June of the same year by his brother Rafi-ud-Daulah. After the death from disease of both these brothers, Muhammad Shah, son of Bahadur Shah's youngest son Jahan Shah, ascended the throne in September 1719, again under the directive of the Saiyids.

The demise of the Saiyids in November 1720, who had meanwhile systematically extended their alliances with the Rajputs and sections of the Marathas, was eventually brought about by Nizam-ul Mulk and Mohammad Amin Khan, with a large army, several Deccan governors and the leading Court nobles behind him.

Through the reshuffling of offices following the defeat of the Saiyids, the highest positions at Court and in the most strategically important provinces fell under the dominance of the Nizam-ul Mulk faction.

In chapter six – although Mughal empire underwent disintegration, the Mughal culture obtained its most fully developed forms and continued to exercise a tremendous influence on the contemporary society for a long time to come. The Muslims of India, who were assimilated into the vast cultural complex of the country, adopted native languages for common use in day to day life, though Persian remained the literary and official language till such time as it was dethroned by Urdu. Thus, our period of study i.e. roughly the first half of 18th century witnessed the climax of an endless process of absorption assimilation and adjustment of diverse elements and tendencies that has gone centuries giving shape and complexion to the cultural tradition of India.

Since there was a marked economic decline at the centre, coupled with the extarvagance of the nobles and elites, the common man was the worst sufferers. The sources of 18th century are replete with the harsh conditions being faced by peasants and professional class. The cities and towns of North India in general and Delhi, Faizabad, Lucknow, Murshidabad and Azimabad in particular were dens of vice on the one hand and of piety and religiousness on the other hand. In every city there were large number of *khanqahs* (hospices), madrasas, and mosques, as also brothels and gambling dens. The pimps were active in every nook

and corner. There was a great contradiction in the attitudes of the people in general. They flocked the *khanqahs* and the shrines with devotion and visited the brothels too with enthusiasm.

Contrary to the claims of the opponents of Saiyids that they were anti-Mughal and sought to monopolize power for themselves, neither the policy and the practice of the Saiyids, nor an analysis of the actual party groupings support such an interpretation. But it suited their opponents to misrepresent the policy of the Saiyids and to give to the anti-Saiyid struggle the outer character of a struggle between the Mughals and the Hindustani. However, it was a monumental mistake on the Saiyids part to have deposed and killed Farrukh Siyar. Nevertheless, it is not denied even by those writers who are strongly opposed to the Saiyids that they strove hard to maintain law and order and that their military reputation and capabilities prevented a final breakdown of the administration.



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2008



Dedicated
To
My Papa (Marhoom)
&
Ammi

CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY


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CERTIFICATE

Certified that **Mr. Syed Ali Kazim** worked under my supervision on the topic “*A Critical Study of the Role and Achievements of Sayyid Brothers*”. This thesis is the original work of the candidate and I find it suitable for submission for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


(Dr. S.Liyaqat Husain Moini)
Supervisor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is a pleasure to express gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. S. Liaqat H. Moini for his valuable guidance, constant encouragement, support and affection during the period of my research and preparation of this thesis.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Prof. Mushirul Hasan (Vice-Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi) and Prof. S.M. Azizuddin Husain (Department of History and Culture, J.M.I.) for attaching me with the prestigious project on Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library which also happens to be one of the best places for research work in India.

I consider myself fortunate to have Prof. B.L. Bhadani (Chairman and Coordinator, CAS, Department of History, A.M.U. Aligarh), Prof. Afzal Husain (Department of History, A.M.U.), Prof. S. Inayat Ali Zaidi (J.M.I.) and Prof. Sunita Zaidi (J.M.I.) as my well wishers. They gave moral and intellectual support at every stage of my research.

No words are enough to express my deep regards to my colleagues Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Ms. Geeta Kudaisya, Mr. Amrit Tandon, Mrs. Shanti Shree Banerjee, Dr. Etee Bahadur, Bela, Anish, Bimla and Saroja for their constant support and encouragement during this period.

My friends Dr. Tabir Kalam, Dr. Nazrul Bari, Tahir Husain Ansari, Amit Gaur, Aziz Faisal, Abdus Salam gave me valuable contribution at various stages of this thesis. They also improved the quality of the thesis through their insightful suggestions.

Thanks are due to my friends, Aslam Hasan, Anwar Shamim, Arshad Alam, Sarfaraz Nasir, Sakhawat Bhai, Tariq Anwar, Amrit Pal Singh, Khalid Bhai, Sajjad Bhai, Ehtesham Bhai, Rizvi Bhai, Yasir and Misam for their moral support and cheerful company.

I am equally indebted to the Indian Council of Historical Research for providing two years of Junior Research Fellowship which helped my research work see the light of the day.

I must acknowledge and thank the various libraries and staffs of Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U. Aligarh, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna; Jamia Hamdard Library, New Delhi; ICHR Library, New Delhi; Zakir Husain Library, JMI New Delhi, CAS History Library, AMU Aligarh, Raza Library, Rampur and NMML, Teen Murti New Delhi.

Special thanks to my brothers, Syed Naqvi Kazim, Syed Mohammad Kazim and their wives, and Syed Hasan Kazim for lending me the moral support and affection that saw me through during this period. My love and blessings for Zain, Abid, Abbas and Fatima.

My wife Neelam and sons Mohammad (Gaipee) and Asad (Atee) have been with me at every stage of this project and have shared in the hardships and joys that have been part of my doctoral experience. I owe a lot to them for standing by me.

This acknowledgement would be incomplete without thanking my papa (Late) and my beloved Ammi. During my research, there have been times of highs and lows, and disappointments galore. What has kept me going has been the thought of my parents. It was indeed their inspiration, moral and emotional support and blessings that gave me the strength and determination to complete this work. Though, papa is no more in this world, but it is the path shown by him, that I tread upon and have today come past a significant milestone on it.

SYED ALI KAZIM

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Chapter 1

Introduction

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION

The Mughal Empire, which had dazzled the contemporary world by its extensive territories, military might and cultural achievements showed unmistakable signs of decay towards the beginning of the 18th century. The Mughal Emperors lost their power and glory and their empire shrank to a few square miles around Delhi towards the end of the century with Delhi itself being occupied by the British army in 1803. The unity and stability of the Empire had been shaken during the long and strong reign of Aurangzeb, yet in spite of his many harmful policies, the Mughal administration was still quite efficient and the Mughal army strong enough at the time of his death in 1707. Moreover, the Mughal dynasty still commanded respect in the country.

A sinister development in the later Mughal politics was the rise of powerful nobles who played the role of ‘King makers’. Wars of succession were fought even in the heydays of the Mughal Empire but then the royal princes were the principal contestants supported by powerful *mansabdars*. In the later Mughal period the ambitious nobles became the real contenders for political power and the royal princes receded in the background. The powerful nobles and leaders of different

factions used the royal princes as pawn in their game and set up and removed royal princes from the throne to suit their interests.

Bahadur Shah became the Emperor due to the untiring efforts of a lesser known but dedicated and loyal noble Munim Khan who was rewarded with the *wizarat* in spite of Aurangzeb's desire to retain Asad Khan. Thus Jahandar Shah became the emperor not by his own strength but because of the able generalship of Zulfiqar Khan, a leader of the Irani party. Similarly, it were the Saiyid brothers who raised Farrukh Siyar to the throne in 1713 and pulled him down in 1719 when he ceased to serve their interests. Three puppet emperors, Rafi-ud-Darajat, Rafi-ud-daula and Mohammad Shah were raised to the throne by the Saiyids. The fall of the Saiyid brothers in 1720 came not because they had lost the confidence of the Emperor but was brought about more by the Turani faction under the leadership of Nizam-ul Mulk and Mohammad Amin Khan. And worst of all, these powerful parties were not political parties in the modern sense having different programmes for the welfare of the state but were factions looking for self-advancement, more often at the cost of the state and against the interests of the Mughal ruler.

William Irvine mentions the multiplicity of parties at the Mughal court. Among these four were prominent – The Turanis, the Iranis, the

Afghans and the Hindustani. The first three were descendents of foreigners from Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan. Their number had greatly increased during the last twenty five years of Aurangzeb's reign when he waged incessant war in the Deccan. Descendants from these foreigners held important military and civil offices in India. Among these the Turanis from Trans-Oxiana and Afghans from Khurasan and Fars were mostly Sunnis, while the Iranis from Persia were mostly undeclared Shias. In opposition to the Mughal or Foreign Party was the Indian born or Hindustani party. It mainly comprised Muslims born in India, many of whose ancestors though originally immigrants had settled in India for generations. This party got the support of the Rajput and the Jat chiefs and powerful Hindu landlords. The Hindus who filled almost all the subordinate offices naturally ranged on their side. However it will not be correct to assume that the political parties were based entirely on ethnic or religious groups. As has been rightly pointed out by Satish Chandra that "slogans of race and religion were used by individual nobles only to suit their convenience and that the actual groupings cut across ethnic and religious divisions."¹

The Saiyids brothers, whose rise and fall constitutes the crux of the work, were Hindustani Muslims and they prided themselves on

1. Satish Chandra : *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-40*, pp. 257-58.

being so. They were not prepared to accept the superiority of the Turani party or be treated as a conquered inferior or non-privileged race.

The Saiyids followed a tolerant religious policy, reminiscent of the days of Akbar. It was under their influence that *Jazia* was abolished in 1713 and after reimposition again abolished in 1719. Further, the Saiyids won over the confidence of the Hindus and gave them high posts. The appointment of Ratan Chand as *Diwan* is illustrative of their policy. They also won over the Rajputs to their side and transformed Raja Ajit Singh from a rebel to an ally. Ajit Singh gave his daughter in marriage to emperor Farrukh Siyar. The Saiyids showed sympathy towards the jats and it was their intervention that the siege of the fort of Thuri was raised and Churaman visited Delhi in April 1718. Above all, the Marathas sided with the Saiyids and Chhatrapati became a deputy of the Mughal Emperor.

The present study would also be looking at this hypothetical question as to whether the history of India would have taken a different course if the enlightened religious policy of the Saiyids had been continued by their successors in high offices.

Since my study is confined to the role being played by an ethnic or national group i.e. Saiyid Brothers, of Barha, it would not be out of place to discuss in a nutshell the position of different ethnic national (or

regional) or religious groups) in the nobility of the Mughals at various periods.

Some modern writers have divided the nobility into 'foreigners' and 'Indians' identifying the former with the Mughals and the latter with Hindustanis and Rajputs. But such a division seems to be of doubtful validity for the seventeenth century. The word Mughal was loosely used to denote those who had recently come to the country from Iran and Turan.² However the Mughals were not the representatives of any foreign power which had its economic and political interests outside the country. Once they joined the emperor's service, they made India their home, and hardly kept any contact with the land of their birth. One of the conditions of service was that they should bring their wives and children to the country. Since service generally lasted till death, and even after to progenies there was no question of returning to the country of their birth after retirement. Large numbers of the so-called Iranis and Turanis had lived in the country for one generation or more. They were thus wholly different from the English civil servant in India. Culturally too, the Mughal nobles did not form any distinctive group. Like the other immigrants at the Mughal court, they rapidly adopted the language and the manners and customs prevalent at the court and also introduced

2. Satish Chandra, p. 15.

and influenced their own ways. They married in the country and assimilated the culture which had been gradually developed at the Mughal Court and was widely prevalent among the upper and to some extent even among the lower classes all over northern India.³

By the second half of the 17th century, the only group among the Indian Muslims which retained the tribal clan structure to any considerable degree were the Afghans. However, there was nothing like an Afghan party at the court infact they were in the group of Indian Muslims. Culturally, too, the Afghans did not form a separate group, hardly any differences remaining between them and others on this score.

The Rajpts who formed a regional as well as a tribal clan group had shown themselves even less capable than the Afghans of overcoming their tribal clan disunity. Nor did they have the advantage of numbers. But their traditional position as rulers and leaders of Hindu society gave them a social status which Akbar was quick to recognize. The Bundelas like the Rajputs, too were a tribal clan cum regional group. But for various historical reasons they could not attain a position comparable to that of the Rajputs till well into the 18th century.⁴

As the empire expanded towards the Deccan, many Marathas (*Deccanis*) also entered the royal service. The problem of assigning the

3 . Ibid., p. 16.

4 . Satish Chandra, pp. 18-19.

Marathas a position which would accord with their aspirations and importance and which would not at the same time, upset the internal balance in the nobility or unduly strain the resources of the empire, proved a difficult one, and became a factor in the organization and growth of a movement in Maharashtra aimed at regional independence. Religions and sectarian differences also affected the nobles. Thus, among the Muslims there were Shiah and Sunnis. Sectarian controversy and bitterness between the two sometimes ran fairly high. Shiah were often identified with Iranis, there being a widespread belief that most of the Irani nobles were secretly or undeclared Shiah.⁵

The nobility of the Mughals, although suffered from a number of internal weaknesses, was on a broad view, a remarkable institution which welded into a homogenous and harmonious whole, men belonging to different regions and tribes, speaking different languages and professing different religious and with differing cultural traditions.

During the later part of the seventeenth and in the early part of the 18th century, stresses were placed on the nobility which combined with its internal weaknesses, led to growing factionalism in the nobility and disrupted the empire.⁶

5 . Ahkam-i Alamgiri, p. 70 (ed. by J.N. Sarkar)

6 . Satish Chandra, p. 19.

However, a principal characteristic of the history of the Mughal Empire in the 18th century was party or group politics. Its nature was, however, different from that of the personal groups centering round a particular person under the early Mughals in India. During the time of the Great Mughals, personal considerations sometimes led ambitious and rebellious princes and nobles like Kamran, the Mirza, Mirza Hakim, Khusrau, Mahabat Khan and others to form a group or coterie with their supporters. But usually such attempts were nipped in the bud and did not envelop the entire court. In the time of Jahangir, however, the waters of the court were seriously troubled on account of the machinations of Nur Jahan Junta in the Khurram Sahiryar rivalry. Under Shahjahan, again, the see-saw of Court politics pulsated with the dominance of Aurangzeb or Dara in imperial counsels particularly with regard to Golkonda and Bijapur. But in such moves the nobility as such played a secondary role, because the emperors were too strong.

Towards the end of Aurangzeb's reign, two groups of nobles, Irani and Turani were already raising their heads and seeking to come to the forefront of in Mughal Court. The Barha Saiyids were there, of course, but Aurangzeb inspite of their military skills had a poor opinion about them. After his death the controlling and unifying machinery went out of order with the practical abeyance of monarchy. So the importance

of parties or groups grew out of all proportions. It now came to be moulded more by the character of the nobles than by that of the rulers. In fact the emperors were largely responsible for this state of affairs because they were weak. Candidates were put on the throne by the self-centred nobles who wanted that the Emperor should reign and they should rule. They could neither govern themselves nor did they possess the power to judge the right persons who could become worthy and honest officers and ministers.

As has been mentioned earlier, this party politics can hardly be compared with the party government in a purely democratic state. Unlike modern political parties there was no common principle of work or firm party obligations in the Mughal court parties. It was the natural instinct of self-preservation which tempted the nobles to form such groups and keep the governmental machinery under themselves, and strengthen their own respective groups with the provincial governor, military commander and obedient feudal nobles and courtiers. What gave strength and cohesion to these groups was the family bond while ethnic identity added to the common interests of the group as symbolized by a recognized leader. What held the members of each group together were the traditional emotional attachment to certain cultural and political institutions.⁷

7. Zahiruddin Mallick, *The Reign of Mohammad Shah*, 1977, pp. 72-73.

It is, therefore, necessary to have a knowledge of the character and composition of the political parties and their role in shaping the destinies of the state.

Broadly speaking the nobles of the later Mughal court were divided down to 1720 into three principal groups –

- (i) The Hindustani party included those born in India or had settled for long here, e.g. many Afghan nobles, the Saiyids of Barha, as well as Khan-i-Dauran whose family came from Badakshan. The nobles of this group largely depended on the support of their Hindu friends. The Afghans were not prominent in Indian politics down to 1748, notwithstanding their numerical strength in the army.
- (ii) The so-called ‘foreign’ nobles, collectively called ‘Mughals’ were subdivided into two groups according to the country of their origin. One of them, the Turanis came from Turan or Transoxiana, and other parts of central Asia. They were of Turkish origin and were mostly sunnis. They enjoyed much influence and power as fellow countrymen of the ruling race, the Mughals, and formed a large proportion of the army. The Turani leaders were highly distinguished both as generals and civil administrators.

(iii) The other foreign group was of the Irani nobles, coming mostly from Persian and Khurasan and they were mainly Shias. The Iranis excelled in civil administration, especially in revenue and secretariat work. But being Shias they were in a minority and their influence in the state was less except when their leaders were in power.

At first sight it would appear that race and religion constituted the basis of rivalry. But this division was not wholly exclusive. Even in one group there were members of the other groups. Hence this differentiation was not entirely based on religion or racial differences.

The leading figures in the Irani group were Alamgiri nobles, Asad Khan and his son Zulfiqar Khan, holding the ranks, 7000 and 6,000 respectively by the end of 1707. They were also highly influential. Zulfiqar was also a successful general. He was supported by Daud Khan Panni, Rao Dalpat Rao Budh Singh of Bundi, Rao Ram Singh Hara of Kota, all distinguished soldiers. This Irani group was very powerful and influential but it was not a racial group. Both Asad and Zulfiqar were Persians born in India. It was 'a family-cum-personal' group bound by family ties and personal relations of supporters. There was no clearly defined political programme of this group, except that Zulfiqar was interested in *wizarat* of Deccan even in Shahu and in negotiating with

the Marathas. Again he was favourably disposed towards the Hindu and his close association with the Bundela and Hada Rajputs was very significant. The group operated with a fair degree of cohesion which gave its effectiveness. After the fall of this Irani family in 1712, no other Irani noble rose to such high rank till the end of Mohammad Shah's reign in 1748.

The famous Turani group which rose to prominence at the end of the seventeenth century and continued to hold power in varying degree till the middle of the 18th century was headed by Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firoz Jung.⁸ Like the group of Asad Khan mentioned earlier this was also a family group, well knitted together by ties of kinship and marriage and by common allegiance to the Mughal crown. But it was larger stronger more exclusive and consequently more cohesive. Other members of this family were Chin Qulich Khan⁹, Mohd. Amin Khan¹⁰, Abdus Samad Khan¹¹ However a serious setback of the Turanis was that the relation between Firuz Jang and Chin Qulich Khan was strained and Firuz Jung was blind. During the war of succession in the first two decades of eighteenth century (1707-20) the indifferent attitude of this

8 . For details of his biography, Maasir-ul Umara, II, 872-879.

9 . Maasir ul Umara, III, 837-48.

10 . Ibid., I, 346-350.

11 . Ibid. III, 69-74, He was the brother-in law of Amir Khan.

group, put them out of power, and paved the way for the rise of Zulfiqar Khan Abdullah Khan.

There was longstanding rivalry between the Irani and the Turani groups for power and position at the court. Both Zulfiqar and Chin Qilich Khan were ambitious to seize supreme power. At first the Irani group was superior not only in power and influence but also in prestige. The combined *mansabs* of the first few Irani nobles totaled 24,500/24,000 while those of the Turani group only 20,000/15,600. This rivalry between the Iranis and the Turanis did not, however, stand in the way of their combining against the Hindsutanis. But after the fall of the latter, the former two confronted each other fiercely.

During the war of succession after Aurangzeb's death, the Turanis held aloof from Azam and deserted Kam Bakhsh. They remained in the background in the time of Bahadur Shah. They also deserted Rafi-us Shan in the civil war against Jahandar in 1712. In the contest between Jahandar and Farrukh Siyar, too they were bribed by the latter and remained passive at Samugarh. The Saiyid brothers gave important posts to the Turanis. Mohammad Amin Khan was appointed second *Mir Bakhshi* and was given the title of Itimad-ud-daula Nusrat Jung; his son, Qamaruddin Khan became paymaster of the *ahadis*; Chin Qilch Khan Bahadur entitled Nizam-ul Mulk was appointed viceroy of the Deccan

with headquarters at Aurangabad and with his deputies in the six provinces thereof.

During the period 1707-13, covering the reigns of Bahadur Shah and Jahandar Shah, the Irani party was strong with Asad Khan *Vakil-i-Mutlaq* and Zulfiqar Khan as first *Mir Bakhshi* and then *Wazir* (1712-13). Zulfiqar initially joined Azam during the struggle with Bahadur Shah but deserted him due to his personal defects. He was favourably disposed towards the Marathas securing the release of Shahu in 1707 and also towards the Hindus. He was instrumental in the accession of Jahandar. As *Wazir* he tried to monopolise power in his own hands. But owing to the differences with Kokaltash, a foster brother of Jahandar, he did not exert himself against Farrukh Siyar in 1713, leading to the fall of Jahandar Shah.

From the accession of Farrukh Siyar in 1713 to the first year of Muhammad Shah's reign (1720) the Hindustani party remained in power under the Saiyid brothers. Without attempting to monopolise power the Hindustani Saiyids sought the cooperation of the Alamgiri nobles. But their pro-Hindu, pro-Maratha policy lack of administrative experience and their friction with the emperor led to a reaction against them on the ground of their policy being anti-Islamic and anti-

monarchical. Hence, they lost their ascendancy in 1720 as a result of the combination of the Iranis and the Turanis.¹²

While explaining the phenomenon of the decadence of Mughal power, Historians generally lay stress on the social and moral degeneration of the privileged few who grew indolent, self-satisfied and indifferent in their duties. For instance Ahsan Ijad¹³ the author of the *Shahnama-i Deccan* criticizes the character of the nobility and attempts to interrelate its decline with the break-up of political power. He burns with indignation at the corrupt and luxurious life of Aurangzeb's successors, factional rivalries among the nobles, and their cowardly behaviour in dealing with the enemies of the Mughal government.

The age being one of political decline and economic distress there runs a thread of gloom through the entire contemporary historical writings. The contemporary writers, who saw the Empire passing into the turmoil of strife, and its vast structure ultimately breaking down before waves of insurgency and foreign invasions, did not hesitate to condemn the unwise policies of the Emperor and their inefficient conduct of administration. They denounced the kings for their impolitic and inexpedient acts in regard to military operations and administration;

12 . J.N. Sarkar, pp. 28-29.

13 . Ahsan Ijad is also the author of *Farrukh Siyarnama*, which deals exclusively with the political history of Farrukh Siyar.

even matters relating to their private life were subjected to severe criticism.¹⁴ Bahadur Shah was blamed for his extreme munificence in lavishing gifts and privileges of office and power on undeserving persons.¹⁵ Jahandar Shah was depicted as a drunken profligate¹⁶ while Farrukh Siyar was called a prisoner of indecision.¹⁷ Muhammad Shah was accused for his indolence and intemperance which made him incapable of holding the self-seeking nobles under control.¹⁸ A number of *Ibrat Namahs* (Kamraj's, Mirza Mohammad's and Qasim Lahori's) were written in this period showing the political anarchy of this period.

Nevertheless, any act of insubordination on the part of the nobles was unbearable to the historians. They gave full vent to their indignation at the local leaders who made a bid to secure shares, compatible with their might in profits the empire could offer.¹⁹ In the struggle for supremacy between the centre and the provinces the historians are divided into two groups; some display enthusiastic partiality towards the Imperial Centre, while others lend their support to the local chieftains and provincial governors. Historians like Qasim Aurangabadi, Mansa Ram, author of *Maasir-i-Nizami*, Yusuf Mohammad Khan, author of

14 . Zahiruddin Mallick's article in Mohibbul Hasan's edited *Historians of Medieval India*, p. 176.

15 . Khafi Khan, vol. II, 601-2, 627-27; *Ibratnama*, Kamraj, f. 36a.

16 . Nuruddin Faruqui, *Jahandarnama*, Aligarh Rotograph, ff. 36-38.

17 . Mirza Mohammad, *Ibratnama*, Patna Ms 95-96.

18 . Yahya Khan, *Tazkirat-ul Muluk*, Aligarh Rotogrpah, f. 132b.

19 . *Mirat-i-Waridat* 644-45.

Tarikh-i-Fathiyah, and others who compiled their works in Deccan, supported the Nizam-ul Mulk in his conflict with the centre. But writers, like Ashub, Rustam Ali, Shafi Warid, Mirza Muhammad held the Imperialist point of view. It appears however, that their loyalty was to the Mughal crown and not to one who wore it.

In an atmosphere filled with faction feuds, historians felt constrained to take sides and advocate the cause of their group leaders and patrons.

The prolonged conflict between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyid brothers kept the Imperial Court in a state of almost continuous alarm and unrest while recording these momentous events the historians of 18th century seem to be sharply divided in their attitude to the selection of facts and their interpretations. A set of writers bitterly criticized the Saiyid brothers for their misdeeds; others on the contrary, lay the entire responsibility for all the evils of the government on the shoulders of Farrukh Siyar. The Saiyid brothers are referred to in disparaging terms for their acts of insubordination, inordinate ambition for power and their indifference to the actual discharge of administrative duties.²⁰ In like manner, Farrukh Siyar is accused of his feeble and fickle policies in dealing with the all powerful ministers.²¹

20 . Ahwal ul Khawaqin, f. 77a.

21 . Mirza Muhammad, Ibratnama, ff. 102-3.

Khafi Khan explicitly states that Farrukh Siyar committed a serious mistake in conferring the highest civil and military posts on Saiyid Abdullah and Hussain Ali who were untrained and inexperienced in administrative matters.²² On the other hand, Qasim Lahori, who calls himself a slave of the *Sadaat*, manifests enthusiastic partiality towards the Saiyids and holds the emperor responsible for driving the Saiyids to desperation by his breach of faith and intrigues against them.²³ Mirza Mohammad²⁴ and Shafi Warid²⁵ allege that nobles like Mir Jumla, a Mughal and Khan-I Dauran an Indian born Muslim, having become jealous of the rise of the Saiyid's to power, resolved to preserve their privileges by means of back stage intrigues. These nobles instigated the Emperor against the *Wazir* and the *Mir Bakhshi* and thus formented strife at the court.

Yahya Khan, the *Mir Munshi* of Farrukh Siyar, adds other factors which contributed to the widening of the rift between the king and his ministers. He writes that, apart from the dispute over appointments to the posts of *Wizarat Sadarat* and *Diwan*, Farrukh Siyar expressly disapproved of the introduction of *Ijaradari* and abolition of the *jiziyah*²⁶.

Muhammad Ashub surveys the whole situation from a sectarian point of

22 . Khafi Khan, 738.

23 . Tarikh-i-Saltanat-i-Farrukh Siyar ff. 1b, 2a, 66b.

24 . Ibratnama, f. 30.

25 . Mirat-i Waridat, 505.

26 . Tazkirat ul Muluk ff. 122, 124.

view. He ascribes the cause of the conflict to an outstanding hostility between the Mughals and the *Sadat* of Barha. According to him, the Saiyids monopolized all higher public employment, and the Mughals, the backbone of the Empire, faced unemployment and economic distress.²⁷

Rustam Ali Khan author of the *Tarikh-i Hindi*, a highly summarised and condensed work, glorifies the spectacular feats of gallantry performed by Husain Ali Khan. His acts of generosity and liberal patronage to saints and men of letters are also praised.²⁸ But Ashub prefers to ignore these achievements and virtues of Husaini Ali Khan. He takes pains to bring forth the vices of his character.²⁹ Worthy of note is the fact that nearly all historians fail to reveal the underlying pattern of Husain Ali's conciliatory policy towards Marathas, Rajputs and Jats. They betray a spirit of prejudice against the Saiyids and misrepresent their methods of dealing with the zamindars and the regional leaders. True, their system of alliances with the local potentates was envisaged to isolate Farrukh Siyar, but this indirectly contributed to make the royal authority paramount in areas where disorders on a wide scale prevailed.³⁰

27 . *Tarikh-i Sahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i Muhammad Shah*, ff. 70a, 43.

28 . *Tarikh-i Hindi*, 772.

29 . *Tarikh-i Sahadat-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julus-i-Muhammad Shah*, ff. 38, 42-43.

30 . Zahiruddin Mallick's article *Persian Historiography in 18th century* in Mohibul Hasan ed. *Historians of Medieval India*, Delhi, pp. 160-61.

The disgraceful deposition of Farrukh Siyar and his cruel treatment raised a storm of anger against the Saiyids. Not only the discontented nobles felt indignant at the wrongs done to the king, but the humble ranks of the society were also stirred to wrath.³¹

The victorious ministers dishonoured the Mughal throne filled public posts with their relations and adherents and inflicted severities on the person of the fallen monarch. Even those historians who had hitherto, justified the stand of the Saiyids suddenly changed their attitude and used harsh language in condemning them for these wicked acts. This is particularly true of Mirza Qasim Lahori³² and Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi³³.

In contradictions to their earlier observations with regard to the irresolute and weak-kneed policy of Farrukh Siyar these writers now censure the methods followed by the Saiyid brothers. Another significant issue on which the narrators of these events differ from one another, is the bitter struggle for supremacy between the Saiyids and the Muhgals. For an understanding of the origin, scope and nature of the clash of interests between the two groups of the ruling party, it is necessary to explain the historian's group alignments, his associations

31 . Shahnama-i-Munawwar Klam, f. 32b.

32 . Tarikh-i-Saltanat-i-Farrukh Siyar, ff. 76-77, 80.

33 . Ahwal-ul Khawaqin, 88a, 145b, ff. 152.

and source of inspiration which influenced his views. Most of the works were written either under the patronage of Muhammad Shah or the Nizam ul Mulk, the acknowledged leader of the Mughals. For instance Khafi Khan completed his work in the reign of Muhammad Shah and served for a long time under the Nizam-ul Mulk. Muhammad Bakhsh Ashub was a Mughal and he represents the Mughal view point in interpreting the scramble for power Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi, Ahsan Ijad Yusuf Muhammad Khan, Munim Khan Aurangabadi, Mansa Ram and others compiled their chronicles when the Nizam ul Mulk was at the zenith of his power.

These writers, as employees of the government in the Deccan, were bound by strong ties of personal loyalty to the Nizam-ul Mulk who patronized and encouraged them. The Saiyids have few historians to advocate their case. Rustam Ali Khan and Ghulam Husain Tabatabai³⁴ might be included in this list of the Saiyids supporters. Reflecting on these divergent opinions, Khafi Khan writes: 'in the times of Farrukh Siyar men have shown a partiality or animosity to one side or the other exceeding all bounds. They have looked to their own profit and loss, turned the reins of their imagination accordingly. The virtues of one side

34 . Ghulam Hussain Tabatabai, *Siyar-ul Mutakhhirin* (text) Calcutta II, 1836, 21-22, 30, 37-39.

they have turned into faults, while they have shut their eyes to the faults of the others'.³⁵

Khafi Khan, in spite of his tall claims to honesty and frankness in recording events, could not conceal his sympathies for the Nizam-ul Mulk. He tries to gloss over the faults of his patron and finds faults with his enemies. He holds that the Nizamul Mulk was averse to the idea of calling Saiyid brothers as *namak-ba haram* and *haram namak*.³⁶ But the Nizam ul Mulk himself used these abusive terms for the two brothers in each and every *arzdasht* and letter he sent to the Emperor and to his friends and subordinates.³⁷ Reflecting on rumours that Saiyid Abdullah Khan was poisoned to death at the instigation of the Nizam ul Mulk, Khafi Khan tried to defend the position of his patron. Without going deep into the matter and investigating the truth, he concluded that God alone knew the reality.

35 . Khafi Khan, 726.

36 . Ibid., 940.

37 . Munshat-I Musavi Khan, ff. 48, 51.

Chapter 2

*Barha Saiyids in Mughal
Nobility*

CHAPTER – 2

BARHA SAIYIDS IN THE MUGHAL NOBILITY

When Akbar took over the reins of government personally and was faced with opposition in his nobility he seems to have turned to the Rajputs and the Indian Muslims to counter the old nobility.¹ The rise of the Barha Saiyids, who were admitted in large numbers after the overthrow of Bairam Khan should be seen in this context.

The Barha Saiyids were one of the largest and most influential group among Indian Muslim (Sheikhzadas) in the Mughal nobility. They were admitted in the Mughal service in the reign of Akbar and within a very short period by sheer dint of their military ability and prowess in the battle field they came to enjoy an important place at the court.

During the reign of Jahangir and Shahjahan, they considerably improved their position both in terms of *mansabs* and offices that they were offered specially during Shahjahan's reign.

A brief history of the family along with the list of Barha *mansabdars* of Akbar was prepared by Blochmann. References about

1 . Iqtidar Alam Khan; The Nobility of Akbar and the Development of his Religious Policy', JRAS, 1968, 29-30.

them have been made in all most all important contemporary and near contemporary sources.²

According to their traditions, Abul Farah, the ancestor of Barha Saiyids left Medina because of the persecution of the contemporary rulers and came to Wasit in Iraq and then migrated to Ghaznin. Traditionally, it is claimed that from Ghazni his four sons arrived in to India in the army of Shihabuddin Ghauri. These four sons Saiyid Abul Fazl, Saiyid Abul Fuzail, Saiyid Daud, Saiyid Najmuddin settled in Tihanpur, Chatbanauri, Jajner and Kundli³ villages in the Punjab. The families retained these names when they migrated to localities within the present Muzaffarnagar District of Uttar Pradesh and are still known by these names.

Several views are given about the derivation of their name Barha. One view is based on their preference to live outside (*Bahir*) the city of Delhi. Another opinion is that it is taken from ‘Abrar’ i.e., the Pure Saiyid”. Still another view is that since they were shias and followers of twelve Imams, they called themselves ‘Barhas’.⁴ Jahangir in his memoirs writes that, “they call twelve *bara* in Hindi. As in the

2. References of Barha Saiyids could be found in the following works – *Akbarnama*, *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, *Zakhiratul Khawanin*, *Ain-I Akbari*. I (tr). Notes on Barha Saiyids. Statistical Discriptive and Historical Account of North West Provinces of India, vol. III, Muzaffarnagar district; District Gazetteers of United Provinces, Muzaffarnagar District.

3. Nevill, p. 160.

4. Ibid., p. 161.

Duab there are twelve villages near each other which are the native country of these Saiyids, they have become known as Saiyids of Barha".⁵

In the course of their stay in the region, they developed considerable influence over local zamindars. It appears that before joining Mughal service, some of the Saiyids were in the service of Afghans and had enjoyed some position with them. However, it had not been possible to trace the position of Barha Saiyids before Mughals. According to local traditions they worked as menial servants in the army of Hamayun.⁶

From the *Ain* also we could not gather whether they possessed *zamindari* rights in the villages, as in its listing of *zamindar* castes in *sarkar* of Saharnapur, it enters Saiyids in some *parganas*, but the Saiyids of Barha are not recorded as *zamindars* anywhere.⁷

There was a controversy during the reign of Akbar and Jahangir regarding their geneology. Once, in the court of Akbar, some nobles questioned Saiyid Mahmud Barha about his ancestry, Saiyid Mahmud jumped in a fire nearby saying that since he was a true Saiyid, the fire

5. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, p. 366.

6. Nevill, p. 162.

7. *Ain-i Akbari*, II (tr.) see account of twelve subas.

would not hurt him.⁸ Jahangir himself notes that some people make remarks about their lineage but their bravery is convincing proof of their being Saiyid.⁹ Saiyid Mahmud Barha of the Kundliwal House was the first Barha Saiyid to have joined Mughal service. Before entering the Mughal service, he was in the employment of Sikander Afghan. He deserted Sikander during the siege of Mankot and came over to the Mughals. It is said he joined the personal service of Bairam Khan.¹⁰ When Bairam Khan sent an advance guard under the command of Khan-i-zaman, Saiyid Mahmud was also despatched with him.¹¹ After the victory at Panipat in 1556, he was despatched alongwith Shah Qali Mahram against Haji Khan in the expedition against Ajmer in 1556.¹² The famous episode that after annexation of Ajmer, one of the Commander said that it was the Iqbal (fortune) of the king that the victory was achieved. Syed Mehmud took out his sword in presence of Emperor and exclaimed No your Majesty Iqbal was not there. I was there, and instrumental in victory. His sons Syed Hashim, Syed Qasim were given *jagir* in haweli Ajmer¹³. In 1558 he was despatched alongwith Adham Khan against the rebellions Bahaduriya tribes of

8 . Zakhirat ul Khawanin, vol. I, p. 189.

9 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 362-364.

10 . *Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh*, vol. II, p. 18, *Maasir ulUmara*, vol. II, pp. 375-377.

11 . *Akbarnama*, vol. III < p. 33.

12 . *Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh*, vol. II, pp. 46.46. *Maasir ulUmara*, vol. II, pp. 375-377.

13 . Abdul Bari Mani, *Asanidus Sanadid*, pp. 11-13.

Hatkant. He was also deputed for the conquest of the fort Jaitaram in Jodhpur.¹⁴ Later on when the Emperor was alienated from Bairam Khan, he joined imperial service and received a *jagir* in Delhi.¹⁵ It appears that Saiyid Mahmud joined the Mughal service as a political gamble, because he found the position of the Afghans to be very precarious. But except him no other Barha Saiyid is noticed in our sources till after the overthrow of Bairam Khan.

However, when the reins of government came into the hands of the Emperor and he was faced with opposition in his nobility, he seems to have introduced two new elements of Indian origin viz. the Rajputs and the Indian Muslims to counter the old nobility.

In the siege of Chittor which was personally supervised by the emperor, the Saiyids of Barha fought bravely and Saiyid Jamaluddin, son of Saiyid Ahmad Khan Barha was killed when a mine exploded.¹⁶

In the Gujarat campaign, Saiyid Mahmud Barha, Saiyid Ahmad Khan, Saiyid Qasim and Saiyyid Hashim were dispatched to accompany the advance guard of Khan Kalan.

After the conquest of Gujarat, an army was sent under Man Singh, Saiyid Mahmud and others for the conquest of Surat, which was

14 . Akbarnama, vol. II, p. 78. Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, p. 78.

15 . Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 375-377.

16 . Akbarnama, vol. II, p. 317; Ma'asir-ul Umara, vol. II, p. 379.

under the occupation of the Mirzas. Akbar, too joined, the campaign and in a fierce battle at Sarnal, Ibrahim Husani Mirza was defeated and put to flight.¹⁷ After the victory at Sarnal the Emperor alongwith Saiyid Mahmud and other Barha Saiyids marched to conquer Surat.¹⁸ While the operations were in progress, the Mirzas tried to create commotion near Pattan. Ibrahim Hasan attempted to surprise Agra. Akbar sent Saiyid Mahmud, Shah Quli Mahram and Bhagwan Das to intercept the rebels.¹⁹

After the defeat of Mirzas, Khan-i Alam along with Saiyid Qasim Barha was deputed to pursue Muhammad Husain Mirza who had fled to Deccan.²⁰ After the completion of the conquest of Gujarat, Saiyid Mahmud returned to the court along with Akbar, but Saiyid Ahmad, Saiyid Qasim and Saiyid Hashim were left in Gujrat.

Soon after Akbar's departure, Gujrat was again invaded by the rebels and Mirza Aziz Koka was besieged. On hearing this, Akbar personally marched towards Ahmadabad. A strong advance guard was formed under Man Singh, Bhagwant Das, Saiyid Mahmud and other Braha Saiyids.²¹ In the battle fought against Muhammad Husain Mirza, the Barha Saiyids were in the centre under the command of Mirza Khan.

17 . Akbarnama, vol. II, ep. 11-16; Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. P. 141.

18 . Akbarnama, vol. II, p. 19.

19 . Ibid., vol. III, p. 23.

20 . Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 147-149; Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 378-79.

21 . Akhbarnama, vol. II, pp. 41-43. Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 164-190.

The centre was responsible for the great victory, and in the battle Saiyid Mahmud and Rai Singh distinguished themselves.²²

In the same year after the reconquest of Guajrat, Saiyid Mahmud along with Amroha Saiyids, were sent against the rebel Madhukar. Saiyid Mahmud behaved courageously and brought the country to order. Shortly afterwards Saiyid Mahmud died.²³

In 1576 Man Singh was sent against Rana Pratap of Mewar. He was accompanied by Saiyid Ahmad, Saiyid Qasim, Saiyid Hashim, Saiyid Raja and a number of other Barha Saiyids. Some of the Barha Saiyids under the command of Saiyid Hashim numbering eighty were in the vanguard, and Saiyid Ahmad commanded the right wing. There was severe fighting and Saiyids reputedly threw the valour of Rajputs into the shade. Badauni who had personally witnessed the fighting remarks, “that if Saiyids would have not held ground the affair would have turned disgraceful.”²⁴

Later on in 1577 another army under the command of Shahbaz Khan Kamboh was sent against Rana Pratap, Man Singh, Raja Bhagwan Das, Saiyid Raju, Saiyid Qasim and Saiyid Hashim were ordered to accompany him.²⁵

22 . Akbarnama, vol. III, pp. 47-49.

23 . Akbarnama, vol. III, pp. 143-44

24 . Abarnama, vol. III, pp. 166-167, 174-176; Muntakhab-ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 228, 230-234; Maasir ul Umara, vol. III, p. 403-404.

25 . Abarnama, vol. III, pp. 318-19; Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 409-410.

In 1580, Saiyid Hashim and Saiyid Qasim were ordered to march against Chandrasen, son of Maldeo who had rebelled. After a fight they expelled him from the imperial territory.²⁶

It appears that until 1584, Saiyid Hashim and Saiyid Qasim remained at Ajmer serving in the imperial armies. They were also granted *jagir* in the *suba*.²⁷ However, in 1580 they were appointed with Abdur Rahim Mirza Khan to Gujrat who was called upon to chastise Mzuaffar Gujrati.²⁸ The vanguard of the army was commanded by the Barha Saiyids. In the battle fought at Sarkhij Saiyid Hashm was killed and Saiyid Qasim was severely wounded. Mirza Khan achieved a great victory but Muzaffar escaped.²⁹

During the year 1587 and 1588 the Saiyids of Barha under Saiyid Qasim and Nizamuddin fought many battles against Muzaffar, and the *Jam* the ruler of lesser Kutch, and achieved much success.

In 1590, Gujrat was assigned to Mirza Aziz Koka. The Saiyids remained there during his tenure of office and fought in every battle against Muzaffar, their place being as usual in the vanguard. Apart from Saiyid Qasim, Saiyid Bayazid, Saiyid Salim, Saiyid Bahadur and Saiyid Mustapha are also referred to during this period.³⁰

26 . Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 409-410.

27 . Akbarnama, vol. III, pp. 409-410, 413-414; Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 409-410.

28 . Akbarnama, vol. III, p. 425; Mintakhab ul Tawarikh, vol. II, pp. 331-32; Maasir-ul Umara, vol. II, p. 409-410.

29 . Akbarnama, vol. III, pp. 452-454; Maasirul Umara, vol. I, 409-410.

30 . Akbarnama, vol. III, p. 608-609 and 633-634.

In the year 1591-92 where Abdur Rahim Khan Khanan was dispatched for the conquest of Thatta, the Barha Saiyids also accompanied. When in 1591, Murad was appointed governor of Malwa, Saiyid Raju was placed under him.³¹ After some time Murad was deputed to the Deccan. Saiyid Raju, Saiyid Qasim and other Barha Saiyids escorted the prince under Abdur Rahim Khan Khanan.³²

After the death of Murad, command of the Deccan forces was given to Daniyal in 1599, in the same year Saiyid Qasim was killed.³³ In 1600, Shaikh Farid Bukhari along with a big army which included a contingent of Barha Saiyids was sent to besiege Asirgarh.³⁴

After 1600, no reference about Barha nobles is available until the last days of Akbar. It appears that during this period Shaikh Farid Bukhari was their principal mentor.

During the last days of Akbar a conspiracy was hatched by Aziz Koka and Man Singh to arrest Salim and enthrone his son Khusrau. But Shaikh Farid Bukhari collected his Barha soldiers and went to offer allegiance to Prince Salim.³⁵ The great support rendered by the Barha was generously awarded by Jahangir after his accession Saiyid Ali

31 . Ibid., vol. II, pp. 402-403.

32 . Akbarnama, vol. III, pp. 698-699; Maasir ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 400-403.

33 . Akbarnama, vol. III, p. 767.

34 . Ibid., vol. III, pp. 797-798.

35 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 13-14; Ma'asir-ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 410-411.

Asghar who was in personal service of the Prince was promoted to the rank of 3000 and was given the title of Saif Khan.³⁶

In 1605, Prince Khusrau rebelled. An army under the command of Shaikh Farid along with a contingent of Barha Saiyids under Saif Khan and Saiyid Jalal was sent against him. The battle was unusually severe and the Barha and Bukhara Saiyids had to bear the brunt of the fight. The Barhas, as usual, were in the vanguard and at one stage about 50 or 60 of them had to face some 1500 Badakhshis. Later, in 1609 Saif Khan was assigned the *faujdari* of Hissar and received a further promotion to the rank of 2500/1350.³⁷

In 1610, certain Barha nobles such as Adam Barha and Saiyid Ali both from Gujrat were favoured. Next year Saiyid Adam was killed while fighting against the Afghan chief, Usman in Bengal.³⁸

In 1613, prince Khurram was sent against Rana of Mewar. It appears that Saif Khan was also deputed with him, because at his request the *mansab* of Saif Khan was increased to 3000/1500.

Hizabr Khan Barha was also deputed to the same expedition. In 1615, Saif Khan Barha, Saiyid Ali Barha and Abdullah Barha were raised to the rank of 3,000/1000, 1500/1000, and 700/450 respectively.

36 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p. 30; Maasir-ul Umara, vol. II, pp. 410-411.

37 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 86-87.

38 . Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, 86-87, 166, 209-210. Saiyid Ali was promoted to the rank 1500/700.

In the following year (1616) Saiyid Qasim, son of Saiyid Dilawar, was also promoted to the rank of 800/450.³⁹

In 1616 news of the death of Saif Khan was conveyed to the Emperor. He had died in the Deccan, which suggests that he was transferred to the Deccan from Ajmer along with Prince Khurram when the latter was appointed viceroy of the Deccan. His two sons, Ali Muhammad and Bahadur were given ranks of 600/400 and 400/200 respectively and his nephew Saiyid Ali Barha was also promoted to the rank of 1000/600.⁴⁰

In 1617 Saiyid Abdullah came from the Deccan with the news of the peace reached with the Deccanis. He was given a *jagir* worth 2,000,000 *dams* in return for communicating this joyful news to the emperor, and received the title of Saif Khan.⁴¹

While the Emperor was in Gujrat in 1618, he promoted certain Barha nobles who were serving in that province. Saiyid Hizabr Khan was promoted to the rank of 1000/400, Saiyid Bayazid and others were also rewarded in the like manner. In the same year Safi Barha and his brethren were killed in the Kangra campaign against Surajmal.⁴²

39 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 188-189.

40 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 159, 163; Maasirul Umara, vol. II, pp. 410-411.

41 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, 1888-89.

42 . Afzal Husain, Nobility under akbar and jahangir, pp. 112-113.

In 1622, Khurram was ordered to march to Qandhar with all his troops. But the prince who had developed ulterior motives proposed to remain in Mandu till the rainy season. The message of Khurram was not appreciated by the Emperor because of the growing pressure of Persians. Therefore he ordered the prince to send immediately all great amirs, the Barha and Bukhari Saiyids to court.⁴³ It is not known whether he complied with the orders, but certain Barha nobles were with him when he openly rebelled. Saiyid Muzaffar Khan and Saiyid Shujaat Khan, who were in the personal servers of the prince, are referred to in all our sources.⁴⁴

But at the same time many of the Barha nobles remained loyal to the Emperor. When the Imperial armies were deputed to fight the rebels, in the battle of Bilochpur, the Barha Saiyids were placed under the command of Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung. Although Abdullah Khan deserted in the midst of the battle, the Barhas remained firm and loyal and many of them were killed in the battle. After the battle, Saiyid Bahwa was promoted to the rank of 2000/1500.⁴⁵

When an army was appointed to pursue the rebels under Parvez and Mahabat Khan along with others, Hizabr Khan was also sent with them.⁴⁶ After that we have very little information regarding activities of

43 . Zakhiratul Khawanin, vol. III, pp. 10-12 and pp. 13-15.

44 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 357-358; Maasir-i Jahangiri, vol. I, pp. 493-494.

45 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp. 360-361, Maasir-i Jahangiri, vol. II, pp. 415-416.

46 . Zakhiratul Khawanin, vol. III, pp. 10-12; Maasir-ul Umara, vol. I, p. 758, II, pp. 423-424.

Barhas. However, in the rebel camp Shuja'at Khan and Muzaffar Khan accompanied all along in his marches. When the prince proceeded towards Bengal, Muzaffar Khan fought a battle with Ibrahim Khan Fateh Jang and defeated him, the Saiyid remained loyal to Khurram throughout.⁴⁷ But Shujaat Khan left the prince after Shahjahan's defeat at the battle of Tons and when he came to know that the princes wished to proceed to Iran he went home.⁴⁸

Khurram after being defeated fled towards the Deccan. As Bhim was killed at Bilochpur, he made over the Suba of Gujrat to Abdullah Khan, who, in turn appointed his servant Wafadar to take charge. The officers of Gujrat under Mirza Safi and Diler Khan Barha expelled Wafadar. When Abdullah Khan came to know of it, he rushed to defend Ahmedabad, but he was also defeated by Safi (later Saif Khan)⁴⁹ and Diler Khan Barha. For his meritorious service Diler Khan was promoted to the rank of 2000/1200.⁵⁰ It was at this stage that Jahangir remarked on their bravery and quoted Aziz Koka as saying that the 'Saiyids of Barha were the averters of calamity for the Mughal dominion', and added that such was in reality the case.⁵¹

47 . Zakhiratul Khawanin, vol. III, pp. 13-15, Maasir ul Umara, vol. I, p. 758; II, pp. 423-424.

48 . Maasir ul Zumara, I, 758, II, 423-4.

49 . He was an Irani officer.

50 . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, 362-4, 366.

51 . Ibid., 269.

The progress of events suggests that the Barhas had some sympathy for Khruram. When Jahangir died, Diler Khan who was in Gujrat was the first to come forward and rendered homage to Shah Jahan. Hizabr Khan was with Asaf Khan at the time of Jahangir's death, and fought against Shahryar. It appears that Shahjahan also had great regard for them. After his accession no less than seven persons of the Barha families were promoted. Saiyid Shujaat Khan who had deserted him was recalled from his home town and granted a *mansab* of 4,000/400,2000 *du aspa Sih aspa*.⁵²

From the above discussion we can safely say that the Barha Saiyids exercised influence on the Mughal nobility in a significant way. Hence their role in the war of succession during the illness of Shahjahan in 1658 and at the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 and subsequently, can be put in proper perspective. During the illness of Shahjahan and the ensuing war of succession, Barha Saiyids were divided into four camps. Saiyid Sher Khan Barha, Saiyid Salabat Khan Barha, Saiyid Salar Barah, Saiyid Masud Barha, Saiyid Najabat Khan Barha. Saiyid Munawwar Barha, and Saiyid Nahar Khan Barha were in Dara's camp. Saiyid Sultan Barha and Saiyid Qasim Barha were holding the charge of Banaras and Allaahbad forts on behalf of Dara respectively.⁵³

52 . Afzal Husain, pp. 114-115.

53 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, pp. 65-126 and 207; Amal-I Saleh, vol. III, pp. 459-464.

Aurangzeb's camp consisted of Saiyid Sherzaman, Saiyid Muzaffar Khan, son of Shujaat Khan, and Saiyid Zafar⁵⁴ and Saiyid Feroz Barha. Saiyid Mansur Barha, Saiyid Hasan Barha s/o Saiyid Sher Khan Barha were serving under Murad Bakshi.⁵⁵ Saiyid Alam Barha was with Shuja.⁵⁶

Prince Shuja crowned himself and assumed the title of Nasiruddin Timur III, without wasting any time he marched out at the head of a large army which included a corps of Barha Saiyids under Saiyid Alam Barha.⁵⁷ At Bahadurpur (five miles away from Banaras) he was defeated by the Imperial army commanded by Jai Singh and Diler Khan Rohela under the overall command of Dara's son, Sulaiman Shikoh. In the meantime, Jaswant Singh had suffered a defeat at Dharmat. As situation was critical, orders came from the court to come to term with Shuja and hasten back to Court as early as possible. Therefore, Orissa Bengal and Mongheyra was given to Shuja.

In February, 1658 the forces of Murad Baksh joined Aurangzeb near Ujjain. The imperial forces sent under the command of Jaswant Singh to contain the combined forces of Murad Baksh and Aurangzeb failed to pursue the princes to return to their respective assignment.

54 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, p. 49; Muntakhab-ul Lubab, vol. II, pp. 40-45.

55 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, p. 139.

56 . Ibid., vol. I, p. 239.

57 . Maasir-ul Umara, vol. II, p. 456.

Ultimately a battle was fought at Dharmat in April, 1658. On the side of Aurangzeb Saiyid Sherzaman and Saiyid Mansur served under Muhammad Sultan who was incharge of artillery⁵⁸ and Saiyid Sher Khan with his barha retainers⁵⁹ accompanied the imperial army. Jaswant Singh was defeated because of lack of coordination in the Imperial army. Aurangzeb and Murad Baksh achieved an important victory and rewarded to those officers who had shown loyalty and valour. Saiyid Sherzaman was given the title of Muzaffar Khan.⁶⁰

After the battle of Dharmat, Aurangzeb marched towards Agra and in the battle fought at Samugarh in May 1658, Saiyid Muzaffar Khan, Saiyid Hasan, Saiyid Mansur and other Barha Saiyid were in the vanguard of combined army led by Aurangzeb.⁶¹ On the other hand, Saiyid Sher Khan Saiyid Munawar, Saiyid Zafar, Saiyid Nahar Khan, Saiyid Ismail Barha, Saiyid Fazil Barha, and Saiyid Shaikhan were in the imperial army under the command of Dara Shikoh.⁶² A fierce battle took place in which the imperial army under Dara was decisively defeated and Dara fled from the battle field. Saiyid Nahar Khan, Saiyid Ismail and Saiyid Fazil Barha were wounded in the battle field and

58 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, pp. 47-63.

59 . Ibid., vol. I, p. 65.

60 . Ibid., vol. I, p. 65.

61 . Ibid., vol. I, pp. 92-93.

62 . Ibid., vol. I, pp. 96-107.

Saiyid Shaikhan Barha was killed.⁶³ After the defeat of Dara at Samugarh, Saiyid Sher Khan and Saiyid Munawwar deserted Dara and joined Aurangzeb.⁶⁴ About the same time Aurangzeb sent Khan-i Dauran to replace Saiyid Qasim Barha⁶⁵ who was holding the fort of Allahabad on behalf of Dara. Aurangzeb had directed Khan-i Dauran that if Saiyid Qasim handed over the fort without offering any resistance, he was to be conciliated and sent immediately to the Court.

After the imprisonment of Murad Baksh in 1658 Saiyid Feroz Barha, Saiyid Mansur Barha who were with Murad Baksh also came over to Aurangzeb and entered his service. They were confirmed in their previous ranks.⁶⁶

Free from the danger of Murad Baksh and strengthened by a large addition to his army Aurangzeb set out in pursuit of Dara. At Dorai (Ajmer) Dara was completely routed by Aurangzeb's army and in haste ran away to Delhi leaving all his beg and baggage. But Dara was so frightened that he left Delhi without waiting for Sulaiman Shikoh and proceeded towards Lahore. Aurangzeb captured Delhi without fighting and again started in his pursuit. In the meantime Dara reached Lahore, but when he came to know that Aurangzeb had crossed Bias, he fled to

63 . Ibid., vol. I, pp. 104-107.

64 . Ibid., vol. I, p. 115.

65 . Muntakhab-ul Lubab, vol. II, p. 35.

66 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, pp. 139-140, Muntakhab ul Lubab, vol. II, p. 39.

Multan. Aurangzeb now pushed forward and reached Multan only to know that Dara had gone to Bhakker. Now Aurangzeb was convinced that Dara position was hopeless, he returned to Agra. In this whole campaign Saiyid Munawar, Saiyid Masud and Saiyid Mansur along with their Barha retainers accompanied Aurangzeb.⁶⁷ Sulaiman Shikoh, son of Dara Shikoh, being deserted by many officers, was also wandering in search of a shelter. He was left with barely two hundred adherents including Saiyid Qasim Barha.⁶⁸

Shuja was the last serving contender to the throne of Delhi. Although he had been defeated at Bahadurpur by Jai Singh but because of the defeat of Dara at Samugarh situation changed and Shuja was able to re-establish himself. Now after re-equipping his army he marched forward to be challenged by Aurangzeb at Khajwa near Allahabad. As mentioned above Saiyid Qasim Barha, qiledar of Allahabad and Abdul Jalil Barha qiledar of Chunar had also joined him on the instruction of Dara.⁶⁹

The battle of Khajwa took place on December 1658. It is quite to note that advance guard of both the armies comprised of noted Barha Saiyids who exhibited their traditional valour and fought with great

67 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, pp. 203-209.

68 . Ibid., vol. I, p. 170.

69 . Ibid., vol. Im, pp. 239-240; Muntakhab ul Lubab, vol. II, p. 46.

determination.⁷⁰ However, Aurangzeb's army defeated Shuja who fled towards Jahangirnagar (Bengal).

On reaching there Shuja began to collect both men and artillery. Prince Muhammad Sultan along with Muzaffar Khan Saiyid Zafar and others were deputed in pursuit of Shuja. Prince Shuja fought two or three severe battle and was defeated every time. Saiyid Alam Barha along with other Barha Saiyids remained firm in loyalty and created all kinds of hurdles against Muhammad Sultan's army.⁷¹ Ultimately, Shuja fled towards Aracan along with Saiyid Alam Barha and ten other Barha Saiyids.⁷²

From the above discussion it becomes quite clear that at the beginning of the war of succession very few Barha Saiyids were in the camp of Aurangzeb. But it was not because Aurangzeb was hostile to them or Barha were not inclined towards the other princes. Actually the contending princes were commanding nobles who were posted with them by the Mughal emperor. It was just a matter of chance that only few Barha Saiyids were posted in the Deccan with Aurangzeb. However, when Sahahjahan ordered him to suspend the campaign

70 . Saiyid Mansur, Saiyid Masud, Saiyid Sher Khan, Saiyed Zabardast, Saiyid ali Akbar Barha, Yadgar Husain, Karamullah Barha, Saiyid Shams Barha, Saiyid Muzaffar Khan Barha, Saiyid Najabal Khan Barha were put under the command of Muhammad Sultan and Saiyid Alam Barha. Saiyid Qasim, Saiyid Jalil were in the vanguard of Shuja army. See Alamgirnama, vol. I, pp. 235-236, Muntakhab ul Lubab, vol. II, pp. 48-55.

71 . Alamgirnama, vol. I, pp. 541-550.

72 . Ibid., vol. I, p. 561; Muntakhab ul Lubab, vol. II, p. 110.

against Adil Shah and send back immediately commanders to the Court, some Barha Saiyids preferred to remain with Aurangzeb. The Barha Saiyids fought bravely in battles of Bahadurpur (Jan. 1658), Dharmat (April, 1658), Samugarh (May 1658) and Khajwa (Dec. 1658), on both sides Aurangzeb gladly admitted Barha Saiyids in his service once he got better of his brothers, because he was eager to expand his support base. They were not only confirmed in their previous ranks but promoted to higher ranks and some of them were rewarded with drums of honour and horses. Their services were utilized in important military campaigns. The Barhas after going over to Aurangzeb, on their part served him with loyalty and distinction.

A case in point may be taken as that of Saiyid Abdullah Khan popularly known as Saiyid Mian, father of Saiyid brothers. Despite being on the side of Dara during the war of succession, his courage and conviction for Dara's cause was acknowledged by Aurangzeb, who gave him mansab and attached him with Ruhullah Khan the chief *bakshi* and later on with prince Muazzam in Deccan. He was sent on many assignments, the important being the siege of Golconda, and last but not least was the *Subahdari* of Bijapur and then of Ajmer, where he died.

Here mention is being made that generally the Sadat-i-Barha got their appointments in *subah* and city of Ajmer from where they served

the imperialists in campaign against local chieftains and even went upto Gujarat for the imperial cause. Their *jagir*, too were Ajmer. Perhaps keeping in view their ancestry and religious sanctity of Ajmer due to the dargah of Khwaja Sahib. They were given such kind of privileges which is evident that in the eighteenth century the famous Saiyid of Barha had a very close link with Ajmer.

Chapter 3

*Struggle for the Throne and
the Changing Role of
Nobility*

CHAPTER – 3

STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF NOBILITY

A struggle for the throne was in the tradition of the Chaghtai Turks in India ever since the time of Humayun. Sometimes it was a fratricidal war, sometimes it partook of the nature of a rebellion of a son against the father. Whatever the form, the nobles played an important, sometimes a decisive role in such civil wars.

Aurangzeb's death on 3 March 1707¹ at Amadnagar in Deccan signaled the outbreak of a fratricidal war among his three surviving sons, Prince Muazzam, Muhammad Azam and Kam Bakhsh. The eldest brother got the better of the two and defeated and killed Muhammad Azam at Jajau, 18 June 1707² and Kam Bakhsh (near Hyderabad, 13 January 1709).³ Muazzam assumed the title of Bahadur Shah I. An elderly man (over 63 years of age) the new emperor was not fitted for the role of an active leader. "He was the last emperor", writes Sidney Owen, "of whom anything favourable can be said. He was free from some of the worst defects or vices of his successors, whom he did excel in several respect. Unlike all of them he was accustomed to an active

1 . Bhimsen, *Nuskha-i-Dilkusha*, f, 161a.

2 . For details, Khafi Khan II, 576-578; Kamraj, *Azam-ul Harb*, 227-230.

3 . William Irvine, *Later Mughals I*, 58-64.

camp life. He freely exercised his own discretion in public affairs, selecting his own *Wazir*, a fairly able and experienced man of business and other ministers and governor. He frequently moved out of Delhi to conduct military campaigns himself, which very few of his successors actually did. Khafi Khan has praised his generosity good nature and sense of forgiveness. He could not say 'no' to anybody. In fact he was extremely soft by nature. His character was a complete contrast to that of his father but it somewhat resembled Dara's.

Whether it was the outcome of statesmanship or weakness, the new emperor favoured a pacific policy. The Maratha *sarkar*, Shahu who had been in Mughal captivity since 1689 was released and allowed to return to Maharashtra. Peace was made with the Rajput chiefs confirming them in their states. However, Bahadur Shah was forced to take action against the Sikhs whose new leader Banda Bahadur had become a terror for government and the Muslims in the Punjab. Banda was defeated at Lohgarh and the Mughal forces reoccupied Sirhind in January 1711; however the Sikhs were neither conciliated nor crushed.

It was during the reign of Bahadur Shah that the *Wazir* became the most powerful minister and the most important man in the State. Munim Khan who held that office had great influence over the royal mind and his counsels had more weight with him than that of other

ministers. His powers and functions contended beyond the jurisdiction of the revenue department, he took active part in all the campaigns fought in this period. He overshadowed the *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*, Asad Khan and drove him into the background.⁴

Though Bahadur Shah gave the impression of being a weak and feeble king, he kept the nobles under restraint and did not allow the reins of government to slip from his grasp. With courage and foresight he successfully resisted the plans of Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan to concentrate all executive powers in their own family.⁵ Bahadur Shah, by utilizing the services of the princes, maintained the dignity and strength of the monarchy and shielded it from encroachment by ambitious ministers. Under him the monarchy faced no crisis; it commanded respect and inspired awe as in the past. With his death on 27 February 1712 at Lahore, however, began the long and bitter struggle for the *Wizarat* which became the keynote of Mughal History in subsequent years.

His death was immediately followed by a new war of succession among the princes even before his body was buried.⁶

4 . Khafi Khan, II, 602.

5 . Khafi Khan, II, 677-78.

6 . When the war of succession was over, his dead body was brought to Delhi and buried in the courtyard of the Alamgir mosque near the tomb of Khwaja Qutubuddin Kaki. Later Mughals, Irvine, I,135.

Muizzuddin (Jahandar Shah), the eldest was negligent and slack, and had neither money nor troops. The second son, Azim us Shan, the ablest amongst Aurangzeb's grandson outshone his rivals in ability, influence and power. He was the favourite and influential counsellor of his father. As a governor of Bengal (1697-1706) he became the wealthiest and strongest. The third son, Rafi-us-Shan was jealous of him. The youngest, Jahan shah, was, an invalid. Thus Azim us Shan was 'the destined victor' in the impending Civil war.

It came as a matter of course. The problem of succession was ultimately connected with the problem of the *Wizarat*. Zulfiqar Khan, the Mir Bakhshi who was regularly but unsuccessfully pressing his claim for *wizarat* after the death of Munim Khan in 1711, again aspired to become *Wazir*. To realize his own ambition he interfered in the struggle for succession and adopted new tactics. First, in order to check Azim-us-Shan whom he regarded as his chief obstacle, Zulfiqar tried to form an anti-Azim-us-Shan league of the three other princes. It was really a struggle between 'the most powerful prince and the most powerful noble'. In this respect the civil war after Bahadur Shah's death was different from previous civil wars. But being uncertain of the issue, Zulfiqar approached Azim-us-Shan for a settlement. The latter not only refused but asked Zulfiqar to submit to himself. Thereupon Zulfiqar

drew up a scheme of partition of the empire excluding Azimus Shan. Jahan Shah was to get the entire Deccan: Rafi-us-Shan was to be given Multan, Thattah, Bhakkar, Kabul and Kashmir i.e., northwestern India: Jahandar Shah would get the rest of India and become its emperor, coins were to be issued in Jahandar's name and the *Khutbah* was to be read in his name. Zulfiqar would remain the common *Wazir*, stay at the Court with Jahandar Shah, and exercise the functions through deputies. In other words there was to be decentralization within the empire. The eldest brother would represent and symbolise the unity of the empire with the *Wazir* as its hub or pivot. The emperor would reign, the *Wazir* would rule. This was wholly a novel feature.⁷ But everything depended on the success of the war. The issue really hinged on who would succeed, Azim-us-Shan or Zulfiqar? In a sense Azimus Shan destroyed his bright chances by miscalculation. Like Azam he despised his rivals and met the same fate.

Zulfiqar Khan seized the initiative, cut off Azim us-shan from Lahore and capturing money and artillery stored up there, attacked him on the bank of the Ravi by a numerically superior army and artillery even before the expected reinforcements from Turani noble Chin Qilich Khan could come. The defeat of the most powerful aspirant was entirely

7. Cf. J.N. Sarkar, pp. 13-16.

due to the vigour and policy of Zulfiqar, the mastermind of the league. After the defeat and death of Azimus Shan, however, the three brothers quarreled over the division of the spoils. Zulfiqar Khan favoured the weak and pleasure loving Jahandar as that would give him a free hand. The support of Zulfiqar was the most decisive factor in the victory of Jahandar over the other two brothers who were ultimately defeated (end of March 1712), Jahandar Shah ascended the throne on 29 March 1712.⁸ The emperor appointed Zulfiqar Khan, to whose zealous efforts he owed his crown, as the *Wazir*, and retained his father, Asad Khan in the office of *Wakil-i-Mutlaq*.⁹ During his eleven months rule, Jahandar Shah showed complete indifference to the affairs of the State and administrative business. The general supervision and control over the administration was exercised by the *Wazir* and the *Mir Bakshi*. In the words of a contemporary writer: “The Emperor’s prestige was undermined and awe for him vanished from the hearts of the people”.¹⁰ The impression created on the minds of the people was that the king reigned but did not rule and that real power rested with the ministers.¹¹

8 . For details of this war of succession: Khafi Khan, II, 685-88. Kamraj-bin-Nain Singh, *Ibrat Namah*, ff. 45-46.

9 . The mansabs of Zulfiqar Khan and Asad Khan were increased to 10,000/10,000 and 12,000/12,000 respectively. Zulfiqar Khan retained the governorship of Deccan and Asad Khan was appointed the governor of Gujrat. *Miratat-i-Waridat*, 446; *Mirat-i-Ahmedi*, I, 395.

10 . Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chaghtai, f. 365b; Nur-ud-Din, Jahandar Namah, f. 39a.

11 . Khafi Khan II, 685.

Revolt of Farrukh Siyar Aided by Saiyid Brothers

Jahandar Shah was rudely disturbed in his pursuit of pleasure by the revolt of Farrukh Siyar, the son of Azim-ush Shan.¹² Having enlisted the aid of the Saiyid brothers and backed by the resources of Chhabela Ram Nagar, Muhammad Khan Bangash, Farrukh Siyar marched on Delhi from Patna to fight for the Mughal throne.

At this stage it would be pertinent to take a look at the early life and career of Saiyid Brothers and Farrukh Siyar. The Saiyids of Barha claimed to be descended from Abul Farah, of Wasit in Mesopotamia. Several hundred years ago, at a date which cannot be fixed exactly, Abul Farah and his twelve sons came from Wasit to India, settling at first in four villages near, Patiala, in the *Sarkar* of Sirhind and Subah of *Dihli*. From these villages the four branches, into which they are divided, derive their names. Then crossing the Jamuna they formed a settlement on the eastern side of the upper Duaba, half way between Meerut and Saharanpur, in a sandy, unproductive piece of country, possibly at that time very sparsely inhabited. Cut off from the country of their origin and marrying in the country, they formed numerous settlements and became thoroughly Indianized in their manners and habits in course of time.¹³

The etymology of the name Barha is disputed: perhaps it is from the

12 . Khafi Khan, II, 707-708, Mirza Mohammad Ibrat Namah, ff. 141-5.

13 . See *Tarikh-i-Sadat Baraha* by Muzaffar Ali Khan.

word *bara* (twelve) with some allusion to the number of their villages or *Imams*. From the time of Akbar, the men of this clan of Saiyids were famous as military leaders, and by their bravery had acquired a traditional right to lead the vanguard of the Imperial troops. Until the reign of Farrukh-siyar they seem to have been little distinguished outside the profession of arms, and judging from what we know of their descendents in the present age, they probably had little love of learning. In Muzaffarnagar, many is the story current of the 'Saiyid Sahib's' reckless improvidence and ignorance of the commonest rule of business. In the 18th century a *Barha Ka ahmaq* or 'Barha blocked' was a common saying.¹⁴ The Saiyids of Baraha first attracted attention during the reign of Akbar when they won the hereditary right to lead the Mughal van in battle in battle. Their custom was to fight on foot in the Indian fashion.

Though reckoned as brave fighters and doughty warriors, the Baraha Saiyids acquired a reputation for unreliability and ambitiousness. On one occasion, we find Aurangzeb writing: 'To relax the reigns of authority to the Saiyids of Baraha is to bring a final ruin, i.e., a bad end because these people on getting the least prosperity and promotion

14 . Irvine, I, 201-203.

boast". There is none like me, stray from the path of right conduct, cherish high handedness and cause impediment'.¹⁵

The two Saiyid brothers, who now come into such prominence, were not the mere upstarts. Besides the prestige of Saiyid lineage, of descent from the famous Barha branch of that race, and the personal renown acquired by their own valour, they were the sons of a man who had held in Alamgir's reign first the Subahdari of Bijapur in the Dakhin and then that of Ajmer, appointments given in that reign either to princes of the blood or to the very foremost men in the state. Their father, Saiyid Abdullah Khan, known as Saiyid Mian, had risen in the services of Ruhullah Khan, the chief *bakshi* of Aurangzeb.¹⁶ During the course of Rathor rebellion in the closing years of seventeenth century Syed Miyan put forward some of his own demands, when he was asked to hold the Office of *subedar* of Ajmer (Akhbarat).

Hasan Ali Khan (afterwards Abdullah Khan Qutbul Mulk) and Husain Ali Khan, two of the numerous sons of Abdullah Khan Saiyid Mian were now men of about forty six and forty four years of age respectively. Earlier, Abdullah Khan was the *faujdar* of Sultan Nazarpur (Nanderhar) in Bangalore in 1698. It was in that year that the Marathas under Nimaji Sindhia raided the province of Khandesh for the first time.

15 . *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri* 32, 8. *Hum Chune dighare Nist.*

16 . Irvine, I, 202-03.

Abdullah Khan put up a disastrous but heroic fight against Nimaji, and thus won his spurs as a brave warrior.¹⁷ Two years later in 1700; ‘Abdullah Khan displayed great energy in fighting another Maratha general Hanumant. He sacked Hanumant’s base camp, made his nephew, Janoji, a prisoner and converted him to Islam. Zulfiqar Khan who was passing that way commended. Abdullah Khan’s bravery.

Soon after this, ‘Abdullah Khan joined the service of Jahandar Shah who was the eldest son of Shah Alam and was the Governor of Multan. Husain Ali was appointed the *faujdar* of Ranthambhor and later of Hindaun Bayana.¹⁸

In an expedition against a refractory Billoch Zamindar, Abdullah Khan was of the opinion that the honours of the day was his. However, Jahandar Shah thought otherwise, and assigned them to his then favourite, Isa Khan Mani. Abdullah Khan quitted Jahandar’s service in disgust and repaired to Lahore.¹⁹

There he remained unemployed till 1707 when, Munim Khan, who was on his way to Agra for the war against Azam secured for him the *mansab* of 3000.²⁰ Husain Ali also joined Bahadur Shah near Delhi and was granted the *mansab* of 2000.²¹

17 . Khafi Khan, 457.

18 . Maasir ul Umara, I, 322,iii, 132.

19 . Maasir ul Umara, i, 322, iii, 132; Khafi Khan, 456; Cf. Satish Chandra, 128-29.

20 . Maasir-ul Umara, i, 825-6, iii, 130.

21 . Maasir-ul Umara, i, 322, iii, 132; Khafi Khan, 456.

In the battle of Jajau, they served in the vanguard and fought valiantly on foot, as was the Saiyid habit on an emergency.

A third brother Nur-ud-Din Ali Khan was left dead on the field, and Husain ali Khan was severely wounded. Though their rank was raised to 4,000 and the elder brother received his father's title of Abdullah Khan (Hasan Ali) they were not treated with such favour as their exceptional services seemed to reserve, either by the new emperor or his *Wazir*.²²

Abdullah Khan was again called upon to serve during the Sikh campaign. At the battle of Anantpur in 1710, he fought on foot as was the custom of the Baraha Saiyids, and after great slaughter, won a signal victory.²³ At length by the favour of Prince Azim ush Shan, Abdullah Khan became his deputy in the province of Allahabad. Thus the two Saiyids were indebted to Azim ush Shan for their appointments.²⁴

A brief outline of Muhammad Farrukh Siyar's career at this stage would not be out of place. Born in Aurangabad (1683), the second son of Azim us-Shan. He was sent to Delhi, but brought back again to Dakhin again in 1694. After spending three year spent with his great grandfather, Aurangzeb, he accompanied his father Azimush Shan first

22 . Khafi Khan, ii, 5745; Kamwar Khan, 20; M.U.i, 3212, iii, 130.

23 . Cf. Satish Chandra, pp. 128-29.

24 . Satish Chandra, p. 129.

to Agra and then to Bengal. In the last year of his reign Alamgir recalled his grandson, Azim ush Shan from Bengal, giving him orders to leave his eldest son, Muhammad Karim, in charge of Bihar and his second son Farrukh Siyar, in Bengal. The young prince passed some years at Dacca, then the capital of the Bengal province, but in the reign of Bahadur Sah (1707-12), he moved to Murshidabad. He subsequently moved to Raj Mahal, higher up and on the other side of the Ganges. Azim ush Shan anticipating a struggle for the throne at an early date, called on Farrukh-siyar to return to Court. Farrukh Siyar was on the march and not far from Azimabad, Patna, where he heard of Bahadur Shah's death and without waiting for further information, he proclaimed his father's accession and had coins struck and *Khutba* read in his father's name.²⁵ Thereafter, he decided to march no further. In reality he was reluctant to proceed to the Court for he enjoyed little favour with his father as compared to his brothers.²⁶ According to some others, it had been predicted that he would be king on the death of Bahadur Shah, and so he delayed purposely.²⁷

Husain Ali Khan who had gone out against some malcontents in the direction of Rajgir did not like this action of Farrukh Siyar.²⁸

Apparently he wanted to sit on the fence till the results, of the contest at

25 . Irvine, I, 198-99.

26 . Maasir ul Umara I, 322-3.

27 . Ghulam Husain Salim in *Riyaz us Salatin* informs us that he had been hailed asking by the famous *sufi* Saint of Burdwan, *Sufi Bayazid*, as early as 1697, when as prince, he had visited him to seek blessings for his father.

28 . Khafi Khan, 711.

Lahore were known. Farrukh Siyar wrote flattering letters to Husain Ali who was at last agreed to give his support to the Prince. This seems to have happened before the result of the contest at Lahore was known.²⁹ When news arrived of the defeat and death of Azim-ush Shan, Husain Ali wanted to drawback. The prince himself wanted to commit suicide in despair. But Farrukh Siyar's mother threw herself on the support of Husain Ali, appealed to his sense of generosity and his old relations with Azim-ush Shan, and fired his imagination by promises of high office. 'Whatever the result you will be the gainer', she is reported to have told him. 'If defeated your name will stand recorded as where till the day of judgements; if successful, the whole Hindustan will be at your feet, above you none but the Emperor.'³⁰ Ultimately Husain Ali agreed to join Farrukh Siyar, partly because he was afraid he was already too deeply committed, and partly due to his dislike of Jahandar shah and his disgust at the absolute authority enjoyed by Zulfiqar Khan at his Court.³¹

Round about this time it was decided that the two most important posts, that of *Wazir* and first *bakhshi* would go to Syed Abdullah and Husain Ali Khan respectively. Then coins were struck and

29 . Khafi Khan, 710-11.

30 . Cf. Satish Chandra, 130-31.

31 . Warid, 236.

the *Khutba* ordered to be read in Farrukh Siyar's name and letters dispatched to the elder brother, by both the prince and Husain Ali Khan.

Abdullah Khan was at first horrified by Husain's rashness in committing himself to an apparently hopeless enterprise, but events happened in such a manner that he found that he had little choice but to join them.

He was himself facing some embarrassment. His soldiers' pay was in arrears and in the course of a punitive expedition they had mutinied and he was compelled to retreat to Allahabad where he shut himself in the fort. About this time Shuja-ud-Din Khan, son-in-law of Murshid Quli Khan was passing through Allahabad with the Bengal tribute. Abdullah Khan saw in this a possible means of escape from his predicament. A little while earlier, the news of the death of Bahadur shah had also been received and no one knew which prince would finally succeed. So he sent officers to the camp of Shujauddin advising him that in view of the disturbed situation prevailing in Allahabad (mainly because of the presence of the large number of deserters from his unpaid troops) it was not safe to camp in the open and that it would be desirable to bring the treasure into fort where it would be secure from marauders. It would also be advisable for Shuja Khan to avoid the outcome of the ongoing fratricidal struggle at Lahore before proceeding

further. Shuja found the advise sensible and complied, thus placing himself and his treasure, at the mercy of Abdullah Khan.³²

Shortly after, news of the success of Jahandar Shah was received. Abdullah Khan dispatched a congratulatory letter to the victorious prince declaring his loyalty and desiring to know how he could be of service to him. He must have been nervous, the question was, would he, a known protégé of the late Azim ush Shan be allowed to continue at Allahabad.

Soon news came that he had been replaced by one Raji Muhammad Khan whose family was based in nearby Manakpur. The new governor in turn nominated a relative of his, one Syed Abdul Ghaffar, as his deputy who raised a force of about 7,000 men and marched towards Allahabad to assume charge. On being apprised of his supersession Abdullah Khan decided to throw in his lot with Farrukh Siyar. With the Bengal treasure in the fort he was on strong ground and had the means of raising an army. A letter from the prince authorizing him to appropriate funds for this purpose from the tribute came handy, and he started preparations to resist the advancing amir.

Abdullah Khan dispatched a force of hurriedly raised levies to oppose him. Three of his younger brothers, his *Diwan*, and *Bakhshi*

32 . Warid, Mirat-i-Waridat, p. 138b, Irvine, i, 207; Khafi Khan, 711, 715.

went with the force and they gave battle to Abdul Ghaffar near Sarai Alam Chand, about 15 miles from Allahabad. Most of the troops of the Saiyids, being fresh recruits were scattered by Abdul Ghaffar but the three Saiyids and the hardcore of their followers from Barah made a very determined attack in which Abdul Ghaffar's brother was killed along with Nur-ud-Din, one of the Saiyid brothers. A rumour spread in the imperial force that Abdul Ghaffar himself had been killed and despite the best efforts of the latter to convince the troops that this was not so, panic spread. A dust storm added to the confusion and the Saiyid's carried the day, Abdul Ghaffar's army soon ceasing to exist. He retreated with the remnants to Shahzadpur when the news of the disaster reached Delhi the emperor tried to conciliate Abdullah Khan. Fresh patents were sent from Delhi appointing him Governor of Allahabad.³³

Compliments and titles were showered upon him, while the letter to Abdul Ghaffar was so worded that it might well have been written to a rebel rather than to an officer who had been faithfully, if unsuccessfully, trying to execute his mandate. The letter highlights the peculiar methodology of imperial diplomacy which would become more and more marked in its declining years. The underlying principle was, 'if you can't fight them, join them?' We shall see many examples of the

33 . Irvine i, p. 209.

emperor and his wazir coopting rebel and defiant governors by conferring on them provinces and parganas previously seized.³⁴ Meanwhile, Farrukh Siyar had been able to attract some other notables to his cause. Chief among them were Ahmad Beg, a man long attached to the family and bearing the titles of Ghazi ud-Din Khan Ghalib Jang and Sidisht Narain, chief of Ujjainya rajas of Bhojpur. It was Ahmed Beg's persuasion which was responsible for bringing over Sidisht Narayan and his adhesion was a very notable coup for he brought with him 10,000 cavalry and 3,000 musketeers. Khwaja Asim and some other fugitives from the wreck of Azim ush Shan's army also joined the prince and finally Saif Shikan Khan, the *naib nazim* of Orissa, also came over, as did various other disgruntled officers from Awadh and Rohilkhand.³⁵

Money remained a problem inspite of the Bengal treasure, with the help of Husain Ali a forced loan was raised from the merchants and bankers of Patna. More strong arm methods were used and the goods of the Dutch company which had a factory at Patna were also seized, the factory having recently died. One Surat Singh Khatri, a revenue official under the governor of Kabul, Nasir Khan, which had accumulated great wealth happened unfortunately to be in Patna at the time with a large caravan of coined bullion which he was transporting under heavy guard.

34 . G.S. Cheema, 93-95.

35 . Ibid., 95-96.

The treasure was loaded in so or 60 carts and was escorted by 500 musketeers. Taking advantage of their slackness, the carts were seized by Farrukh Siyar's officers and the money distributed among the soldiers.³⁶

On November 1712, Farrukh Siyar reached Jhusi and received Abdullah Khan in audience. The previous assurances given to the two brothers were reaffirmed though it is not clear whether they were formally invested with the office of *Wazir* and *mirbakshi* at this time or not.³⁷

The decisive battle of Agra took place in 10 January 1713 immediately to the West of the city. It had rained in the morning so the armies could not engage till the afternoon. The battle was a confused melee in which the only notable who distinguished on the imperialist side was Kokltash Husain Ali Khan was wounded early in a charge led by Abdus Samad Khan Abdullah Khan was also at one point isolated with only a few hundred supporters, and Farrukh Siyar's men seemed to be losing heart. If Zulfiqar had thrown in his full weight at that moment, Jahandar would have won the battle, but for some strange reason with 25,000 fresh troops, he, and not until the tables were turned against the

36 . Irvine, pp. 210-12.

37 . Irvine (I, p. 213) asserts, apparently on the authority of Ahsan Ijad, that formal engagements were entered into with the Saiyid brothers at this juncture making over the post of *Wazir* and *mirbakshi* to the Saiyids.

brave Kokaltash did he throw his men into the struggle. And as for the Turanian leader, Chin Qilich and Mohammad Amin, true to their word, they remained spectators. After the flight of Jahandar Shah from the field of battle and the formal proclamation of Farrukh Siyar, Abdullah Khan was made the *wazir* and Hussain Ali the *mirbakhshi* with the ranks of 7,000/7,000. They were also granted the governorships of Multan and Bihar respectively, and allowed to govern them through deputies. Saiyid Najm-ud-Din Ali Khan and a number of their younger brothers and other kinsmen were also admitted to *mansabs*.³⁸ The maternal uncle of Abdullah Khan, Saiyid Muzaffar Khan Baraha, was made the Governor of Ajmer.

But apart from these posts, the Saiyids claimed no special position for themselves or their kinsmen. Indeed, far from seeking to establish a monopoly of power for themselves, they were keen to conciliate and to win over the nobles of the time of Aurangzeb and Bahadur Shah.

To cut the story short, the ministry of Zulfiqar Khan ended with the fall of Jahandar Shah. His brief reign was significant in two ways. First, it showed that the only alternative to a strong king was a strong *Wazir*. But there were difficulties before Zulfiqar. Neither the king nor

38 . Satish Chandra, p. 134-35.

the *Wazir* was powerful. Second, Aurangzeb's policies which had largely been maintained by Bahadur Shah, were rapidly given up, namely, abolition of *Jizyah*, concessions to Rajputs and attempts were made to secure the cooperation of the Marathas. But all these liberal moves of Zulfiqar ultimately failed with the fall of Zulfiqar.

In the next chapters and conclusion of this thesis we will be discussing how the new power players, i.e., Saiyid brothers having taken a leaf out of the book of Zulfiqar Khan, in terms of liberal policy, failed at the onslaught of Irani and Turani factions.

Chapter 4

Struggle for Power – Farrukh Siyar's Reign: Mughal Court Politics

CHAPTER – 4

STRUGGLE FOR POWER – FARRUKH SIYAR'S REIGN: MUGHAL COURT POLITICS

The history of the year's from 1713 to 1721 consists of a series of crises caused by a struggle for power between the two brothers who occupied the posts of *Wazir* and chief *Bakhshi* and the Emperor Farrukh Siyar with the culmination, being the deposition of Farrukh Siyar.¹

The two Saiyid brothers were indebted to Azim-ush Shan for their appointments. They enjoyed a reputation for bravery, but were considered haughty and ambitious. Their career had in no sense been remarkable and it is probable that they would have died as obscure nobles had it not been for the circumstances created by the civil war and the rebellions of Farrukh Siyar.²

As we have seen in the previous chapter the ill-will between the emperor and the Sayid brothers had the roots in their stint in Bihar.

The first sign of strain developed when Farrukh Siyar on way to the court made an halt at Patna much to the dislike of Husain Ali Khan from Patna, he sent an *arzdasht* pleading the approach of the rainy season and the advanced pregnancy of his wife for his inability to march further.

1 . Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p. 86.

2 . *Ibid.*, p. 89.

In reality he was reluctant to proceed to the court for he enjoyed little favour with his father as compared to his brothers.³ According to some others, it had been predicted that he would be king on the death of Bahadur Shah, and so he delayed purposely.⁴ When on 15 March 1712, news reached of the death of Bahadur Shah, Farrukh Siyar at once proclaimed his father Azim-us-Shan, as king and struck coins and had Khutba read in his name. Husain Ali who had gone out against some malcontents in the direction of Rajgir, did not like this.⁵ Apparently, he wanted to sit on the fence till the results of the contest at Lahore were known. He came back to Patna and wanted to arrest Farrukh Siyar who had only a small following with him. But he was prevented from doing so by Ahmad Beg who was Farrukh Siyar's chief lieutenant besides Farrukh Siyar writing flattering letters to the governor who was at last persuaded to give his support to the prince.⁶ But the mutual suspicion and ill will between Farrukh Siyar and Husain Ali did not end with the latter's adherence to his cause. Husain Ali, we are told, was afraid of the notorious low-down cunning and deceitful nature of Farrukh Siyar.⁷ The

3 . Ma'asir ul Umara ii, 322-23.

4 . Ghulam Husain, Riyaz-us Salatin (242-43).

5 . Nur-ud-din, 40. Khafi Khan, f. 711.

6 . Khafi Khan 710-711, Mirza Mohammad, (80).

7 . Mirza Mohammad, 14a.

reports of the English factor at Patna gave a graphic account of the height to which the mutual suspicion and ill will reached.⁸

The ill-will between Farrukh Siyar and Husain Ali kept growing till there were differences of opinion between them on practically every point. In addition to this there were altercations and misunderstanding among their followers.

It is difficult to say whether the differences between Farrukh Siyar and Husain Ali were essentially personal or extended to the sphere of policy. While in Bihar, Farrukh Siyar, at the instance of Saiyyid Husain Ali, issued a proclamation abolishing the *jizyah*.⁹ This was an important move on Husain Ali's part with far-reaching implications. But there is no evidence that Farrukh Siyar was, at that stage, opposed to the move.

We have already seen that the relations between the Saiyid brothers and Farrukh Siyar were far from cordial from the very beginning. After the accession of Farurkh Siyar, these relations steadily deteriorated till an open breach was precipitated towards the end of the year 1714.

From the outset, the struggle was essentially for power. The Saiyid wanted not merely the appearance but the substance for power, while Farrukh Siyar, though lacking in any real ability, had the ambition of

8. Wilson ii, 50-6, 81, 86, Ijad, 51a.

9. Jizyah in the post Aurangzeb period, Satish Chandra I.H.C. 1946, 320-7.

exercising personal authority of a monarch. Concretely, the Saiyids desired that 'no business should be transacted or *mansabs* given on promotions and appointments made without their advise and consultation.¹⁰ Farrukh Siyar felt that this claim went much beyond the traditional powers and functions of the *wazir* thereby reducing the emperor to the position of a figure head.¹¹ Thus, the real issue was two divergent concepts of the *wizarat*. Like Zulfiqar Khan earlier, the Saiyid brothers felt that the interests of the empire were bound up with the concentration of effective power in their own hands, and hence they wanted to make the *wazir* the real hub of affairs, while the king merely reigned. They clearly felt that they had secured the crown for Farrukh Siyar by the strength of their arms, and hence considered their claims for the Supreme power to be indisputable. Farrukh Siyar on the other hand stuck to the concept of the *wazir* being merely the chief adviser of the king and head of the revenue department, but not having any power of independent initiative. This divergence in outlook manifested itself from the very beginning.¹² The ill-will and mutual discord between the king and his ministers was further accentuated by the activities of some of the personal favourites of the king, who thought that their opportunity lay in fomenting the discord between the two sides.

10 . Khafi Khan, p. 379. *Maasir ul Umara* (i, p. 328).

11 . Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p. 142.

12 . Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p. 143.

Two of the leading favourites of the king were Khan-i Dauran and Mir Jumla. Mir Jumla was a native of Turan and had been the *Qazi* of Dacca and later of Patna in the time of Aurangzeb. He had gradually won the confidence of Azim-ush-Shan who was then the Governor of Bihar and Bengal.¹³ Khan-i Dauran (Khwajah Asim) had also been in the employ of Azim-ush-Shan.¹⁴ After the battle of Agra, Mir Jumla and Khan-i Dauran were promoted to much higher position than their services to the empire demanded. Mir Jumla, being extremely ambitious could not tolerate the sovereign power under the control of the two brothers turned envious. In addition to this Mir Jumla and Khan-i Dauran resented their supersession by the Saiyid Brothers whom they regarded as comparative new comers and upstarts. Hence, they tried to induce the emperor by all means in their power to oust their rivals.¹⁵ Farrukh Siyar, who was already suspicious of the Saiyids dreaded their power and influence, lent a ready ear to these persuasions.

Thus, Farrukh Siyar, Khan-i Dauran and Mir Jumla ranged themselves in opposition to the Saiyid brothers, and upheld the principle of the personal rule of the monarch. As opposed to this, the Saiyids were firmly of the opinion that the task of running the administration should be

13 . Ibid., p. 144.

14 . *Maasir-ul Umara* i. p. 819, Ashub, 253.

15 . Khafi Khan, 732, J.

left in the hands of the *Wazir* and the *Mir Bakhshi*. This became the central issue in party politics during Farrukh Siyar's reign, all other issues being linked with it.¹⁶

Mir Jumla and Khan-i Dauran gradually gained a complete ascendancy over the mind of Farrukh Siyar.¹⁷

In spite of these differences and the growing ill-will, there was no open breach between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyids till, emboldened by the secret support of the Emperor, the favourites started interfering in the administration.¹⁸ Farrukh Siyar authorized Mir Jumla to sign all papers on his behalf, and repeatedly declared: "The word and signature of Mir Jumla are my word and signature".¹⁹ This was contrary to all the established rules of procedure and also effected the prestige and authority of the *Wazir* Abdullah Khan and deprived him of the perquisites of appointment which were a well-known and substantial source of income.²⁰

Mir Jumla was encouraged in his conduct by Abdullah Khan's disinclination to attend to the details of administration. He was primarily a soldier and preferred to leave all the affairs of state and ministerial

16 . Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p. 145.

17 . Khafi Khan, p. 730.

18 . Ibid, 740. *Maasir ul Umara* iii 476.

19 . Ibid, 739.

20 . Ibid., 739, *Khush-hal*, 102.

duties in the hands of his *diwan*, Rattan Chand.²¹ Rattan chand was haughty and overbearing and, according to one writer, 'had a mouth as insatiable as the nethermost hell for swallowing gold and silver.'²² Apart from above mentioned things, Farrukh Siyar had valid reason for complaint against the Saiyid Brothers, practice of revenue farming (*Ijarah*) becoming universal getting alarming proportion being one the reasons. Even *khalisah* lands were formed out. Whenever an *amil* was appointed, Rattan Chand would take from him a contract or lease in writing and realize the money from his banker.²³ Farrukh Siyar rightly considered this practice to be ruinous one, and had issued standing orders forbidding *ijarah*.²⁴ Mir Jumla took advantage of all these factors and impressed upon Farrukh Siyar that the Saiyids were unfit for high office and that there would be no peace and prosperity in the empire as long as they had a hand in the administration.²⁵

Hoping to overawe the Saiyids and make them from their offices voluntarily, Farrukh Siyar began to increase the military power of his favourites, i.e. Mir Jumla and Khan-i Dauran.

21 . K.K. 739, Siyar-ul Mutakhirin, 396, Qasim. 78. Elliot and Dowson (vii, 447) Calls Ratan Chand a grain merchant.

22 . Qasim. 87.

23 . Khafi Khan, 773, Mirat ii.141, Siyar-ul Mulakhirmi 407 Jagir lands were sometimes formed out even in the reign of Aurangzeb. The practice seems to have become universal in the time of Jahandar Shah and was apparently continued by Ratan Chand.

24 . Akhbarat, d.23 Rajab, Yr. 4, 25 July 1715.

25 . Khafi Khan, 739, Qasim 78-79.

The was the situation which Husain Ali confronted on his return from Marwar. Where he subdued Ajit Singh a long standing rebel of the empire by compelling him to send *Dola* of his daughter in marriage to Farrukh Siyar.

After due deliberations, Husain Ali came to the conclusion that it would not be possible for them to maintain their position at the court unless they gained control of one of the most important *subahs*, and could utilize their resources. Accordingly, he demanded and secured for himself the viceroyalty of the Deccan in the place of Nizam-ul Mulk²⁶ which he wanted to exercise through Daud Khan Panni, following the practice of Mir Jumla who had made a similar pact with Murshid Quli Khan, the Deputy Governor of Bihar.²⁷ However, on the advice of Mir Jumlah, Farrukh Siyar turned down Husain Ali's request and ordered that he should proceed to the Deccan personally.²⁸ Things were now fastly coming to a head, when Husain Ali refused to proceed to Deccan leaving his brother Abdullah Khan at the mercy of Mir Jumla and Khan-i Dauran.²⁹ Meanwhile the emperor objected to Husain Ali's private agreement with Ajit Singh and delayed issuing a *farman* confirming the

26 . Akhbarat, 11, Ramzan Yr 3.20 September, 1714, Kamwar, 20.

27 . Akhbarat, 3, Jamada I, Yr. 2, 28 May 1713.

28 . Khafi Khan, 739. Maasir ul Umara i.328.

29 . Khafi Khan, 739.

appointment of the latter as the Governor of Gujarat.³⁰ Shortly after the departure of Husain Ali for Marwar he sent secret letters to Ajit Singh promising him favours if he would defeat and kill *mir bakshi* the result of this back-hand intrigue was somewhat unexpected for Farrukh Siyar. Husain Ali came to know of the Emperor's plot against him because Ajit Singh communicated their contents to Husain Ali in order to induce him to make peace.

In the meantime the Saiyyids discovered a plot to murder them and responded in a aggressive manner by demanding that Husain Ali would come to pay his respects to the emperor only after the departure of Mir Jumla whom the Saiyids considered the evil genius of the emperor. At the time of his visit all the arrangements in the fort were to be in the hands of the employee of the Saiyids.³¹

On 20 May 1715, Husain Ali left for the Deccan, carrying with them the authority to appoint and dismiss all jagirdars and office holders in the Deccan and to transfer the commandants of the forts. It was even rumoured that Farrukh Siyar had been compelled to hand over the royal seal to Husain Ali so that the latter may not have to depend on his formal

30 . The agreement had been made in April and in June Ajit Singh had left for Thatta But he was not appointed to Gujrat, till the dispute with the Saiyids was over.

31 . Khafi Khan, 741, Warid, 284.Qasim (p. 87).

assent for appointments.³² Thus ended the first trial of strength between the Saiyid brothers and Farrukh Siyar. The outcome was, to all outward appearances, a great triumph for the Saiyids. The emperor not only failed to dislodge them from their offices, but had to accept the humiliating condition of handing over the charge of the fort to their men before they would come to pay their respect to him. Thus the ministers dictated and imposed their own conditions on the monarch who tacitly accepted the special position of the Saiyids. Nevertheless, the struggle revealed the weakness of their position to the Saiyids, and forced them to accept a compromise".³³ However the compromise made by Husain Ali was out of necessity of creating a strong territorial base for themselves. But it was impossible to create such a base unless one of the brothers took charge of it personally. It was, perhaps, for this reason that Husain Ali dropped his original demand for permission to govern the Deccan through a deputy, and agreed to proceed to it himself.³⁴

The Saiyids doubtless, hoped for some respite from intrigues after Mir Jumlah's departure, but he remained a constant source of danger to them. Nor did the agreement produce even a temporary abatement in the emperor's hostility towards them. As a matter of fact, as soon as Husain

32 . Cf. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p. 151.

33 . Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p. 152.

34 . Cf. William Irvine I, p. 300.

Ali's back was turned. Farrukh Siyar sent secret instructions to Daud Khan Panni transferring him from Gujarat to Burhanpur and ordering him to resist Husain Ali.³⁵ Although in the ensuing battle fought on 6 September 1715 in which Daud Khan was defeated and killed, Husain Ali got hold of secret letters sent to Daud Khan by the Emperor as a fresh proof of the duplicity of their royal master.

In addition to the continued hostility of the emperor and his friends, the Saiyids had to reckon with the powerful group of M. Amin Khan, Nizam-ul Mulk and Abdus Samad Khan.

Qasim Lahori in *Ibratnama* mentions that the Turanis had all along been eager to remove the Saiyids from the court but wanted to employ stratagem (*hikmat-i-amli*) rather than courage and bravery.³⁶

With Husain Ali's departure, Abdullah Khan was left alone to face a treacherous master and a hostile court, though the city was free from conspiracies for sometime. But towards the end of 1717, with the rise of a new royal favourite Mohammad Murad Kashmiri, plots and counterplots again became the order of the day.

Murad was a minor chamberlain but in January 1718 he was appointed superintendent of the *harkaras* or scouts and he soon became a

35 . Cf. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p. 153.

36 . Qasim Lahori (pp. 79, 86).

close confident of the emperor, with influence over his mind and apparently also his heart. He undermined and discredited Samsam ud-Daulah insinuating that he was in league with the *Wazir*, which was why all plans and conspiracies had failed in the past. Now fresh plots began to be hatched, and Murad was the prime mover.

Honours were showered on him, from third *Mir Tuzuk* he was moved to the second position and was in addition given the charge of Superintendent of the pages or *khawas*. According to Yahya he was at one time promoted daily on one day his rank was 5.000 *zat*, the next day it was raised to 6,000 and on the third day it was raised to 7.000.³⁷

With Murad dominating the emperor the wheels of intrigue started grinding again. Plots and conspiracies were hatched but never executed, for Murad like the rest of the emperor's favourites, was eloquent in respects but indecisive in action. Then on another it was planned to seize Qutb-ul Mulk on the occasion of Id prayers. But the plot was leaked the night before, the *Wazir* filled the entire *Idgah* with thousands of his followers.

Yet again, Farrukh Siyar summoned Maharaja Ajit Singh his father-in-law. It was assumed by him and Murad that Ajit Singh would support his son-in-law to the hilt against the *Wazir*. But the chief of the

37. G.S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals*, New Delhi 2002, pp. 122-23.


Rathors had no faith in the emperor. He had been forced to give him his daughter and there could be no love lost between them. When Qulb learnt that Ajit was on his way, he got in touch and convinced him about the emperor's fickleness. When he arrived he refused to be drawn into any conspiracy and made it plain that he would not act without the wazir's counsel.³⁸

Efforts were made to win over Nizam-ul Mulk (Chin Qilich Khan). But this cautious nobleman was in no hurry to commit himself to a rash adventure. He had already suffered and the *sarkar* of Moradabad was nothing when compared to the six subas of the Deccan. The negotiations fell through but the Nizam was in for another rude shock. He was recalled from Moradabad which was elevated to the rank of a *suba* and handed over to a royal favourite as another of his absentee charges. So instead of gaining friend, the emperor had made an enemy in this Mughal *amir*.

By this time Samsam-ud-Daulah had also abandoned the emperor and made his peace with Qutb-ul-Mulk. This became evident on the occasion of the failure of yet another plot to seize the minister during an audience.³⁹ Then to cap it all. In January 1716, Mir Jumla entered Delhi surreptitiously in a state of great financial distress, with 7,000 Mughal troops clamouring for their salaries which had not been paid for the last

38 . Ibid., pp. 126-127.

39 . Irvine, 1, pp. 354-55.



12 to 13 months. Since Mir Jumlah had failed to deal satisfactorily with the *zamindars* of Bihar who were notoriously turbulent besides woefully mismanaging his finances and committing every sort of excess and oppression upon the people, he was removed from the governorship of Bihar and was replaced by Sarbuland Khan. Soon afterwards, he was also deprived of the absentee governorship of Bengal.⁴⁰ Thus, the affair took a turn quite different from what Mir Jumlah had expected. In despair, he applied to his old enemy, Abdullah Khan. At the latter's he was appointed the Qazi of Lahore and ordered to leave without an audience. Seven or eight months later, his *mansab* and titles were also restored at the instance of Abdullah Khan.⁴¹

The result of these developments was that a dangerous rival was removed from the path of Abdullah Khan who now felt more secure, while the position of Farrukh Siyar was correspondingly weakened.⁴² Meanwhile, the struggle for power between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyyid brothers was assuming a deeper significance.

Early in 1717, Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri, who had gone to Makkah towards the beginning of the reign after the execution of his son, Sadullah Khan, returned to the court. Farrukh Siyar was now of the

40 . Shiv Das Lacknavi (p. 9), Akhbarat, 5 November 1715, M.M. 46b. Khafi Khan, 770 is not correct in stating that Mir Jumla was dismissed from Bihar after he came to the court.

41 . William Irvine I, 332.

42 . Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 158.

opinion that it was a mistake to have rooted out the old Alamgiri nobles who were experienced administrators and who could have acted as a counterpoise to the Saiyids. Hence at the behest of the some of his advisors, Farrukh Siyar proposed to appoint him as the *diwan-i tan wa khalisah*. He was also made the (absentee) Governor of Kashmir, and granted the rank of 4,000 in April 1717.⁴³ In view of Abdullah Khan's authority in revenue matters, Inayatullah Khan refused to accept the post of the *Diwan-i tan* without an understanding with the *wazir*. After sometime an agreement was arrived at with the help of Ikhlas Khan by which Inayatullah undertook not to make any proposals or recommendations to the emperor in revenue matters without the advise and consultation of Abdullah Khan.⁴⁴ For sometime, things went smoothly. But soon disagreement arose. First of all Inayatullah who was an admirer of Aurangzeb produced a letter from the Sharif of Makkah stating that the levying of *jizyah* was obligatory (*wajib*) according to the *Shara*.⁴⁵ Abdullah Khan showed displeasure at the re-imposition of the *jizyah*. Thus the pact with Inayatullah Khan broke down. After this, we

43 . Khafi Khan, 774, M.M. 70a.

44 . Cf. Satish Chandra, 164-65.

45 . Letters explaining the measure to Jai Singh, Farrukh Siyar wrote, 'It is a matter of faith. I am helpless (to intervene)'. Khafi Khan 772, M.M. 70a.

are told, “the Hindus became hostile to Inayatullah Khan, and determined to oppose him in every way.”⁴⁶

By his resistance to Inayatullah’s measures, ‘Abdullah Khan rallied to his side the subordinate officials and appealed to the Hindu sentiment generally. From this time onwards, the Saiyids came to be regarded as the champions of the Hindus and Hindustani. However, it would not be correct to interpret the struggle at the court as primarily one between the Hindustani and the Mughals, as contemporary and later writers often represent it to be.

While all these above mentioned events were taking place at the Court, Deccan being ruled by Husain Ali was also playing a crucial role in the polity of Mughal India.

The day Husain Ali replaced Nizam-ul Mulk as the Viceroy of the Deccan, he followed the earlier policy of Nizam refusing to pay *chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan to Shahu. The result was that the Marathas appeared everywhere and plundered and desolated Mughal places. The Imperial commanders failed to cope with the situation.⁴⁷ Matters were rendered more difficult for Husain Ali by the underhand opposition of Farrukh Siyar who wrote letters to Shahu and to all the

46 . Khafi Khan, 775.

47 . Khafi Khan ii, 777-78.

zaminars and *diwan* in Karnatak to oppose the viceroy.⁴⁸ The result was that Husain Ali's authority in Bijapur, Hyderabad and the two Karnataks was almost reduced to a cypher.⁴⁹

Consequently on the advise of Saiyid Anwar Khan and through the instrumentality of *Shakaraji* Malhar, Husain Ali opened negotiations with the Marathas. This was done sometime in the middle of 1717.⁵⁰ Reports of these negotiations reached the Emperor, but he was powerless to circumvent them. Ultimately, in February 1718, Husain Ali reached an agreement with Shahu granting him the Swarajya of Shivaji with certain reservations,⁵¹ and the right of collecting the *chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the six *Subahs* of Deccan through his own collectors. The recent Maratha conquests in the Deccan, Berar, Gondwana and the Karnatak were confirmed. Shahu was to pay attribute of 10 lakhs and maintain a force of 15,000 Cavalry for keeping peace and order and for use by the Deccan Viceroy. No taxes were to be claimed except the established ones and it was specifically stipulated that *rahdari* (toll tax) was not to be charged. For the Sardeshmukhi only Shahu undertook to pay the *Peshkash* customary upon a hereditary grant.⁵²

48 . Khafi Khan 780, Elliot and Dowson viii, 260, Masir ul Umara I 328.

49 Ibid., 780, 787-88.

50 Ibid, 784.

51 In lieu of Khandesh, he was to get the adjoining districts of Pandharpur and Trimbak (Duffi, 363).

52 Jagdish Narayana Sarkar, A study of Eighteenth Century India Vol. I Calcutta, 1976. pp. 80-81.

Clearly Husain Ali won over the Marathas. But the emperor did not ratify this pact. Besides, 'Several well wishers of the State urged that it was not proper to admit the vile enemy' to be over-bearing partners in matters of revenue and government.⁵³ Hence the proposal was rejected.

There can be little doubt that the terms of the agreement with the Marathas were against the best interests of the empire. The recognition of the right of *chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* was inevitable but their collection through Maratha officers created an imperium in impervo. But all this was largely due to Farrukh siyar's own actions, which drove the Saiyids to the Marathas.⁵⁴

The conclusion of the pact between Husain Ali and the Marathas brought the affairs of Farrukh Siyar to a crisis. The Saiyids had now secured that superiority for which they had been menoenuring since the first breach with Farrukh Siyar three years ago. Anticipating their next move, Farrukh Siyar had posted M. Amin Khan to Malwa as early as November 1717. The ostensible purpose of this appointment was to drive out the Marathas who had been *harrying* that province for the past several years.⁵⁵

53 Khafi Khan – 786, Maasir-ut Umara(i) 329-30.

54 J.N. Sarkar, p. 81.

55 Maasir ul Umara, 1, 330.

M. Amin Khan wrote to Jai Singh asking for his co-operation in the chastisement of the 'oppressors'. But his real motive was to check Husain Ali, should he march north. Farrukh Siyar also made a number of other appointments to Husain Ali's Northern province (Burhanpur), with the intention of weakening the Saiyid hold on that province. In the Deccan, it was widely rumoured that Farrukh Siyar had decided upon war against the Saiyid.⁵⁶

In despair Farrukh Siyar now tried to get the support of some old anti-Saiyid nobles. The total estimated strength of the emperor was 70-80,000 horse, as against Abdullah 15-30,000. But because of his own shortsightedness the expected combination of his father-in-law, Ajit Singh, Nizam ul Mulk and Sarbuland Khan did not materialize. Farrukh Siyar now selected a new favourite Md. Murad Kashmiri, an old Alamgiri noble' to be *wazir*. Murad Kashmiri, a braggart, ingratiated himself into the emperor's favours and secretly proposed plans for destroying the Saiyids. With blind confidence Farrukh Siyar promoted him as superintendent of the Imperial harem (entitled, Itiqad Khan, May 1718). But the Kashmiri knowing his limitations and lacking, courage, shirked in execution of the plot and suggested Sarbuland Khan to be its principal instrument. His rise alienated Khan-i-Dauran and the old nobles who

56 Khafi Khan, 773, 787, 790, Siyarul Muta Khaerin, 409-10, Maasir-ul-Umara ii, 36.

were no more prepared to take orders from M. Murad than from Mir Jumla earlier.⁵⁷

One by one Farrukh Siyar alienated old nobles like, Khan-i-Dauran the Nizam deprived of the faujdari of Moradabad; Sarbuland Khan, deprived of his Bihar governorship; Md. Amin Khan, dismissed for failure to check Husain Ali in Malwa; and Ajit Singh, dismissed from Gujarat on the ground of 'oppression' Abdullah now wisely won over these discontented nobles to his side by promoting some of them to important posts. Clearly all the anti-Saiyid plots proved to be immature and ended in nothing but talk.⁵⁸

By the end of 1718, the emperor became completely isolated, only Jai Singh and a few others were by his side. From their vantage position the Saiyids could dictate terms to him. Three courses were open to them:

- (a) to depose the emperor and assume royalty themselves;
- (b) to depose Farrukh Siyar and choose a new Timurid prince who could be relied upon to rule according to their wishes; and third
- (c) to retain the Emperor but deprive him of all controlling power.

57 Kamwar, 428, Shiv DAs pp. 40-41, See also Irvine i. pp. 340-45.

58 J.N. Sarkar, pp. 80-82.

The first course was never seriously considered and was perhaps considered unworkable.⁵⁹

The choice lay between the second and the third course. 'Abdullah Khan' who was a bit shrewd politician, as is evident from his deft handling of the situation during his brother's absence, favoured the last course. He wanted as a contemporary writer puts it 'to treat Farrukh Siyar as Mahabat Khan had treated Jahangir⁶⁰ i.e. to keep him a virtual prisoner in his hands.

The emperor recalled Mir Jumla from Lahore in September 1718. This violated the former agreement and gave a valid excuse to Husain Ali to move north wards without permission with a Maratha army. At Burhanpur he was joined by a Maratha army of 10,000 horse under Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath, the combined forces of Husain Ali and the Marathas numbering about 25,000 horse and 10,000 foot. The ostensible pretext for coming to the court without permission was that a (fictitious) son of Prince Akbar had been handed over by Shahu and it was necessary to escort him to Delhi.⁶¹

59 . According to a Barha tradition (*Tarikh-i Sadat-i Baraha*, Muzaffar Ali Khan Jansath Ms., pp. 300, 314) one Jalal Khan of Muzaffarnagar or his son Diyanat Khan proposed that one of the two brothers should ascend the throne Irvine (iP.388) however, considers this story to be of doubtful veracity.

60 . Khush Lal Rai, *Nadir-us Zamani*, 416.

61 . *Iqbalnamah*, Probably by Shiv Das 49-50, Khafi Khan, 793, 795. Irvine (i) pp. 357-58.

Husain Ali who was of a haughty and impatient temperament had already made up his mind about the deposition of Farrukh Siyar. This decision was known in his innermost circle by the time he reached near Delhi.⁶² He entered Delhi with drums beating like an independent sovereign, defying Imperial etiquette, and repeatedly said that he no longer reckoned himself among the servants of the monarch, adding 'I will maintain the honour of my race and care neither for the loss of my *mansab* nor for royal censure.'⁶³ Husain Ali's troops destroyed the crops and looted the bazaars like a hostile army. In particular the country of Jai Singh was thoroughly ravaged. These facts were brought to the notice of Farrukh Siyar but he could do nothing about them.

In fact Raja Jai Singh advised the emperor to place himself at the head of his troops and fall upon the impertinent rebel. He assured him that he and other loyal *Umara* would support him with all their strength and was confident that many of the nobles in the Syed's camp would also return to their proper allegiance once they saw that His Majesty meant business. But it was all to no effect.⁶⁴ But something was still required to precipitate action. Qutb-ul Muk tried to break the stalemate by demanding that the emperor dismiss Jai Singh, a known enemy of their

62 . Khafi Khan, 825.

63 . Shiv Das, 58, Khafi Khan, 804, Maasir-ul Umara, I, 330.

64 . G.S. Cheema, The forgotten Mughals, p. 130.

family and order him to depart for his country. He also demanded the two offices of the *mir atish* and superintendent of the *diwan khana* for his nominees, and permission to take what precautions they considered necessary for their own security.

At first the emperor tried to play for time but two days later he succumbed and gave into all their demands. By a note written in the emperor's own hand, Jai Singh and Rao Budh Singh of Bundi were asked to leave for their estates and informed that the following day was particularly auspicious for departures. The eunuch who delivered the note also brought the customary *khillat* of departure and he let them know that a formal audience would not be necessary! Raging with fury, Jai Singh complied and pitched his tents at Sarai Sahil, outside the city.⁶⁵

The departure of Jai Singh was followed by the defeat of his protégé, Budh Singh, at the hands of Bhim Singh who had allied himself with the Saiyyids. On 22 February, 1719 Husain Ali had an interview with the emperor after posting his men at all strategic points in the fort. But the differences between the two sides could not be bridged. The Saiyids were impatient at the delay in the handing over of actual charge of the various offices to their nominees, and suspected that Farrukh Siyar

65 . Cf. G.S. Cheema, p. 131, Irvine. i.p. 376.

was only playing for time in order that he might resort to some new trick.⁶⁶

Hence, they refused the compromise. On 26 January 1719 Abdullah had an stormy interview with Farrukh Siyar during which the latter refused to make any further concessions, openly abused the *wazir* and retired into the *haram*. Abdullah Khan thereupon turned out the royal favourite. Itiqad Khan, and all the royal guards from the fort and took possession of it.⁶⁷

In the fort, ever since daybreak Abdulah Khan had been sending messengers to persuade the emperor to come forth and take his seat on the throne. Apparently he had not yet decided to replace him; on the other hand, his authorization was needed before his partisans could be arrested. But the craven emperor refused to come out.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, wild rumours of the death of Abdullah Khan and Husain Ali at the hands of Ajit Singh and M. Amin and other spread in the town, and several nobles took courage to come out in defence of the monarch. The Maratha troops of Husain Ali clashed with the Mughal troops of M. Amin Khan.⁶⁹ Though militarily ineffective, this

66 . Cf. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 178-79.

67 . Khafi Khan 807, *Mirza Mohammad, Ibratnama*, 239, Shiv Das, 59, Qasim, 14506, Irvine i, 377-78.

68 . Cf. G.S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals*, p. 134.

69 . Khafi Khan 812-13, *Mirza Mohammad Ibratnama*, 262-3.

demonstration of popular attachment to the House of Timur confronted the Saiyids with the danger of a sudden landslide against them, and impressed upon them the urgent necessity of making a decision quickly, specially as Jai Singh was hovering 40 miles from Delhi with 20,000 horsemen.⁷⁰

Meanwhile Abdullah Khan had sent messages to his brother that since all the offices of the Imperial government and the palace were now in the control of their friends and adherents there was no need to dethrone Farrukh Siyar, but Mohammad Amin Khan urged Husain to think otherwise. Khan-i Dauran now with the Saiyids, also sent a note urging the viceroy to place some other prince on the throne without delay. Subsequently the *Amirul Umara* sent a message urging his brother to forget the recalcitrant emperor and replace him.

Maharaja Ajit Singh was also pressing for action. Finally in a hurried conference, it was decided to raise 'Bidar Dil, son of Bidar Bakht, to the throne, as he was reputed to be the most intelligent of the Princes. But when the *Wazir* and Raja Ajit Singh sent their attendants to fetch the prince the women refused to open the doors and started wailing and crying. In vain the emissaries shouted that they had been sent to fetch Bidar Dil to make him emperor, but the women had convinced

70. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p. 179.

themselves that the Saiyids were about to begin a general massacre of all the Salatin prior to assuming the throne themselves, and refused to unbolt.⁷¹

Ultimately the door was broken in, but Bidar Dil, locked in a closet could not be found. In desperation they turned towards the apartments of the sons of Rafi-ush-Shan and from among them they seized Rafi-ud-Darjat and dragged him out.

Then with the *Wazir* holding him by one hand, and Raja Ajit Singh by the other, the prince was led to the throne and requested to take his seat. The *wazir* leading, all the nobles in turn made their taslimats and presented nazars, while the musicians in the *naubat khana* were ordered to announce the new reign.⁷²

With the enthronement of Rafi-ud Darjat an accomplished fact, casting aside all delicacy, Najmud-Din Ali Khan was sent with about 400 to hunt out Farrukh Siyar. The room in which the craven Farrukh Siyar was hiding was soon broken in. He came out at last holding a naked sword. His mother, wife daughters and maid servants, tried to shield him but they were pushed aside. Easily overpowered, he was dragged out with every mark of indignity. His turban was knocked down while his captors

71 . G.S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals*, pp. 134-35.

72 . Ghulam Husain Tabatabai, i; p. 136, Irvine, i, p. 389.

taunted and abused him. Thus he was produced before the *Wazir* in torn and disordered clothes, sans turban and in barefeet. It is said that Abdullah Khan himself opened his writing box and took out a needle which he used for applying collyrium. Handing it to one of the men he ordered that the ex-emperor be thrown down and blinded, a command which was obeyed instantly. Thereafter, he was taken away to the room above the Tirpoliya, the same where his predecessor had been imprisoned and subsequently strangled.⁷³ Shortly afterwards on 29 April 1719, Farrukh Siyar was murdered and buried in the crypt of Hamayun's tomb.

Contradictory opinions have been expressed on the conduct of the Saiyids towards the emperor. On the one hand the Saiyids and Shiahs defended their action as the only course left. On the other hand, the rivals of the Saiyids denounced their conduct as being disloyal. None of these views can be fully accepted. It was unjustifiable or wrong to remove a worthless emperor who had proved treacherous and deceitful in different ways and set a new precedent in dealing with the undesirable. For seven years the state passed through a period of instability. Farrukh Siyar was strong neither for evil nor for good and as Irvine says 'it is impossible either to admire or regret him'. But the Saiyids were ministers and 'their way of doing what had almost become a necessity was unduly harsh',

73 . Irvine, i.p.390; Elliot and Dowson, viii p. 488.

utterly regardless of the personal dignity of the monarch. In those days, blinding a deposed king was a normal practice and the Saiyids just followed the prevailing custom. For this they can not be blamed specifically but 'the severity of the subsequent confinement was excessive and killing him in captivity was 'an extremity entirely uncalled for. According to one writer, Shah Nawaz Khan, the Saiyids were forced to do this in order to save their own lives and honours. But the same historian also says that it would have been nobler for them to have given up the struggle and retire to a distant place leaving the service and go onto Mecca. But it is not always open for men to rise superior to their passions. The Saiyids fell a victim to their own passions. In future they themselves met a violent fate. On the other hand it may be said that execution of Farrukh Siyar was unnecessarily cruel and it was a logical corollary to his deposition. The Saiyids could never feel secure for their lives and honour so long as he was alive and the main problem for them was to decide whether they could realize their object without deposition. Abdullah Khan felt that they could do so as long as the important offices were controlled by them. The primary responsibility for the deposition was Husain Ali's. The deposition created a fear in minds of many nobles about the intention of the Saiyids. It alienated their own supporters who were not prepared for such an extreme step. Before the execution the

Saiyids might have gained some praise for their bravery in fighting 'their ungrateful master. But after the deposition, the Saiyids came to be regarded as tyrants and treacherous to the salt (*Namakharam*) of the emperor.

All contemporary writers condemned the deposition as a disgraceful act. Considering the weakness of their actual position, it was political blunder on their part. Abdullah Khan himself regretted the deposition and blamed his brother for this. In destroying Farrukh Siyar, the Saiyids destroyed their effective protection against the old nobles. The rival Turani group now came forward to champion the cause of the outraged monarchy and royal family. They used the public revulsion against the Saiyids. The Saiyids had now to solve many problems of the empire but it became extremely difficult for them to do so.

Chapter 5

The Fall of the Saiyids

CHAPTER – 5

THE FALL OF THE SAIYIDS

The Saiyid brothers had made Farrukh Siyar's life a torture before they put it to a ghastly end on 28 April 1719. The grim deed provoked a strong and spontaneous reaction all over the capital and its repercussions were soon evident in Agra and other places.¹ The cruel treatment meted out to Farrukh Siyar in the prison stirred the minds of the people and proved the starting point of reaction against the Saiyids. The demonstration of anger by a section of public in Delhi was the first overt sign of opposition to their authority. The chroniclers who had previously justified the stand of the Saiyids now began to sympathise with the luckless Emperor. Even Mir Qasim, author of *Tarikh-i Sutanat-i Farrukh Siyar*, wavers in his devotion to the Saiyids. Khafi Khan again and again condemns the Saiyids on this score.²

Hatred of the Saiyids grew in volume and was directed equally powerfully against their partisans who had outraged public opinion by their conduct. For instance, Ajit Singh was generally condemned for his

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1. Hadi Kamwar Khan states that at least 15,000 to 20,000 people followed the bier of Farrukh Siyar. They wept and wailed; they tore their garments and threw dust on their heads. The women shrieked and threw stones on the servants of the Saiyids. (*Tazkirat-us Salatin-i Chagtai f 364 b*). But Khafi Khan and Ghulam Husain write that only two or three thousand beggars formed the funeral procession. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab* II, 820; *Siyar-ul Mutaakhkhirin* II, 425.
 2. *Mirat-i Waridat*, 540; *Shah-Namah-i Minawar-ul Kalam*, *Muntakhab ul Lubab*, II, 901, 902.905.

betrayal of Farrukh Siyar and came to be called the killer of his son-in-law (Damad Kush) wherever he went curses and abuses were heaped upon him.³ The citizens of Delhi violently demonstrated their anger against the Marathas.⁴ They viewed the policy of friendship with Churaman Jat, a former rebel and enemy of the public peace, as highly reprehensible. Ratan Chand who exercised a powerful influence at the court through his control of the departments headed by the Saiyids, was despised not only by the officers and clerks whom he treated abominably but also by the nobles who felt their dignity compromised by being obliged to present themselves at his residence when he used to hold office.⁵

The first serious expression of this resentment and revulsion of feeling was the revolt of Shayista Khan, maternal uncle of Farrukh Siyar, who gathered a force in Delhi to avenge the fate of his nephew. But his mansion was stormed and he was made prisoner.⁶ Other nobles like Ruhullah Khan III, Tahawwur Khan Turani and Salabat Khan unable to fight with the Saiyids left Delhi and joined Jai Singh who became the spearhead of opposition.⁷ At Agra, Mitra Sen⁸, a physician by profession

3 . Tarikh-i Sultanat-i Farrukh Siyar, f.83 Tabatabai, i.p.138, Irvine, i.p.408.

4 . Muntakhabul Lubab II, 811.

5 . Muntakhab-ul Lubab, Khafi Khan, II, 843.

6 . Ramraj 'Ibrat Namah f.69a.

7 . Cf. Zahiruddin Mallick, The Reign of Mohammad Shah, p. 35, Khafi Khan, II, 832.

8 . For details of his life, Khafi Khan's Muntakhab-ul Lubab II, 825-26.

set up Neku Siyar, a son of Prince Akbar living as prisoner in the Agra Fort as emperor in 18 May 1719. Samandar Khan the new commandant, was refused entry in the fort and the garrison prepared for defence. Mitra Sen tried to seek the help of the hostile nobles and local *zamindars*. There was talk of making a common front at Agra by Raja Jai Singh, Chhabela Ram Nagar and Nizam-ul Mulk such an overwhelming combination was expected to bring about the fall of the Saiyids.

Husain Ali Khan marched from Delhi on 23 June 1719 and after his arrival at Agra operations were launched vigorously against the insurgents. However, the rebellion failed to spread beyond Agra and did not receive any support from the high grandees. Even Nizam-ul Mulk, who passed Agra en route to Malwa, gave no help.⁹ Only Raja Jai Singh moved up to Toda Tank, a place 80 kos from Agra; beyond which he was not prepared to risk and advance.¹⁰ Mitra Sen appealed to the Saiyid brothers and other prominent nobles to accept Neku Siyar as the emperor and Abdullah Khan was said to be in favour of accepting the suggestion. But Husain Ali considering it a personal affront, declined and resorted to stern measures.

In spite of the conciliatory policy adopted by the Saiyids, two centres of resistance and overt challenge to their authority were rapidly

9 . Khafi Khan, 827-8, Shiva Das, 79-80.

10 . Khafi Khan, II, 827, 826.

formed; the first at Agra having been suppressed, Allahabad rebellion drew Saiyid's attention, which was due to the personal apprehensions of Chhabela Ram, an old servant of Farrukh Siyar and the Governor of Allahabad. He suspected the intentions of the Saiyids towards him and his suspicions were strengthened when the Saiyids attempted to displace him from Allahabad, and sent a force under Shah Ali Khan with instructions to seize the fort. In reality, the Saiyids had no desire to destroy Chhabela Ram, but they considered his possession of such a strong fort as Allahabad dangerous, especially as it commanded the route from which the vital Bengal treasures came to Delhi.¹¹ They were even prepared to grant Awadh to Chhabela Ram in exchange for the *Subahdari* of Allahabad, but the latter refused to place any trust in their word and rose in open revolt. Soon afterwards Chhabela Ram died. But the rebellion was continued by his nephew, Girdhar Bahadur.

These two rebellions occupied all the energies of the two brothers during the first fourteen months of their domination. It took three months of siege before hunger and treachery brought about the surrender of Agra (12 August 1719). Another nine months were spent before he agreed to

11. The Bengal treasure had been the mainstay of the Delhi government even towards the end of Aurangzeb's reign. At the time of Chhabela Ram's rebellion, a conveyo of 90 lakhs was waiting at Patna. The financial affairs of the brothers were not too good, as is evident from letters written at this time by Abdullah Khan to Chhabela Ram asking him to escort the treasure beyond his borders as the soldiers had not received their salaries for years (Balmukand Nama, 7, 27).

evacuate Allahabad (11 May 1720).¹² Meanwhile Girdhar Bahadur kept up the resistance bravely, and restored the confidence of the soldiers shaken by Chhabela Ram's death.¹³

The Wazir renewed the terms of peace which he had offered to Chhabela Ram. As no favourable response to overtures of peace was forthcoming, reinforcements under the command of Haider Quli Khan was dispatched. The insurrection continued for nine months without precipitating any serious fight¹⁴ and once again negotiations were set on foot through the medium of Ratan Chand in whom Girdhar Bahadur reposed his trust. It is significant that even then Gridhar Bahadur refused to place any reliance in the words of the Saiyid brothers, and stipulated that Ratan Chand should be the guarantor and intermediary.¹⁵ A settlement was reached by which he gave up his claims over the possession of Allahabad and accepted the *Subedari* of Awadh with the *faujdari* of Gorkahpur. The Saiyids conferred on him the rank of 5,000 and the title of Raja. He also received 30,00,000 of rupees as a gift.¹⁶ Suppression of Jai Singh was the next immediate task which drew the

12. Cf. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, p. 184-85.

13. *Tarikh-i Muzaffari*, p. 189.

14. Balmukand Namah No. 9, 10, 11, pp. 13-15. These letters are addressed to Haider Quli Khan and Shah Ali Khan. The substance of these letters is that Girdhar Bahadur should be forced, either by means of military operations or some amicable settlement, to surrender the fort. The Wazir informs the imperial generals that he is ready to march in that direction to reinforce them.

15. Khafi Khan, 838.

16. Balmukand Namah, Letter No. 4, p. 8.

attention of the Saiyids. But the risks involved in an attack on his stronghold forbade a major military action. Husain Ali Khan sent Ajit Singh to pacify Jai Singh and persuade him to lay down arms. At the same, the Saiyids announced that a punitive expedition against the refractory Raja would be launched when the Emperor visited the Shrine of Khwaja Muin-ud-din Chishti at Ajmer. The announcement was obviously designed to bring pressure on the Raja and terrify him into submission.¹⁷ Their tactics proved successful. Besides, Jai Singh's resolve to keep up armed opposition was shaken by lack of support from any quarter. In the circumstances, compromise appeared to be a wise and prudent step. He retired from Toda Tank and reached Amber.¹⁸ He received a sum of Rs. 20,00,000 and the faujdari of Sorath in Gujarat. The Mughal nobles who had sought refuge with him were allowed to stay in Amber. This, however, did not improve their relations, and Jai Singh remained in the opposite camp.¹⁹

Back to the Court, the property and mansabs of a number of the personal favourites of Farrukh Siyar – such as Mohammad Murad Kashmiri, Amin-ud Din Sambhali, Ghazi-ud-din Ahmad Beg and the emperor's relation like Saadat Khan, Shaistah Khan etc. were confiscated.

17 . Cf. Zahiruddin Mallick, 36-38.

18 . Khafi Khan, II, 835, 838.

19 . Cf. Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 36.

But the property of many more were spared. There was no bloody executions, and even some of the close favourites of the late emperor such as Khan-i Dauran and Mir Jumlah were left in possession of their mansabs and jagirs and given employment. In general, the Saiyids made no attempt to monopolize the high offices of state. M. Amin Khan continued to be the second *bakhshi*, another Turani, Roshan-ul-Daulah Zafar Khan was made the third *bakhshi* and even Inayatullah Khan, whose policies had been strongly opposed by the Saiyids, was allowed to continue as the *Khan-i Saman* and the (absentee) governor of Kashmir. The post of Sadr was given to Amir Khan, an old Alamgiri noble and then to Mir Jumlah.²⁰ Apart from the two highest offices of the state and the viceroyalty of the deccan which the Saiyids held since 1715, and the offices which controlled access to the emperor, the only new posts given to Barahas or the personal employees and dependents of the Saiyids were the subahdaris of Agra and Allahabad and the faujdari of Moradabad.²¹

All political symptoms pointed a favourable direction and angered well for the consolidation of the Saiyid oligarchy. Perils of great magnitude which had threatened the power and position of the Saiyids had been warded off by their political wisdom and diplomatic skill. Their

20 . Cf. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 182-83.

21 . Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

rivals were defeated and humbled. However, whatever was happening can safely be termed as the proverbial lull before the storm’.

The coalition which had brought about the deposition of Farrukh Siyar has to be maintained and consolidated at any cost, which implied two things, first, the consolidation and extension of the alliance with the Marathas and Rajputs and second the solution of what might be called ‘the problem of the Alamgiri nobles’.²² The *Jizyah* was abolished at the request of Ajit Singh after the deposition of Farrukh Siyar.²³ His queen, Ajit Singh widowed daughter was allowed to give up Islam and return home with all her wealth and property against the opinion of the *Qazi* and to the indignation of the Muslims. Khafi Khan described this as ‘unprecedented’.²⁴

Negotiations were made through Ajit Singh with the hostile Jai Singh Sawai who was appointed faujdar of Sorath in Ahmedabad. Ajit Singh was given charge of Ajmer and Gujrat. Thus these two Rajput Rajas constituted a very strong group. In spite of Ajit Singh’s pleading for the Saiyids, Jai Singh who married Ajit’s daughter did not join them. Nor did he join the Nizam against them. The Saiyids could not succeed with

22 . Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

23 . Khafi Khan, 816, Kamwar, 442, *Mirat-i- Ahmadi*, ii,23.

24 . Khafi Khan, p. 833.

the Rajputs except in the case of Ajit Singh. The Saiyids pact with the Rajputs, therefore, touched only Ajit Singh.²⁵

Other honours were also conferred on the Raja who thus became one of the most powerful and influential noble in the empire. The two Rajput rajas together constituted a very powerful faction in the empire. The returning confidence felt by the Hindus is reflected in Khafi Khan's 'complaint' that from the environs of the Capital to the banks of Narbada, the infidels were engaged in repairing temples and attempting to forbid cow slaughter.²⁶

The old Saiyid Maratha pact of 1718 was now strengthened by formal imperial grants, under the new emperor, Mohammad Shah's signature, of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi to the Marathas. The Marathas allies of Husian Ali carried these while returning to the Deccan. But their support, though unpopular, was one of the main sources of strength of the Saiyids in the Deccan. Alam Ali, Husain Ali's deputy had some connections with court of Satara through a minister and good relations with Shahu was maintained.²⁷

25 . Khafi Khan, 838 (Elliot (vii, p.485) has confused Sorath with Surat.

26 . Khafi Khan, 8960. No formal order prohibiting cow slaughter was passed by the Saiyids but on his own responsibility Ajit Singh prohibited it in the two subahs under his charge, an action which Khafi Khan says 'exceeded his authority' (Khafi Khan, 936).

27 . Cf. J.N. Sarkar, pp. 89-90, See also Duff I,368-9.

It was not only among the Rajputs and the Marathas that the Saiyids sought to extend their connections. They sought to bind churaman Jat still closer to themselves by further concessions. He was given charge of the royal highway from Delhi to Gwalior and took part in the siege of Agra, receiving favours for his services.²⁸

Another problem was that of the old Alamgiri and Bahadur Shahi nobles. The Saiyids had no intention to seek monopoly of power or follow a policy of religious or racial exclusiveness. As in the past they tried to win them over and get their cooperation in administration. They were given increments and also appointed to high posts or confirmed. In a letter to Nizam ul Mulk, 'Abdullah Khan explained his general policy in the following words: 'The high and mighty task of administering Hindustan is not one that can be accomplished single-handed, without the help of prominent nobles and officers of state. Under the circumstances, is it better that I should bring forward new (untried) men and become deponent on them, or that I should continue to take the help of one like out who has ever been a friend?'²⁹

It was, however, difficult to implement this policy. The Saiyids were suspected and feared by the nobles on account of the deposition of

28 . Shiv Das, 69, Kamwar, 423.

29 . Balmukund Namah, 2. The letter was written sometime in 1720 when Nizam-ul Mulk was the Governor of Malwa. 'Abdullah Khan used to say, 'we are three brothers of whom Nizam ul Mulk is the eldest and Husain Ali the youngest (Hadiqat-ul Alam by Mir Alam).

Farrukh Siyar. Many were jealous and dissatisfied with the supremacy of the two Hindustanis. Men like the Nizam and Mohammad Amin Khan were ambitious to enjoy supreme power; and if it was not possible they wanted to go away from the court and establish independent principalities of their own. The Marathas, too, cherished high ambitions which conflicted with the attempt of the Saiyids to win them over.³⁰

Moreover, the two brothers differed over personal and political question, viz. sharing the spoils of Victory after the capture of Agra, as well as political power. To some extent Ratan Chand effected a compromise. But the difference was deepseated.³¹ Husain Ali, being more energetic, wanted to dominate over the elder brother. But he was hasty and he did not want the Nizam to remain in the court. He wanted to send the Nizam to Malwa. But Abdullah Khan wanted him to go to Bihar. The over hastiness of Husain Ali (in liquidating political rivals) and his arrogant and tactless behaviour contrasted sharply with the wisdom and moderation of Abdullah and largely accounted for the failure of the Saiyids. Distrusting the Saiyids, the Nizam agreed to go to Malwa as a long term measure and refused to leave his son in the Court.³² A conflict between the Nizam and the Saiyids was inevitable. Both the Turanis and

30 . J.N. Sarkar, pp. 90-91.

31 . At the intervention of Ratan Chand, 'Abdullah Khan received 21 or 28 Lakhs, supposed to represent his share of the booty after deducing the expenses. 'Abdullah Khan felt cheated. Khafi Khan, 847, Qasim, pp. 117-18, Maasir ul Umara, i, 331.

32 . Khafi Khan, 847-58.

the Iranis, looking down upon the Hindustani and Indian born Muslims, supported the Monarchy and claimed monopoly of power by excluding the Hindustani nobles.³³ Many did not like the alliance between the Saiyids and the Hindus (the Rajputs and the Marathas), the abolition of *Jizyah* and other discriminatory cesses. Many were just waiting to strike at the Saiyids who were considered to be checks to their own individual ambitions. Under these circumstances, an attempt on the part of the Saiyids to take a strong attitude towards Nizam-ul Mulk stood in danger of being interpreted by these nobles as part and parcel of a policy designed to root out all the old nobles. There was a risk the Saiyids could ill afford to take, because the alternative course was to bring forward new, untried men which created the danger of a breakdown of the administration, and an opportunity to the Rajputs, Marathas, jats etc. to augment their power.

Unfortunately for the Saiyids, events so shaped themselves that they were drawn to take the very step they wished to avoid most, viz., the driving of Nizam ul-Mulk into open rebellion.

To the misfortune of the Saiyids, Mohammad Shah by this time too had started thinking of throwing off the yoke of the Saiyids. He naturally

33 . Many Hindi and Turani nobles were opposed to Husain Ali Khan due to personal grudge and jealousy (Tarikh-i-Hindi, Rustam Ali, p. 469).

found many supporters among the enemies of the Saiyids, the ablest being the Turani Nizam.³⁴

Although Nizam ul Mulk and the Saiyids had never actually crossed arms, there was no love lost between them ever since his recall from the viceroyalty of the Deccan in 1714, and replacement by Husain Ali Khan. Nizam ul Mulk and his late father, the blind Ghazi ud-Din Khan Feroz Jung had started their careers in the Deccan and both had been favourites of Aurangzeb.

The Saiyids too had genuine complaints against the Nizam. It was reported that he was collecting men and war materials in Malwa in excess with the object of occupying the Deccan. When questioned by the Saiyids, Nizam ul Mulk explained his action by pointing to the necessity of checking the Marathas who were harrying the province with 50,000 horse.³⁵ But the Saiyids suspected him because he was in concert with the anti Saiyid Jai Singh. The Nizam also appointed a quiladar Marhamat Khan dismissed by Husain Ali from the fort of Mandu.³⁶ Again the Nizam ravaged certain villages of a pargana Nilam and transferred its zamindars against the wishes of the Saiyids.³⁷ They also suspected Nizam-ul Mulk of having instigated the uprising of Neku Siyar.³⁸

34 . Cf. J.N. Sarkar, p. 92.

35 . Shiv Das, 79-80 (Nizam's letter to Abdullah), Khafi Khan, 851.

36 . *Khafi Khan*, 849, 858, *Tabatabai*, 425. Husain Ali considered Marhamat employment a defiance of their authority.

37 . Khafi Khan 851.

38 . Warid, 315.

However, it was with the arrival of the emperor's mother Mariam Makani (now Nawab Qudsia) at the royal camp near Fatehpur Sikri on 14 Oct. 1719 that matters began to assume a different complexion. The pent-up of dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs began to express itself in secret consultation and conspiracies among the nobles who were opposed to the Saiyids. The elements of opposition centred around Qudsia Begum, a sagacious lady, who also possessed a talent of no mean order for undercover intrigue. Anxious to emancipate her son she quickly discovered the instruments she could employ for the purpose. She set to work with Mohammad Amin Khan, the influential leader of the Turani faction and an adept in the art of intrigue and dissimulation, to prepare schemes for the overthrow of the Saiyids.³⁹

Mohammad Amin Khan's hatred for the Saiyids was fierce and strong. He longed for an opportunity to destroy their power. He had sided with Husain Ali against Farrukh Siyar but had gained nothing from the alliance, which had only added to the power and riches of the Saiyids. He himself enjoyed neither influence nor confidence in the councils of the Saiyids. Aggressive, ambitious and unscrupulous he became alienated from them thereby persuading Mohammad Shah and his mother to take Nizam-ul Mulk also into confidence and enlist his support. Accordingly,

39 . Zahiruddin Mallick, pp. 58-59.

the Emperor and Mohammad Amin Khan opened a correspondence with Nizam ul Mulk and explained to him in a series of letters the purpose of their plans against the Saiyids and informed him of the scheme being prepared by the Saiyids for the complete ruin of the Turani group.⁴⁰

No contemporary writer has recorded the text of the letters, Nizam ul Mulk wrote in reply to the Emperor's letters. In the absence of definite evidence it is difficult to ascertain the aims and objectives which goaded this Turani leader to plunge head long into an armed clash with the Saiyid faction. Qasim Aurangabadi holds that, besides the question of his personal safety, Nizam ul Mulk wanted to restore Muhammad shah to sovereign authority and set up a new political order in which the Mughals could occupy the forefront of the stage.⁴¹

However, all these preceding events might not have led to an open breach with Nizam ul Mulk had other more urgent considerations not intervened, namely Husain Ali being desirous to govern the Deccan along with Malwa, Gujrat, Ajmer and Agra personally for two reasons (i) to check the vaulting ambition of Satara, and to check the expansion of Maratha in Malwa and Gujarat.⁴² (ii) to check the secret design of the Nizam to conquer the Deccan.⁴³

40 . Ibid., p. 59.

41 . Ahwal-ul Khawaqin, f.194a, Khafi Khan II, 855.

42 . Khafi Khan, 851, 857, 859; Tabatabai, 425.

43 . Khafi Khan, 858. After his rebellion Nizam mul Mulk was joined by a contingent from Tara Bai at Burhanpur.

So the Saiyids wanted to divide the empire into two zones between the two brothers, the North and the South. A partition of the empire on these lines had also been suggested as a solution to the growing differences between the two brothers. As a first step towards such a division, the Saiyids wanted to remove Nizam ul Mulk from Malwa. Husain Ali offered Nizam ul Mulk the choice of the Governorship of Agra, Allahabad, Burhanpur and Multan⁴⁴ assuring him that he would be sent the *sanad* of whichever *subah* he chose.⁴⁵

Nizam-ul Mulk looked upon the order of transfer as a breach of promise. His attitude was perfectly logical. The Saiyids began to take precautions. By this time Nizam ul Mulk had also received special messages from the emperor and his mother asking him to liberate them from the grip of the Saiyids.⁴⁶ Hence, he decided to disregard the order to return to the Court, and unfurled the banner of revolt. He left Ujjain, ostensibly for the Court, but turned south, and crossed the Narmada into the Deccan.⁴⁷ He was joined by the governors of Berar and Khandesh. Old nobles, confirmed by the Saiyids, raised anti Saiyid slogans. These desertions reveal the political weakness of the Saiyids and their profound unpopularity at the time, having been termed with traitors to the salt.

44 . Khafi Khan, 851, 857, 859.

45 . Khafi Khan 850.

46 . Khafi Khan, 851.

47 . Ibid. 856. Irvine ii, 22.

Nizam ul Mulk exploited these sentiments and posed himself as the champion of the monarchy and of Islam, defender of the Irani and Turani nobles and their racial interests.⁴⁸ Thus after the conquest of Burhanpur, Nizam ul Mulk is said to have assembled all the prominent men of the town and told them, 'The only object of my exertions is to free the emperor from the tyranny of the selfish people who have placed such restrictions on his liberty that he cannot even come to the Friday prayers.'⁴⁹

Frightened and perplexed, the Saiyid brothers could not frame a common course of action. Distrusting the Mughals, particularly the Turanis, Husain Ali wanted to have Muhammad Amin Khan murdered. Abdullah Khan could not agree with this as being unwise and dishonest. He even wanted to conciliate the Nizam by giving him the Deccan. Ratan Chand and Khan-i-Dauran supported Abdullah Khan's proposal for a compromise, remarking that 'war would end in the death of the Saiyids.'⁵⁰ The uncompromising Husain Ali had to give up the idea of removing Mohammad Amin Khan. He planned to attack the Nizam with Maratha troops from two sides i.e. a northern army under Dilawar Khan and a

48 . This aspect is emphasized by almost all the contemporary writers. The alliance of the two brothers with Ajit Singh and Churaman jat, the dominance of Ratan Chand 'the vile infidel' in their affairs, the abolition of *Jizyah* is emphasized by all writers as causes of disgust of the old nobles.

49 . Khafi Khan, 855. Hadiqat ii, 98.

50 . Khafi Khan, 867.

southern army under Alam Ali, the deputy of Husain Ali in the Deccan. Letters were also dispatched to Shahu and to Balalji Vishwanath requesting them to assist Alam Ali. But the Nizam defeated the northern army on 19 June 1720 near Burhanpur and faced the southern army supported by the Marathas under the peshwa.⁵¹

The news of the disaster at Burhanpur caused consternation at Agra. A whole army had been lost and Amir ul Umara's family was in peril. At first he was all for rushing to the Deccan and taking on the Nizam head on, but saner counsels prevailed and it was decided to write a conciliatory letter to the Nizam.

In alarm Abdullah Khan again suggested a compromise. But finally the Saiyids planned a double edged policy: (i) The Nizam was to be appointed viceroy of the Deccan and be asked to allow Alam Ali and the family of Mir Bakhshi to leave the Deccan.⁵² (ii) A great army was to be sent to the Deccan and the southern commander (Alam Ali) was to wait.

⁵³ But the Nizam could easily see through the game. He was too shrewd to relax and he turned the tables against the Saiyids by declaring Alam Ali a rebel for defying imperial authority and not handing over charge of

51 . In fulfillment of Shahu's promise, Baji Rao joined Alam ali with 15,600-16,000 horsemen. Khafi Khan, 874, Hadiqat ii, 101.

52 . Irvine ii, 35-36.

53 . Khafi Khan, 886. Iqbalnamah 88.

the Deccan to him. The Nizam routed Alam Ali and his Maratha allies at Shaker Khera on 10 August 1720.

These successive military defeats in the Deccan struck a shattering blow at the power and prestige of the Saiyid brothers. A spirit of gloom deepened by the invincibility of Nizam ul Mulk army spread in their camp. At this juncture Mohammad Amin Khan suggested that the best course for them would be to come to an understanding with the redoubtable Nizam ul Mulk; and by frankly accepting the realities of the situation in the Deccan they should recognize him as the governor of the province. If that was done he offered to send his son Qamar ud din to the south to fetch Husain Ali Khan's family from Daulatabad. The Saiyid brothers rejected the proposal; they declared their resolve to fight out the issue and punish Nizam ul Mulk for all his misdeeds.⁵⁴

In fact ever since Nizam ul Mulk's flight from Malwa Husain Ali Khan had been busy in completing plans for a campaign against him. The ever prudent Abdulah Khan had urged caution and delay in the hope that Dilawar Ali Khan and Alam Ali might defeat the enemy. But now that the affairs had turned out differently, Husain Ali Khan was determined to lead an immediate campaign to the Deccan and a huge force of 50,000

54 . Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 66.

troops mainly composed of the Saiyids of Barha and the Afghans were quickly raised for the campaign.⁵⁵

The Saiyids had all the time suspected Mohammad Amin Khan of having secretly instigated Nizam ul Mulk and they considered him as the root cause of all the troubles, the real centre of the intrigue and as a traitor in the camp. Twice they attempted to vent their wrath on him but the fear of a general revolt by the Mughals dissuaded them from executing their designs.⁵⁶ They were on the horns of a dilemma. What were they to do with Amin? If he was left behind in Delhi he would rebel, but if he accompanied the army to the south he would certainly desert and join their enemy. Husain Ali Khan ultimately decided to keep him in the camp where his activities could be closely watched. In order not to arouse his suspicion Husain Ali Khan humoured the Mughal leader and kept up the appearance of good relations with him. Liberal payments of salaries were made to Muhammad Amin Khan soldiers.⁵⁷

Mohammad Amin Khan was however too shrewd to be taken in by all this and although he too kept up an appearance of friendship, in his heart of hearts he was convinced that a blow must be struck against Husain Ali Khan by whatever means possible, and he was equally

55 . Tarikh-i Muzaffari, 214.

56 . Shiv Das, f.45a.

57 . Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 67.

convinced that he was not going to be spared whenever it suited Husain Ali Khan design.

“The Saiyids possessed a substantial superiority in man power. Besides the force of 50,000 soldiers and a sizable part of artillery, they could call for powerful armed support from the different provinces of the empire. They had at their disposal vast financial resources and could keep their soldierly liberally paid.⁵⁸ The trump card which they held in their hands, however, was the presence of the Emperor in the army they commanded. They could use him with powerful effect to cause defections among Nizam-ul Mulk’s soldiers and wean nobles *mansabdars* away from his camp to their side. Here was the key by which the doors of success for the Saiyids could be opened”.⁵⁹

Meanwhile leaving Abdullah Khan in September 1720 Husain Ali Khan Mohd. Amin Khan and the emperor set out for the Deccan and proceeded by way of Ajmer because Husain Ali Khan wanted to meet Raja Ajit Singh and discuss with him the details of the campaign.

The projected separation of the two brothers would afford the opportunity for which Amin Khan was looking.⁶⁰ Once Husain Ali Khan was eliminated Abdullah Khan could easily be subdued and the Saiyid

58 . Shiv Das, f. 45b.

59 . Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 68.

60 . Ibid., p. 68.

faction would be liquidated. Mohammad Amin Khan contrived to bring into the plot some more Mughal nobles of influence like Saadat Khan and Haider Quli Khan who were motivated by personal as well as group interests. The Mughal chief made an appeal to his followers, asking for a volunteer ready to risk his life. Should he succeed and survive the attempt the Queen mother would be in his debt forever should he die in the attempt, he could be assured that his family and dependents would be looked after well. At first no one spoke but then one Mir Haider Beg Dughlal Kashghari stood up and offered himself saying, 'I am a Saiyid and so is he. If brother kills brother what does it matter?'⁶¹ This man was descended from an ancient family whose ancestors has been Khans of Kashgar. His ancestor, Mirza Haider, had been governor of Kashmir under Humayun and was the author of the *Tarikh-i Rashidi*, a history of the Chughatas and Timurids.

On 8 October 1720 the imperial camp reached a place between Jiund and Biund about two kos to the east of Toda Bhim, 75 miles north west of Agra and 60 miles east of Jaipur. By this time the conspiracy had matured. On the fateful day of 8 October, when Husain Ali Khan was returning in his Palanquin from the imperial enclosure he was approached by Mir Haider Beg who presented to him a written petition of complaints

61 . Irvine, ii, p.57.

against Mohammad Amin Khan. The moment Husain Ali Khan became engrossed in reading it Haider Beg drew a dagger, plunged it into his body and instantly cut off his head. He was himself immediately killed by Nurullah, the nephew of Husain Ali Khan but Nurullah was soon put to the sword by some Mughal soldiers who had by now come up to the spot. Husain Ali Khan's head was brought to the tent of Haider Quli Khan where Muhammad Amin Khan was also present. Husain Ali was fifty two years of age when he was killed.⁶² There being no reason to continue the journey it was decided to return to the capital to overthrow the wazir. The emperor appointed Mohd. Amin as his new wazir. The bodies of Syed Husain Ali, Ghairat Khan and Nurullah were laid out in biers and sent for burial at Ajmer.

Abdullah Khan was then on his way to Delhi. When he heard the news he pushed on to the capital and raised a new puppet to the throne under the name of Ibrahim Khan and attempted to rally his supporters. The Barahas⁶³ stood by him to the end, as also Churaman Jat. Many Afghans, too, joined perhaps out of mercenary motive, though M. Khan Bangash, the only prominent Afghan noble at the time, went over to the side of M. Amir Khan and the Emperor Muhammad Shah. Some old

62 . For details, see Irvine ii, 56-60.

63 . The only prominent Baraha who went against the Saiyids was Saiyid Nusrat Khan Bararha who had a personal grudge against Abdullah Khan and was a particular friend of Khan-i Dauran (Siyar 4367).

nobles of Farrukh Siyar living in retirement at Delhi, such as Ghaziud-din Beg, M. Murad Kashmiri etc. also agreed to join Abdullah Khan. Khafi Khan says that 'any butcher, cook or cotton carder who presented himself, mounted on some wretched pony was employed and given Rs. 80 per month.⁶⁴ But the hastily collected army of Abdullah could not stand against the armies of M. Amin Khan. Mohammad Khan Bangash and the emperor Mohammad Shah. On 13 November 1720, Abdullah Khan was defeated at Hasanpur near Delhi and taken prisoner.⁶⁵ He died of poison administered to him by the order of Mohammad Shah under pressure from the Mughal nobles at the age of fifty seven on 11 October 1722. He was buried at the side of his favourite mistress, a singer by the name of Kesar Mahi in a walled garden outside old Delhi.

Ghulam Husain Tabatabai narrates an interesting story regarding a partisan of the Wazir who visited a learned astrologer to consult him about the outcome of the final struggle between him and the Turani amirs. Without drawing up any horoscope and using only the letters of the words used by the visitor to frame his questions, the astrologer selected the following letters of the alphabet: *Ghain, Lam, Be, Ain, Qaf, Vow* and *Alif*: which on being put together formed the Arabic words: *Ghalab Aqua* i.e. 'Thine enemy shall prevail'. On being inverted it

64 . Khafi Khan, 915-16, 897-8, 918.

65 . For details of the battle of Hasanpur see Khafi Khan II, 921-34.

signifies, 'Thine end is come'. Read as chronograms, these words give the year of the fall of the Saiyids. Rarely has a prediction been more accurate.⁶⁶

66 . Tabatabai, i, p. 198.

Chapter 6

Socio-Cultural Scene

CHAPTER – 6

SOCIO-CULTURAL SCENE

The Mughal Empire underwent the process of disintegration in the 18th century accompanied by the collapse of its whole military and administrative structure. However the Mughal culture attained its most fully developed forms and continued to exercise a tremendous influence on the contemporary society for a long time to come.

The Mughal nobles, governors and local chieftains were primarily moved by the ambition of gaining political power, but they also combined the life of court and camp with a passion for intellectual pursuits for poetry, music, philosophy and science. At the same time there emerged religious and mystic movements which contributed to the moral transformation of society and growth of a cosmopolitan outlook among the people. Nadir shah was so deeply impressed by the elegant arts of India that he chose to take with him a number of artists, musicians, dancing girls, physicians and architects.¹

The Muslims of India who were assimilated into the vast cultural complex of the country, adopted native languages for common use in day-to-day life. Though Persian remained the literary and official

1 . Zahiruddin Mallick, p. 343.

language till such time as it was dethroned by Urdu. They learnt Hindi dialects, like Braja Bhasha and Awadhi and their poets, saints and artists used them in expressing their ideas and feelings. “The devotional character of Hindi songs and the appeal which the language made to the *Sufis* brought Hindus and Muslims closer together than any other influence”.² The Muslims also took a prominent part in the development of regional languages and literatures such as Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati and Sindhi. The growth of Urdu which took place during the long span of time from the 13th to the 18th centuries represents a process of linguistic and cultural synthesis, an admixture of Hindi grammar, Persian script and Arabic Persian vocabulary. The language grew into a rich and effective medium of expression for values and concepts common to both Hindus and Muslims. In the domain of art heterogeneous items took a more and more congruous shape, making its landscape pleasant and beautiful.³ Thus, “an endless process of absorption, assimilation and adjustment of diverse elements and tendencies has gone for centuries giving shape and complexion to the cultural tradition of India”.⁴

2. M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, 166, 167, 170, 171.

3. Beni Prashad, *Hindu-Muslim Question*, Allahabad, 1941, p. 11.

4. Presidential Address by K.A. Nizami, *Proceedings of Indian History Congress*, Allahabad, 1965, 141.

In describing the cultural milieu of the period special attention may be given to the extravagant and ostentatious lifestyle of the elite and the position they occupied in society.

The Mughal nobles imitated their masters in their extravagant life of sensuality and pageantry. “When the Mogul government was in the plenitude of its power”, observed William Hodges, “it was an object with the Omrahs or great Lords of the Court, to hold captive in their *Zanahs* (female apartments) even hundreds of females, collected from various quarters of empire, and particularly so from cashmire, a country famous for the beauty of its women”.⁵ The nobles amassed wealth at the expense of the state, especially in times when there was a weak man at the helm of affairs. For instance, during the reign of Farrukh Siyar, the Saiyid brothers acquired property worth a crore (ten million) rupees.⁶

The literature of the period is replete with references to the indulgence by nobles in all manner of sensual pleasure. Even if we make due allowance for poetic exaggeration, Mir Taqi Mir’s observations on the luxurious life of nobles cannot be dismissed lightly.

Qutb ul Mulk Abdullah Khan is said to have been much addicted to the company of women. ‘Saiyid Abdullah Khan’, remarks

5 . Travels in India, p. 22. Also see Grose, *A voyage to the East Indies*, I, pp. 135.7, 138 and 140-1.

6 . Maasir ul Umara, I, p. 837; Khafi Khan, II, p. 837; Kamwar, p. 280.

Khafi Khan, “had procured innumerable beautiful fairy faced women, and concubines.⁷ He adds: “Abdullah Khan was much attached to the women and was a debauche. He included two or three most beautiful women belonging to the royal *haram* in his own female apartments. He collected seventy to eighty choicest and most beautiful and fascinating women, and in their company he passed most of his time in ratifying his animal desires.⁸ Similarly, Zulfiqar Khan who was *Wazir* under Jahandar shah was plunged deep in dissipation. Earlier, Munim Khan *Khan-i Khana*⁹, noble of the reign of Bahadur Shah I, amassed so much wealth that on his demise, goods and cash amounting to three crores of rupees were recovered from his house.¹⁰

The *Majlis-i Yazdahum* (the death anniversary of Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani) organized by *Wazir ul Mamalik*, Qamaruddin Khan, presented a vivid picture of the luxurious life of the nobles. Dargah Quli Khan observes as follows : He celebrates the eleventh day of every month, and the dancing girls, musicians and mimics are invited to entertain the participants by their performances.¹¹ Amir-ul Umara Husain Ali Khan possessed fabulous wealth. Three hundred carts loaded

7 . Khafi Khan, II, pp. 821-22.

8 . Khafi Khan, II, pp. 821-22.

9 . He was *Wazir* under Bahadur Shah I. For biographical notice see *Maasirul Umara* III, pp. 667-676.

10 . Later Mughals, I, pp. 124-25.

11 . *Muraqqa-i Dehli*, pp. 124-25.

with gold coins and untold silver coins were recovered from his house following his assassination.¹² He used to spend a good deal of money on the upkeep of his household and on dancing-girls and music parties; so much so that even his huge income did not suffice.¹³

The luxurious style of living of the nobles became so serious a source of moral degeneration of the rank and file of Muslim society that Yahya Khan in sheer despair prayed to God, saying :

“O God, inspire the *Khalifa* of the world and the *umara* (nobles) and *hukkam* (bureaucracy) of the Empire to devote themselves to the welfare of the common people and to make the country prosperous. Let them keep themselves busy in suppressing the refractory and disobedient elements, in supporting the weak and the old, in dispensing justice, in restoring the divine laws of Islam, in stamping out infidelity, and in reviving the honour of the prophet and his successors”.¹⁴

Not that there were no nobles of a pious and virtuous kind. It is said of Nizam-ul Mulk Asafjah¹⁵, for examples that he strictly adhered to the *awamir-wa-nawahi* of Islam (do's and don'ts) and passed some of his time in discussion with the *ulama* and the *mashaikh*. After his

12 . Ahwalul Khawaqin, f. 177a.

13 . *Maasir-ul Umara*, I, p. 320. For a detailed account of the Wealth which he secured from the fort of Agra after the fall of Nekusiyar, see Khafi Khan II, p. 387.

14 . Tazkiratul Muluk, f. 140a.

15 . For his character, see, Khafi Khan II, pp. 747-50; Masirul Umara III, pp. 837-48.

morning prayers he attended to matters of state. In the afternoon, he offered his *zuhr* and *asr* prayer in company with Muslims, recited the Quran, read books on hadis. Thereafter he attended on mystic and pious men.

He was much devoted to the Saiyids, who claimed to be members of the families of the Prophet and holy *Imams*.¹⁶ Similarly Saadat Khan Burhan-ul Mulk is credited with having been endowed with angelic virtues. He was a lover of justice. He was a brave soldier and a generous well-wisher of his soldiers. He was also devoted to religion. He observed the prescribed fasts, performed *namaz* and recited the *Quran*.

The nobles of the period maintained bands of singers and dancers. It is reported that Husain Ali Khan spent an enormous amount of money on them.¹⁷ Khushhali Ram Jani, a famous dancing girl of Delhi, was attached to the court of Qamaruddin Khan.¹⁸

The general character of the Mughal nobility of the period was complex one, being compressed of both virtues and vices. Religion and worldiness went side by side.

16 . Khafi Khan, II, p. 749.

17 . For details see Maasir ul Umara, I, p. 320.

18 . Muraqqa-i Delhi, p. 77.

Raushan-ud Daula celebrated the *urs* of Khwaja Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki with great pomp and splendour. Both sides of the road from old Delhi to the shrine (situated at Mehrauli), were illuminated. It is said that two lakhs of rupees were spent on the lights and on the food for *fatiha*.¹⁹ Husain Ali Khan and Abdullah Khan too celebrated the feasts of *Yazdahum* and *duwazdahum*. It is recorded that Husain Ali Khan²⁰ used to send large sums of money every month to most of the cities for the *Niyaz* of the Saiyids and the saints. He gave orders to all provincial governors, saying that they should spend one hundred and eleven rupees on the eleventh day of every month, on the *fatiha* of *Pir Dastagir* and one hundred twelve rupees on the *fatiha* of the Holy Prophet on the twelfth day of every month. He himself spent a thousand and eleven and a thousand twelve rupees on the *fatiha* of *Pir Dastagir* (Ghaus Pak) and Holy Prophet. An equal amount was set apart for this purpose from the Imperial treasury too. The *mashaikh*, the divines, and the *ulama* were invited. For such recluses as were not in a position to come to the feast, they sent conveyances. Also with all humility and reverence, they personally served them in the assemblies. They stood with fans in their hands to whisk off the flies.²¹

19. Muraqqa-i Delhi, pp. 37-39.

20. Husain Ali Khan reposed great faith in Saiyid Ghulam Husain Qadiri; a saint poet of Aurangabad.

21. Khafi Khan, II, pp. 635 and 964; Maasir ul Umara I, pp. 312-38.

In the same way, Nawab Alauddaulah Motamanul Mulk Jafar Khan Nusairi (Murshid Quli Khan) of Bengal celebrated the feast of Rabi-ul Awwal. Ghulam Husain Salim gives a detailed account of the festive aspects of the feast.²² By an order, Abdullah Khan supported *Khadim vakil's* position with regard to get the *Nazar* offered by pilgrims in general, and by Jafar Khan Nusairi in particular at the shrine of Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti of Ajmer. There are many documents relating to the shrine of Khwaja Sahib indicating the devotion of the Saiyid Brothers. From one of the documents it comes to light that Abdullah Khan earmarked 100 bighas of land at Ajmer for rose cultivation for the sake of offering at the shrine regularly and on the occasion of *urs*.²³ Their link with Ajmer shrine appears strong and hereditary. Syed Abdullah Mian, F/o Syed Husain Ali Khan laid out a garden, founded a quarter (*Mohalla*) known as Abdullahpura where water channel was brought from Ana Sagar lake. His wife tomb of beautiful carved marbles is still a monument of class. Hassan Ali Mausoleum and grave of others family members of Saiyids in it speaks volume of their devotional connection with Ajmer.²⁴

The nobles at the Imperial court in Delhi and the provincial governors ordered celebrations whenever they recovered from an illness.

22 . For details, see Riyazus Salatin, eng. Trans., p. 280.

23 . For details see, Dr. S.L.H. Moini, *Chisti shrine of Ajmer*, Pirs Pilgrims Practice, Jaipur, 2004.

24 . Har Bilas Sarda, *Ajmer, Historical and Descriptive*, pp. 173-175.

They had a ritualistic bath to mark the occasion. They received *nazar* from officers subordinate to them. They also distributed money in the form of *Sadaqa* and *Khairat*. The people of the time must have found it rather difficult to draw a line between extravagance and generosity. A perusal of the records would show that most of the nobles of the period were very generous towards the poor, the *ulama*, the *Sufis*, students, scholars, poets, artists and soldiers. Husain Ali Khan²⁵ was famous for his philanthropy. None of his soldiers, it was said was without gold and silver. Leaders of the contingent would go from camp to camp to tell the soldiers that they should go to the court of the Nawab and get gold and silver according to their needs, and the soldiers would reply that they had enough and they had no place for storing their wealth.²⁶

The nobles of this period often generously patronized men of letters and scholars. One Husain Ali Khan presented three lakhs of rupees and an elephant with a golden chain to Mirza Abdul Qadir Bedil. Abdulah Khan held Mirza Bedil in his esteem. Twice or three times

25 . On the authority of Mir Allah Bakhsh, a close companion of Husain Ali Khan, Rustam Ali describes the character of the Nawab as follows "he kept vigil day and night, and except for his siesta he very rarely slept. He offered his five prayers in congregation and in two or three *pas* (six or nine hours) read the whole of the Quran. He wore a simple dress and had no liking for gaudy garments. He strictly adhered to *Shariat* and never transgressed it. *Tarikh-I Hindi*, p. 237a; Cf. *Maasir ul Umara*, I, p. 338.

26 . Once Abdullah Khan distributed six lakh of rupees among the poor, following the example of Farrukh siyar, who had ordered him to distribute the same amount on his behalf. *Tarikh-i Hindi*, f. 228a. The author of *Risale-i Muhammad Shah wa Khan-i Dauran* tells us; "Abdullah Khan gave away his extensive state to the deserving and opened his treasury for giving daily allowances to the necessitous... The people enjoyed affluence due to his generosity". *Ibid.*, f. 94a.

Mirza Bedil went to meet him and the former rose from his chair to welcome him. On every occasion, he warmly received him and shook hands with him. Similarly both the Saiyid brothers were much devoted to Ikhlas Khan Wamiq²⁷ whom they regarded their *murshid*.

Similar was the attitude of Nizam-ul Mulk Asaf Jah. There were several poets and scholars attached to his court. He had also bestowed grants for the dargah of Ajmer. Zulfiqar Khan was famous for his generosity towards poet. It is recorded that once Shaikh Nasir Ali Sarhindi a poet, composed a eulogy for him. Zulfiqar Khan rewarded him with thirty lakh of rupees together with an elephant. Even then he expressed his regret at not being able to reward him adequately for his verses.²⁸

Samsam-ud-Din Khan-i-Dauran rewarded a poet called Muhammad Rafi of Kashmir with a thousand rupees. Burhan-ul Mulk Saaat Khan extended patronage to many scholars and literate of his age, so did his son in-law and successor Nawab Wazir Safdar Jung. With a view to demonstrating their devotion to religion and the welfare of the people and exhibiting their power and wealth, the nobles often undertook works of public utility. They constructed, mosques,

27. Originally a khattari, he was a native of Kalanaur. He was converted to Islam by Maulavi Abdullah, who was an eminent alim and the father of Hakim Sialkoti. He was given the name of Ikhlas Khan.

28. Masirul Umara, II, p. 104.

*madrasas, havelis, palaces, sarais, and tombs of saints.*²⁹ It is recorded that Amir-ul Umara Husain Ali Khan laid the foundations of a reservoir at Aurangabad which was subsequently enlarged and completed by Iwaz Khan.³⁰ He also built a *sarai*, a bridge, and other works of public utility in his native Barha.³¹ The elegant marble tomb of their mother and mausoleum of Husain Ali Khan at Ajmer reminds people of their contribution in architecture. Qulb-ul Mulk Abdullah Khan constructed a canal in Patparganj, a suburban town in Delhi because there was acute scarcity of water in that area. This canal was connected with the main canal which supplied water to Delhi and was dug during the reign of Shah Jahan.³² Nawab Muhammad Khan Bangash laid the foundations of several townships at Farukhabad such as Shahpur, Muhammadabad, Khuda Ganj, Darya Ganj, Ali Ganj, Yaqub Ganj, Shamsheer Ganj, and Kashi anj. He founded the town of Farrukhabad in honour of the Emperor Muhammad Farrukhsiyar. Imad ul Daula Qamaruddin Khan, the Wazir of Muhammad Shah, used personally to supervise the construction of his new buildings.

Nizam-ul Mulk Asafjeh rebuilt Gosha-i Mahal, the Chahar Mahal, and the Husaini Sagar at Haiderabad. He further rebuilt

29 . For an account of the general interest of the nobles in erecting buildings and laying gardens, see Grose, *A voyage to the East Indies*, I, pp. 137-8.

30 . He constructed a mosque at Aurangabad, in Shah Ganj area, *Maasir ul Umara*, II, p. 834; and Khafi Khan, II, p. 942.

31 . Khafi Khan, II, pp. 941 and 942.

32 . *Maasir ul Umara*, III, p. 140.

Nikamboli, which had been in ruin since the days of Aurangzeb. None of the earlier governors of the Deccan had even thought of repairing it. Nizam-ul Mulk spent considerable sums of money on the repair of old buildings. According to Mohammad Qasim Aurangabadi people used to say that even during the reign of Abul Hasan³³, buildings like those raised by Nizam-ul Mulk had never been constructed. The city of Aurangabad was practically re-founded by him. He also constructed the ramparts round the city.³⁴ Ghaziuddin Khan Firoz Jung, a son of Nizamul Mulk Asaf Jah, constructed a mausoleum, a mosque, and a *madrasa* in Delhi.³⁵ It is this *madrasa* that the Zakir Husain college in functioning today. Sharaf-ud Daula too built a mosque and a *madrasa* at Delhi.³⁶ Itmad-ud Daula Mohammad Amin had a *madrasa* constructed outside the Ajmeri Gate in Delhi.³⁷ At Shah-i Mardan the reputed holy foot print of Hazrat Ali is preserved. Nawab Bahadur Jawed Khan had *majlis khana* and a mosque constructed together with a fountain.³⁸ Many of these nobles were spiritually linked and attached to sufi orders

33 . Abul hasan was a king of Golkunda when Aurangzeb attacked the state and annexed it to his Empire. *Maasir-i Alamgiri*, trans, p. 183.

34 . Ahwal Khwaqin, ff. 223b-225b. He founded the city of Burhanpur in 1728-29 and Nizamabad as well. He also built a mosque, a bridge, and a sarai. He built the ramparts round the city of Haiderabad and the canal called Nahr-I Rasul. *Maasirul Umara*, III, p. 882; *Siyarul Mutakhhirin*, III, p. 871.

35 . *Asarus Sanadid*, Syed Ahmad Khan, pp. 293-4 and 300-5.

36 . *Ibid.*, p. 309.

37 . *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, f. 250a.

38 . *Asarus Sanadid*, pp. 320-1.

specially of Chishti *silsilah* and wished to be buried in the precinct of famous dargahs at Delhi and outside.

In spite of the fact that the Muslim society had fallen into the whirlpool of wide spread poverty from top to the bottom there was reckless display of wealth and extravagance, waste on the pursuits of pleasure, music and dance and observance of ceremonials from those having amassed wealth by corrupt practices. The insolvency (bankruptcy) of the Central government coffers, and treasuries of the nobles, had brought about general state of unemployment for all types of professional classes who earned their livelihood by attaching themselves to the courts of the kings and the nobles, the loss of peace and tranquility, law and order, which had adversely affected trade and industry, and thereby thrown the craftsmen and artisans out of employment.³⁹ “The private luxury and vices of the Mussulman princes, observes William Hodges, too frequently reduce them to a state of real poverty, even with large revenues and too often they delegate to artful, designing and avaricious characters, the management and the concerns of the state, and become virtually the plunderers instead of the parents of their subjects. These men, eager after their own private gain, and

39 . For the insolvency of the state coffers during the reign of Aurangzeb see *Niskha-i Dilkusha*, ff. 84b and 141a. However, for the insolvency of the state Coeffers at the time of Farrukh Siyar's accession (1712-13) see *Farruk Siyar Nama*, ff. 83-84a. For an account of the general state of corruption in the departments of the State, see *Siyarul Mutaakhkhirin*, II, pp. 826-34 and 840-42.

knowing well that their conduct will not bear the blaze of day, connive at any villainy that may be acted by those of inferior degree, many of whom are, indeed, their actual agents.⁴⁰ Thus it is that the people at large retain no real regard for their governors, and the natural consequence is, that the princes are frequently left, in the hour of distress, quite destitute of support, and an easy prey of any invader”⁴¹

Under these circumstances, the rank and file of Indian society in general and the Muslim community in particular, whose livelihood depended mainly on state service and service under the nobles, were the worst sufferers as a consequence of the extravagance of the emperors and the nobles. As such the servants of the state and those attached to the courts of the noble in one way or the other were hard hit.

The trade and industry of the period by and large depended on the patronage of the kings and the nobles, for they were the greatest consumers of the fine goods which the middle class people could not afford to buy. Hence due to the poverty of the kings and nobles, both the arts and artisans were directly affected. For instance, the merchants who brought horses from Isfahan could not find buyers in Northern India and had to go to the Deccan to sell them. The traveling in those days was full

40 . Ratan Chand, the *diwan* of Saiyid Abdullah Khan, collected wealth by hook and crook for his master causing great distress to the people. Due to general complaint against the Diwan, Farrukh Siyar was compelled to ask Saiyid Abdullah Khan for his dismissal but his order was defied. Khafi Khan II, p. 773; Tarikh-i Farrukh Siyar, p. 24.

41 . William Hodges, Travels in India, p. 103.

of danger and involved risk of life and property. In case they sold their horses to any noble, the bargaining was made in such a way as if the horses were stolen property. Even if the price was settled and letter of payment was issued, the *amil* did not pay the amount saying that he had no money to make the payment. On the return from the office of the *amil*, the merchants found both the horses and the money were lost.⁴²

The peasants were not free from worries. The vagaries of nature and the fear of draught haunted their minds all the time and so much so there had always been a possibility of their being confiscated due to the non-payment of the land revenues, which caused great insecurity to them.

There were many a poet in this period earning their livelihood by composing poems and by joining the courts of the kings and nobles. On that account they were generally regarded as well off, but infact, as Sauda himself records, they too were hard hit owing to the economic crisis with which the ruling class suffered. Therefore, the poets like other professional classes, had fallen on the thorns of life. The teachers had lost their former respect. The *Maktab*s were deserted as there were few students to be taught. The Masnavi recitors were paid barely two rupees. The preachers imparted lessons to the students in the day and

42 . Kulliyat-i-Sauda, I, p. 365.

maintained the accounts of someone in the night, as if he was a teacher of mathematics. Besides he had to suffer great insults and hardships from the misbehaviour of the students, who put thorns under the carpet on which the teacher sat.⁴³

The calligraphers, who at the heyday of the Mughal rule, were highly paid for their art of calligraphy, had now fallen into the bad days and were compelled by the circumstances to write hundred verses calligraphy in one *paisa*. There was none to appreciate such an art.⁴⁴

The profession of the false *Shaikhship* (saintship) was regarded very lucrative and they passed their lives in affluency, as they received gifts and presents from their disciples and devoted common people. Since the period under study saw the rise of pseudo-saints, therefore this profession, too lost its glamour. The literature of the period is replete with condemnation of those false saints. The poet ridiculed them and compared a saint's turban to a donkey's tail; others compared it to a cupola. The shaikhs had thus fallen on evil days and were at a loss to earn enough even to keep body and soul together.⁴⁵ Yet real sufi saints enjoyed respect of emperors nobles, ruling elites and even of common masses. Shah Fakhruddin Delhavi who ushered in a renaissance of

43 . Ibid., I, p. 366.

44 . Ibid., I, p. 366.

45 . Ibid., I, p. 366.

chistiya order was always held in high esteem by the people and had thousands of *murid* irrespective of caste, colour and creed. He had even allowed his non muslim disciple to recite *wazaif* (*latinies*). Mirza Mazhar Jan-i-Jaban, Khwaja Mir Dard etc. were the other famous sufi saints of the time who earned respect from the people.

Nizam ul Mulk Asaf Jah and his family was closely attached to Shah Fakhruddin Dehlavi, while Abdus Samad Khan, Raushan ud Daula were the followers of Shah Bhik and Shah Miran.

Muslim jurists, theologians and scholars were also watching the political developments with keen interest and wanted to reform the society. Shah Waliullah was one of them who was of the opinion that the Muslim nobility should change their standard of moral and ethical values so that the common man may or should also imitate them.

Thus all the professional classes were literally thrown on the streets. Not only Mir Taqi Mir but almost all the poets of the period have bemoaned neglect of the arts and the artists.⁴⁶

Hard pressed by penury, many famous poets, scholars and men of art of Delhi migrated to the provincial towns in the hope of making sure of two square meals a day. Khan Arzu, Sauda, Mir, Insha, Jurat, Mushafi, Jafar Ali Hasrat and others left Delhi for Lucknow. In his

46 . Kulliyat-i Mir, p. 167.

autobiography *Zikr-i Mir*, and other verses Mir depicts his own appalling and wretched condition.

In the same way the author of *Risala-I Muhammad Shah-wa Khan-i Dauran*, gives a heart rending account of the thirty six professional classes which were more or less in the same plight as the poets of the period.⁴⁷ Unemployment was widespread at all levels of Muslim society. It was the most vital problem which the Muslims of 18th century had to face without any hope of immediate remedial steps from the government, which was bankrupt.

Enumerating the main causes of the wretched condition of the masses, Shah Waliullah says that the foremost cause was heavy taxation. Without such taxation the nobles could not have enough money for their extravagances. This taxation broke the backbone of the peasantry, as well as of the artisans and the merchants. Land revenue and octroi duties were the main sources of income for the kings and their nobles. Their ever-mounting expenses and spendthrift ways of life led to exorbitant exactions.⁴⁸

Apart from the general insecurity and virtual paralysis of the administrative machinery, blatant injustice, and victimization, the

47 . *Risala-i Muhammad shah wa Khan-i Dauran*, ff. 159a-83a.

48 . *Hujjatiullah-ul Baligha*, Urdu Trans I, p. 163.

society of the day was plagued by unprecedented corruption all levels of the bureaucracy. Indeed it affected the economic condition of the masses. Even in the capital city of Delhi, there was much insecurity of life and property; so much so that people could not sleep peacefully during the nights.⁴⁹

Thus one could see the wretched economic condition of the people everywhere in the country in general and in the city of Delhi in particular, having been subject to attacks and massacres at the hands of Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Marathas, the Jats, the Sikhs and the Rohillas.

No wonder, when Twining visited the city of Delhi in 1794, he too found it in the grip of destruction and poverty. Wherever he went, he happened to pass through the ruins of old monuments and mausoleums:

“The decline of the empire was visible in the tombs as well as in the palaces of the Emperors”.⁵⁰

The life of the common people in the 18th century was by and large replica of the kings and the nobility. As we have already seen both the kings and the peerage of the period wallowed in the mud of debauchery and dissipation. Naturally their influence filtered down and

49 . For details, see *Kulliyat-I Sauda*, I, pp. 378-71; For an account of the widespread practice of bribery. See, *Siyarul Mutaakhhirin*, II, p. 488.

50 . Twining, *Travels in India*, pp. 242-55.

in the rank and file of Muslim society, even places far off from the capital. The streets of Delhi reflected the life of the court and the nobles. After giving a detached account of the profligate life of the emperor Jahandar Shah, Khafi Khan throws light on the people of the period he remarks:

The unstable and transitory reign of Jahander Shah strengthened the foundations of cruelty and prevarication. The vocal and instrumental music and the dance of *qawwals*, the *kalawants* and the *dharis* become so popular that it became almost impossible that the *qazi* should turn out to be a distiller of spirit or that the mufti should emerge as drunkard.⁵¹

The cities and towns of North India in general and Delhi, Faizabad, Lucknow, Najbabd, Murshidabad and Azimabad in particular were dens of vice on the one hand and of piety and religiousness on the other hand. In every city there were large number of *khanqahs* (hospices), *madrasas* and mosques, as also brothels and gambling dens. The pimps were active in every nook and corner. There was a great contradiction in the attitudes of the people in general. They flocked to the *khanqahs* and the shrines with devotion and visited the brothels too

51 . Khafi Khan II, p. 689. Nuruddin corroborates the above statement of Khafi Khan. According to him the *qazis* and officers of lower rank spread the carpet of sensual pleasure deeply engrossed in listening to music and in witnessing dances. The popularity of dance and music was so great that one heard nothing but the songs of dancing girls and noisy brawls of drinkards in every quarter of the city. From the king to the soldiers, from the *faqir* to the *wazir*, everyone was emboldened enough to indulge. Drinking was popular in every section of Muslim society. For the general life of the Muslims of Delhi see, Muraqqa-i Delhi.

with enthusiasm. Thus sin and action of religion went side by side, more or less in a balanced way. When the situation became very alarming, Shah Waliullah in sheer disgust wrote to Ahmad Shah Abdali, saying that if the process of sin and iniquity could not be checked immediately and if its course was not channelled in other constructive directions, the Muslims would soon be unstable to differentiate between Islam and *kufr*.⁵²

Mirza Muhammad Bakhsh Ashab tells us that during the reign of Muhammad Shah, the emperor and the Wazir. The young and the old, the highest and lowest all became devotees of sensual pleasure. They shunned the hard military life and gave themselves over the ease and comfort after the battle of Hasanpur in 1721. The people too devoted themselves to marry making.⁵³

Thus, on the whole the period under review presented horrible picture of moral degeneration. The manifestations of obscenity crossed all reasonable bounds.

A careful study of *Muruqqa-i Delhi* and other contemporary literature would show that the common people of Delhi hankered for a life of sensual pleasure. Opportunities for the pursuit of such pleasures

52 . *Shah Waliullah Key Siyasi Maktubat*, p. 52.

53 . Munshi KhushLal Chand tells us that the people forgot their duty of obedience's of God. They switched their allegiance to sensual pleasure. *Tarikh-i Muhammad Shahi*, f.6a.

were afforded by the fairs held annually at Hindu temples or at the shrines of Muslim saints.⁵⁴

Muraqqa-i Delhi also refers to several examples of the immorality which had crept into Muslim society. It was as if the Muslims of those days had lost their self respect together Dargah Quli Khan gives us an eye witness account of the profligate atmosphere that obtained on the occasion of the *urs* at the shrine of Khuld Manzil.⁵⁵

Kasal Singh, a noble of Muhammad Shah, had founded a whore-house in Delhi known after his name as Kasalpura. The fascinating description of the place as given by Dargah Quli Khan shows how far the whole atmosphere had been vitiated by the luxurious life of the kings and the nobles.⁵⁶

Moreover, as a result of prevailing atmosphere of sensual pleasure, the people had developed a taste and liking for obscenely and obscene literature.

Thus, the permeation of such immoral practices and vices had eaten into the vitals of the physical and moral strength of the Muslim community in general and ruling classes in particular. The nobles who

54 . Mir Hasan Dehlavi gives a fascinating account of pilgrims on their way to attend the fair and *urs* held at the shrine of Shah Madarat Makanpur. *Masnaviyat-i Mir Hasan*, pp. 137-8.

55 . *Muraqqa-i Delhi*, pp. 17-8.

56 . *Muraqqa-i Delhi*, p. 76.

were the custodians and strength of the Mughal state, were engrossed in sensual pleasure and wasted their physical energies and financial resources in such activities, instead of exerting ceaselessly for the restoration of the past glory of the declining Mughal Empire and countering effectively the rising regional political forces.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

CHAPTER – 7

CONCLUSION

The Saiyids claimed descent from a family of Mesopotamia. One of their ancestors came to India and settled in India in Sarhind long before the Mughals appeared in India. They became thoroughly indianised, marrying here, founding settlements, and gaining importance from the time of Akbar onwards. There is some difference about their name, 'Barha' Saiyids. One view is that the family settled as Barha between Meerut and Saharanpur in the upper Ganga-Yamuna Doab. The other view is that they were the masters of a group of 12 villages in that area. Some say as there are Bara Imams, therefore they are described as sadat-e-Barah. Though brave fighters and excellent commanders, they became notorious for their ambition and unreliability. Aurangzeb had a very poor opinion about them. But it was during his reign that Abdullah Khan held administrative and military post fighting against the Marathas and becoming powerful. Abdullah Khan joined Jahandar Shah, then Governor of Multan, while Husain ali was appointed faujdar of Ranthambor. At the battle of Jajau (1707), the Saiyids fought well on the side of Bahadurshah but they were not satisfied with the rewards given. Husain Ali became (1708) deputy of Azim-ush shan governor of Bihar and three years after Abdullah Khan was appointed deputy of Azim-us-

Shan, governor of Allahabad (1711). So both of them were indebted to Azim-ush-Shan. But they did not support him when Bahadur Shah died. However, when Farrukh Siyar, the second son of Azim-ush Shan and his father's deputy in Bengal, who had been recalled to Court, got the news of Bahadur Shah's death, he proclaimed his father as king. But this was not liked by Husain Ali. When Azim-ush Shan was defeated and killed, Husain Ali wanted to drawback. But Farruk Siyar's mother appealed to him in espousing the cause of the family. Ultimately Husain agreed to join Farrukh Siyar, partly because of his dislike of Jahandar Shah and jealousy of the position of Zulfiqar Khan and partly in expectation of future gain. But this did not mean that the relation between Farrukh Siyar and Husain Ali was quite cordial. As a matter of fact there was mutual ill-will and suspicion between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyid Brothers right from the day one, as has been mentioned in the previous chapters. Husain Ali was afraid of the cunning and deceitful nature of Farrukh Siyar. Pressed for money, Farrukh Siyar wanted to levy contributions on all rich merchants including Europeans and to plunder the town of Patna. Farrukh Siyar offered Husain Ali $\frac{1}{4}$ share if he did not oppose the agreement. But Husain Ali disagreed. Differences of opinion arose on the other points also. Outwardly these were sorted out. But it is difficult to say how far these differences were personal or on matters of policy. At the suggestion

of Husain Ali Farukh Siyar then in Bihar abolished the *jizyah* in 1713. Abdullah Khan (at Allahabad) tried to resolve the ill-will between Husain Ali and Farrukh Siyar. Between the two brothers, Abdullah Khan, the elder was tactful and a better manager of events than Husain Ali, the younger. This can be borne out by the fact that, inspite of the break off with Farrukh Siyar, Abdullah Khan was in favour of keeping Farrukh Siyar on the throne and maintaining the *khutbah* and *saikkah* in his name. However, events moved very fast and Abdullah Khan was forced to do what he never wanted i.e. to finish Farrukh Siyar.

Abdullah Khan afterwards regretted the deposition of Farrukh Siyar and blamed his brother for his haste. In destroying Farrukh Siyar, the Saiyids had thus destroyed their most effective shield against the old nobles. Irvine had opined that the deposition of Farrukh Siyar was, perhaps, unavoidable but the way of doing what had become almost a necessity was unduly harsh and taking of the captive's life was an extremity entirely uncalled for.¹

The deposition for which Husain Ali seems to bear the primary responsibility created apprehensions in the minds of many nobles about the ultimate intentions of the Saiyids, and alienated their own supporters who were not prepared for such extreme measures. Even men who owed

1 . Irvine, I, 395.

their fortunes to the Saiyids used to pray secretly for their downfall, culminating into desertion of commandants of some important forts to the side of Nizam-ul Mulk, when he reached Deccan. To the dismay of the Saiyids these commandants had owed their positions to the Saiyids. All contemporary writers, including those favourable to the Saiyids are agreed in condemning the deposition as an act of infancy and disgrace. Considering the weakness of their actual position, it was a political blunder, for it enabled their rivals, the 'chin' group to appear as the champions of the Timurid monarchy and to utilize the public revulsion against the Saiyids for their own ends.

The revolt of the Nizam proved to be the immediate and direct cause of the downfall of the Saiyids. But there were some deep-seated causes of their failure. An important factor in their downfall was the opposition of the old nobles who regarded the Saiyids as upstarts and disliked their pro-Hindu policy. The leading part was taken by the small powerful Turani Group consisting of capable and ambitious leaders like Nizam and Mohammad Amin Khan, who did not want to be overshadowed. They interpreted the Saiyid policy of reconciling the Hindus and satisfying the Hindu sentiment by abolishing *jaziya*, as anti-Islam and anti-monarchial. At the same time they appealed to the narrow interests of the small section of the foreign nobles i.e., *Mughalia*, who

were excluded from power. Hence they posed as champions of Islam of monarchy and the interests of the Mughal nobles. However, on behalf of the Saiyids it may be said that this interpretation of their policy was incorrect. The Saiyids did not want to monopolise power. They associated various sections in the court, Hindus as well as groups of old nobles with the government. But the anti-Saiyid struggle was characterized as a struggle between Mughals and Hindsutanis.

In the meantime, the administration was paralysed by the party conflict. Law and order broke down with the risings of zamidnars and discontented elements. Rules of business were not followed. Their dependence on their subordinates like Ratanchand showed their administrative incompetence, made them unpopular and increased the tendency to harmful revenue farming, bribery and oppression by the subordinate. Naturally, the Saiyids were blamed for this maladministration. Their efforts to maintain law and order failed because they could not command the confidence of the people. On the other hand, it is not denied even by those writers who are strongly opposed to the Saiyids that they strove hard to maintain law and order, and that their military reputation and capabilities prevented a final breakdown of the administration. Rustam Ali says 'As is well known, this Emperor (Muhammad Shah) so long as Amirul Umara Husain Ali Khan lived,

strictly observed, by virtue of the efficient management of that great Saiyid, all the ancient laws and established rules of his ancestors. The achievement of all undertakings, the arrangement of all political affairs, and the execution of all wars were carried on in an excellent manner by the wisdom of that high nobleman'.² Iqbalnama mentions that unemployment was rare in the time of the Saiyids and any soldier or person who reached their audience, generally secured a job worth Rs. 50 per month at the lowest.³

As far as Farrukh Siyar was concerned, the Saiyid brothers were more sinned against than sinning. The constant intrigues of the Emperor turned them to the point of desperation and their safety seemed to lie in the end of the emperor. It is interesting to note that Farrukh Siyar had been the first to make secret overtures for aid to these powerful chief whom the Saiyids later succeeded in turning against him. When the emperor dispatched Husain Ali Khan against Ajit Singh, he had also sent a dispatch to Ajit Singh to fight against and kill Husain Ali Khan. Again he had tried unsuccessfully to induce the Marathas to help Daud Khan Panni in his campaign against Husain Ali who was governor of the Deccan. In the case of Ajit Singh, the emperor vainly tried to the last to win him over. Unfortunately for him, the image which Farrukh Siyar

2. Tarikh-i Hindi, Elliot & Dowson, viii, 42, 43.

3. Iqbalnamah, p. 128.

projected on the popular mind was that of a fickle and ungrateful person who could be trusted only at one's own peril. It is, however, to be added that in view of Farrukh Siyar's disposition, the course adopted by Husain Ali was dictated by the motives of self-defence. His reaction to the situation, beset with danger to his own security and position of his group can hardly be ascribed to any liberal purpose or enlightened policy, "they (the Saiyids) tried their best to put down the Marathas; and Husain Ali, during his first two years in the Deccan, made strenuous efforts to prevent Maratha inroads in Baglan and Khandesh. But when ultimately they found that they stood in great danger to their life and position from their master, they were compelled to reverse their policy and seek Maratha friendship".⁴ The financial difficulties of the emperor further accentuated his weakness. He could not bear the expenditure of his *Wala-shahi* troops while the *wazir*, *Qutub-ul Mulk* Abdullah Khan maintained a strong army of 20,000 horse, well equipped and regularly paid, that formed the core of Saiyids power. Thus, in the end the Saiyids were able to seize control of the fort and the palace without encountering armed resistance.

The Saiyid brothers, although they had done nothing to destroy or supplant the institution of the monarchy and had been at pains to preserve the integrity and power of the empire, had nevertheless pushed the

4. G.S. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, II, 37.

monarch into oblivion. Under their political hegemony, Farrukh Siyar's successors would continue to wear the crown, but would be stripped completely of the sovereign powers. The Saiyids succeeded in their objectivity of reducing the sovereign himself to a nullity but were unable to destroy the ties of loyalty that bound all sections of the people to the house of Timur. The nobles and the people had been used to the exercise of authority by the sovereign and no deep-rooted tradition of allegiance bound them to a government in which all authority proceeded from a family group. It was the monarch alone who could evoke the affection and loyalty of the people. He alone could maintain the balance of power among various sections of the upper classes by the judicious distribution of royal patronage.

The significance of the struggle which ended with the overthrow of the Saiyids brothers has been reduced by some contemporary historians to a mere clash between two vigorous, daring and ambitious personalities, namely Nizam-ul Mulk and Husain ali Khan. Interpreted in this way the conflict would appear to possess no deeper significance than what could be attached to an accidental and passing occurrence. But in reality the struggle was momentous in its consequences and the forces which produced it were complex and lay deep in the political tensions created by the interplay of power politics.

Nizam-ul Mulk and Husain Ali Khan represented two opposing factions, strong furiously against one another for the control of the state. The issue was nothing less than the absolute control of the throne by their own faction. The basis of division between the Mughals and Saiyid factions although it had no religious understones, was ethnic in the sense that the support of the former came chiefly from families who were either of more recent foreign origin or which had preserved their ethnic identity, while the latter was made up almost entirely of family groups of Indian origin or those long settled in the country. Such for example, is the position taken up by Khafi Khan and Muhammad Baksh Ashub who assert that the final showdown between the factions was precipitated by the Saiyid brother's policy that none except the Saiyids of Barha should hold supreme power at the centre. Their hatred for the Turani Mughals was such that they deliberately planned to destroy the prestige and ruin the fortunes of all the Turani and Irani families. Both Khafi Khan and Qasim Aurangabadi held the view that at this stage of the proceedings, the main motivations behind the struggle of the Mughals against the Saiyid brothers were the preservation of the dignity and prestige of the Mughal nobles and restoration of the freedom of action of the sovereign. Through the story told by Khafi Khan and Qasim Aurangabadi there runs the assumption that sectional interests combined with a desire to free

Muhammad Shah from the domination of the Saiyids, drew the Irani and Turani nobles closer Muhammad Amin Khan's appeal for Mughal solidarity was responded by Saadat Khan and Haider Quli Khan although both were Iranis. These Irani nobles never flinched from the deliberate stand they had taken and the energy and devotion they displayed at the battle of Hasanpur amply proved that their support for Muhammad Amin Khan and the cause he championed was whole-hearted and sincere. It must be remembered that considerations underlying group formation and rivalry applied only to the core of the group and its leadership. In actual action like the *coup d'etat* of 1719 by the Saiyids or the palace revolution of 1720 carried out by the Mughals, the forces that came into play on either side were not homogenous. In each case the elements which supported the rival groups were very diverse like the Afghans, Rajputs, Marathas and Indian Muslims, each of whom represented a separate ethnic tradition and followed its own leader, but were found operating on either side. From family groups the Saiyids and Mughals had transformed themselves into two rival heterogenous coalition loosely strong together, whose leaders strove for the attainment of their aims through court intrigue, political manoeuvring and if it came to that through was of succession. The coalition formed by the Saiyids included a larger proportion of the Afghans, Rajputs and the Marathas, while the Mughals,

Shaikhs and Deccani Saiyids predominated in the rival coalition of Nizam-ul Mulk; the proportion of the Afghans and the Marathas was very much smaller in his army. No Rajput *zamindar* or *mansabdar* of note seems to have joined the Mughal leader though it is likely that he enlisted some Rajput soldiers during his stay in Malwa. Similarly, in the battle of Hasanpur the Afghans, Rajputs and other Indians fought by the side of the Mughals for Muhammad Shah. However, except for Nusrat Yar Khan, who was hostile to Abdullah Khan, no other Saiyid of Barha fought on the side of Muhammad Shah or served in the army of Nizam-ul Mulk, nor were the Mughals employed by the Saiyid brothers in any of their battles.

Muhammad Shah's victory over Abdullah Khan had freed him from the tutelage of the Saiyid brothers who had completely dominated the administration, the crown and the court. The centre of gravity now shifted from a group formed by the two top ranking ministers to the monarch himself who became once again the pivot of all administrative, military and fiscal authority. He could once again exercise the right to frame policy and choose his own servants and officials. The restoration of monarchical authority brought stability in political life and relief to the masses from the confusion and tension of civil strife. It engendered the hope that the state machinery which had suffered most by the civil commotion, would now begin to function smoothly. It was believed that

prices would come down, revenues would flow into the royal treasury and arrears paid to the servants, and all thus would usher in an era of peace and plenty yet this kind of atmosphere bred complacency rather than a sense of serious urgency needed to meet the enormous problems of the day.

It would not be out of place at this juncture to have a brief look at the policies being pursued by Mohammad Amin Khan and Nizam-ul Mulk during their respective terms of *Wizarat*. The Mughal group had a sentimental attachment to the monarch as a person whom the Saiyids had reduced to a mere figurehead. The Mughals favoured the dominance of the Khanazad and hereditary nobles. Whereas the Saiyids supported the cause of new elements in the nobility. The Saiyid party had made concessions, in its own interest to the Marathas, Jats and Raja Ajit Singh against whom the Mughal leaders advocated a forward and vigorous policy. The Mughal *wazirs*, stood for strong and clean administration which they tried to achieve by setting an example of firmness and uprightness. Muhammad Amin Khan infused a spirit of duty and discipline among the officials. Nizamul Mulk made proposals for the eradication of such patent abuses as bribery, reckless alienation of *khalisa* lands and *ijarah*. It was when real power lay with the Mughals that

Muhammad Shah abolished the *jaziya* which was a measure in keeping with the temper of an age marked by moderation and enlightenment.

To cut the story short, it must be admitted that the Saiyids brothers were the victims of the circumstances and spirit of the age. To a large extent they failed because of the party conflicts in that corrupt and *confused atmosphere of the Court. Concentrating power in themselves* they tried to save the empire from disintegration. But here also they failed because no lasting solution could be made of the various problems, viz. the old nobility. Problem of the Hindus, problem of the Deccan. In every sphere new problems were created and much of this was due to the bitter party strife prevailing in the court. They tried to develop a composite ruling aristocracy of religion or race. But the old 'Alamgiri nobles' did not want to share power while the Maratha sardars were interested in their own domination in the Deccan. Husain Ali's deputy in the Deccan, Alam Ali rejected Baji Rao's plan of carrying on a harassing warfare against the Nizam. The Rajputs were more interested than the Marathas in maintaining the Mughal empire but neither Ajit Singh nor Jai Singh offered military help needed by the Saiyids. The latter could not secure the support of the nobles and they could not win the backing of the monarchy because of a traditional suspicion between the monarch and all powerful Wazir.

Last but not the least, in that age of monarchical decadence and decline of peerage the only strong agency which could maintain the unity of the empire was the *wazir*. The *wazir* also failed to give the necessary direction in the state. In certain respects the Saiyid tried to follow a secular and national approach as pointed out by Satish Chandra but this was not supported by other powerful sections of the nobles or by the emperor.

Appendices

Appendix 'A'

MANSABDARS WHO SUPPORTED NIZAM-UL MULK

S.No.	Name	Mansab	Office	Group	Reference
1.	Ghiyas Khan	5,000/5,000	Faujdar of Baglana	Mughal	M.U. III, 769-71.
2.	Iwaz Khan	5,000/5,000	Nazim of Berar	Mughal	M.U. II, 832-36.
3.	Muhammad Shah Farouqi	5,000	Daroghah of artillery in the Nizam's army	Shaikh	K.K. II, 876.
4.	Nuru Allah Farouqi	-	-	Shaikh	K.K. II, 876.
5.	Marahamat Khan	5,000/5,000	Nazim of Burhanpur	Irani (Mughal)	M.U. III, 713-15.
6.	Abdur Rahim Khan	1,500/300	-	Mughal	K.K. II, 876
7.	Muhd. Mutawasil Khan	3,000/2,000	-	Shaikh	M.I. II, 520-24
8.	Riyat Khan	5,000/5,000	-	Mughal	M.I. II, 332-33.
9.	Rustam Beg Khan	-	Faujdar of Bijagadh	Mughal	K.K. II, 852
10.	Qadir Dad Khan	3,000/2,000	-	Shaikh	M.I. III, 140-41
11.	Mir Ahsan Khan	-	<i>Bakhshi</i>	Saiyid	K.K. II, 881
12.	Munawwar Khan	-	<i>Jagirdar</i>	Shaikh	M.I. III, 654-55.
13.	Muhd. Hafiz	3,000/2,000	<i>Khan-i Saman</i>	Shaikh	M.U. II, 748-49.
14.	Darab Khan	1,000/500	-	Irani	M.U. II, 39-42
15.	Musafir Khan	5,000	<i>Bakhshi</i>	Saiyid (Deccani)	Ahwal, f. 202

16.	Rambhaji Nimbalkar	5,000	-	Maratha	Ahwal, f. 161
17.	Mir Taqi	-	-	Saiyid	Ahwal, f. 161
18.	Nasiruddin	-	-	Saiyid	Ahwal, f. 161.
19.	Fateh Khan	-	-	Afghan	Ahwal, f. 161.
20.	Dilair Khan	-	-	Afghan	Ahwal, f. 161
21.	Abbas Beg	-	-	Mughal	Ahwal, f. 161
22.	Ghaffar Beg	-	-	Mughal	Ahwal, f. 161
23.	Aziz Beg	-	-	Mughal	Ahwal, f. 161
24.	Mir Ismail	-	-	Saiyid	Ahwal, f. 161

Appendix 'B'

**NOBLES WHO OPPOSED THE SAIYID BROTHERS
(FROM THE TIME OF FARRUKH SIYAR'S FALL TO THE BATTLE OF HASANPUR, FEBRUARY 28, 1719-
NOVEMBER 13, 1720)**

S.No.	Name	Mansab	Office	Group	Reference
1.	Mir Muhammad Taqi	6,000/6,000	Governor of Kashmir	Irani	Father-in-law of F. Siyar T.M. 39
2.	Sha'ista Khan	4,000/3,000	Governor of Kashmir <i>Diwan of Khalisa wa Tan</i>	Saiyid of Irani origin	Maternal uncle of F. Siyar K.K. II, 921; M.U. II, 828-32
3.	Ghazi-u'-d-din Khan	7,000/6,000	Darogha Julu Khana	Turani	He afterwards joined Abdullah Khan, M.U., 879.
4.	Raa Jai Singh	7,000/6,000	Governor of Malwa	Rajput	M.U. II, 81-83
5.	Tahawwar Khan	-	-	Turani	K.K. II, 832
6.	Ruhullah Khan	-	-	Irani	K.K. II, 832; M.U. II, 315-17
7.	Mitter Sen	-	Wakil of Naku Siyar	Nagar Barhman	K.K. II, 825-26.
8.	Raja Chhabela Ram	7,000	Governor of Allahabad	"	M.U. II, 328-30
9.	Raja Girdhar	5,000/5,000	Governor of Awadh	"	K.K. II, 843
10.	Nizam-ul Mulik	7,000/7,000	Governor of Malwa	Turani	Ahwal, 157b
11.	Muhammad Amin Khan	7,000/7,000	Second <i>bakhshi</i>	"	Shiu Das, 46b

12.	Haider Quli Khan	6,000/6,000	<i>Mir Atash</i>	Mughal	Shiu Das, 48b
13.	Sa'adat Khan	5,000/5,000	Faujdar of Hinduan and Bayana	Irani	K.K. II, 903
14.	Saiyid Nusrat Yar Khan	7,000/7,000	-	Saiyid of Barha	He joined Muhammad Shah in the battle of Hasanpur Shiu Das, 52b
15.	Sabit Khan	5,000/5,000	Faujdar of Kol	Mughal	T.M. 75
16.	Dost Ali Khan	5,000/5,000	-	-	Shiu Das, 51a.
17.	Ghalib Khan	4,000/4,000	-	-	Shiu das, 51a.
18.	Abid Khan	4,000/4,000	-	-	Shiu Das, 57a.
19.	Muhammad Khan Bangash	6,000/6,000	Governor of Allahabad	Afghan	M.U. III, 771-74
20.	Zafar Khan	7,000/7,000	Third <i>Bakhshi</i>	Mughal	Shiu Das, 48b
21.	Aziz Khan Rohillah	6,000/5,000	Nazim of Oudh	Afghan	T.N. 43; Kamwar, 352a
22.	Bayazid Khan Mewati	5,000?5,000	-	-	Siyar, 439
23.	Sher Afghan Khan	6,000/6,000	Faujdar of Karra	Ansari (Indian)	T.S.F. 115a
24.	Tarbiyat Khan	3,500	<i>Mir Tuzuk</i>	Irani	M.U. I, 498-503
25.	Azam Khan	5,000/4,000	Deputy governor of Kashmir		K.K. 981, Kamwar, 348a
26.	Ikhlas Khan	7,000/7,000	<i>Mir Munshi</i>	Indian	M.U. I, 350-52
27.	Raja Gopal Singh	4,000/4,000	<i>Zamindar</i>	Chuhan	T.M. 63; Shiu Das, 48b.
28.	Asad Ali Khan	-		-	K.K. 921; T.M. 86
29.	Muhamid Khan	5,000		Mughal	T.M. 43.
30.	Amin-u' d-din Khan	6,000/6,000	<i>Mir Tuzuk</i>	Shaikh	M.U. I, 357-58.

31.	Khan-i Dauran	7,000/7,000	<i>Mir Bakhtshi</i>	Shaikh	Ausaf-al Asaf, 49a
32.	Khaimat Jat	-	-	Jat	Irvine, II, 71.
33.	Saifullah Khan	6,000/6,000	<i>Wala Shahi Zamindar</i>	Afghan	T.M 121
35.	Raja Bahadur	-	<i>Zamindar of Kishangadh</i>	Rathor	K.K. II, 921
36.	Azimulah Khan	-	-	Mughal	T.M. 125
37.	Mir Musharaff	5,000/5,000	<i>Faujdar of Lucknow</i>	Saiyid	He joined Muhammad Shah in the battle of Hasnapur, Shiu Das, f. 46
38.	Diyamat Khan	-	-	-	<i>Ausaf-al Asaf</i> , f.49.
39.	Mir Jumla	7,000/7,000	<i>Sadar-us Sadur</i>	Mughal	<i>Ausaf-al Asaf</i> , f. 47.
40.	Hadi Khan	-	-	-	<i>Ausaf-al Asaf</i> , f. 49.

Appendix 'C'

RANKS AND POSITIONS OF THE SAIYIDS OF BARHA AND THEIR PARTISANS IN 1719

S.No.	Name	Rank	Group	Office	Reference
1.	S. Abdulah Khan	7,000/7,000	Barha	<i>Wazir</i>	
2.	S. Husain Ali Khan	7,000/7,000	"	<i>Mir Bakhshi</i>	
3.	S. Khan Jahan Bahadur	6,000/5,000	"	Governor of Ajmer <i>Daroghah</i> of artillery	Kamwar, f. 371b
4.	S. Nusrat Yar Khan	5,000/5,000	"	<i>Faujdar</i> of Narnol, Mewat	He fought in the battle of Hasanpur against S. Abdullah Khan, M.U. II, 681-83; K.K., II, 911; T.M. 44; Kamwar, f. 375a
5.	Ghairat Khan, son of S. Nasrullah, sister's son of S. Husain Ali Khan	-	"	Governor of Agra	Kamwar, f. 346a; T.M. 40-41; Siyar, 43b
6.	S. Najmuddin Ali Khan	4,000/2,000	"	<i>Dorogha-i-Diwan-i-Khas</i>	Kamwar, 360b
7.	S. Nijabat Ali Khan, nephew and adopted son of Abdullah Khan	-	"	Superintendent of the <i>harem</i>	Kamwar, 360b
8.	S. Saifuddin Ali Khan	-	"	<i>Faujdar</i> of Moradabad	Kamwar, 350a
9.	S. Ibrahim Khan, title S. hasan Khan	5,000	"	Deputy governor of Multan	Kamwar, 357b, 369b; T.M. 59

10.	S. Alam Ali Khan, son of Nuruddin Ali Khan	-	"	Deputy governor of the Deccan	T.H. p. 456
11.	S. Shuja'at-ullah Khan, sister's son of Abdullah Khan	-	"	<i>Doroghah of Dagh-o Tashih</i> (branding)	Kamwar, 363b
12.	Babar Khan	-	"	-	<i>Mi'at-ul Safa</i> , f. 43a.
13.	Shamsher Khan	-	"	-	"
14.	Ashraf Khan	-	"	-	"
15.	Amin Khan	-	"	-	K.K. 895
16.	S. Ghulam Ali Khan	4,000/0,000	"	<i>Daroghah of Diwan-iKhas</i>	Ijad, 135a
17.	S. Himmat Khan	-	"	<i>Ataliq</i> (guardian) of Rafi-d'D Drajat	K.K. II, 829, 831
18.	S. Dilawar Ali Khan	4,000/4,000	"	<i>Bakshi</i> of Husain Ali Khan	-
19.	S. Muhammad Khan, cousin of Hussain Ali Khan	-	"	Superintendent of Privy Audience	K.K., II 918; Siyar, II, 433
20.	S. Karimullah	-	"	<i>Bakshi</i> of Husain Ali Khan's army	K.K.
21.	Shah Ali Khan	6,000/5,000	"	Governor of Allahabad	Kamwar, ff. 370b.
22.	S. Shahmat Khan	-	"	<i>Faujdar</i> of Saharanpur	Kamwar, ff. 369d, 363b.
23.	Zafar Ali Khan	-	"	<i>Faujdar</i> of Sikandrabad	Kamwar, f.375a
24.	Abdul Nabi	-	"	Head Officer of mace-bearers	Kamwar, 360b; M.M. 117a

25.	Dost Muhammad Khan	3,000/2,000	Afghan	<i>Zamindar of Bhopal</i>	Kamwar, f.369a
26.	Raja Rattan Chand	5,000	Indian	<i>Diwan of Abdullah Khan</i>	-
27.	Muhkam Singh	5,000/5,000	Rajput	<i>Diwan of Husain Ali Khan</i>	Shiu Das, 48a
28.	Churaman Jat	5,000/5,000	Jat	-	Shiu Das, f.30; Kumwar, 356a
29.	Ajit Singh	7,000/7,000	Rajput	Governor of Gujarat	-
30.	Bhim Singh	5,000/4,000	Rajput	<i>Zamindar of Kota</i>	M.U. II, 305-307; Kamwar, 352a.
31.	Balaji Vishwanath	-	Maratha	<i>Peshwa of Raja Shahu</i>	-
32.	Raja Gaj Singh Narori	-	"	-	K.K. II < 877; T.M. 41
33.	Shankraji Malhar	-	"	-	K.K. 891
34.	Raja Gaj Singh	-	Rajput	-	T.M. 41
35.	Tahawwar Khan	-	Afghan	-	M.U. III, 776-93
36.	Muthawwar Khan	-	"	-	M.U. III, 776-93.
37.	Umar Khan	-	"	-	K.K. II, 891
38.	Ghalib Khan	5,000	Deccani Saiyid	-	T.M. 42; M.U. II, 504
39.	Ghiyasuddin Khan	-	Deccani	-	K.K. II, 894
40.	Rahmatullah Khan	-	Shaikh	-	K.K. II, 591
41.	Fidai Khan	-	Deccani	-	K.K. II, 891
42.	Wali Muhammad	-	Saiyid	-	K.K. II, 895.

Appendix - D

MANSAB GRANTED TO BARHA SAYYIDS DURING AKBAR'S REIGN

S.No.	Name	Rank	Source
1	Sayyid Mahmud Khan Barha	200/x	Ain-I 224, 2 kh, 34a
2.	Sayyid Raju Barha	1000/x	Tabaqat-I Akbari, vol. II, 453.
3.	Sayyid Qasim Barha s/o Mahmud	1500/x	<i>Ain-i akbari</i> , vol. I, 225.
4.	Sayyid Bayazid Barha	300/x	<i>Ain-i Akbari</i> , vol. I 229.
5.	Sayyid Lad Barha	200/x	<i>Ain-i Akbari</i> , vol. I, 237
6.	Sayyid Chajju Barha	500/x	<i>Ain-i Akbari</i> , vol. I, 227
7.	Sayyid Ahmad Barha, s/o Mahmud	2000/x	<i>Ain-i Akbari</i> , vol. 224
9.	Sayyid Hasim Barha	1000/x	<i>Ain-i Akbari</i> , vol. 226.

Appendix – E

MANSAB GRANTED TO BARHA SAYYIDS DURING JAHANGIR'S REIGN

S.No.	Name	Rank	Source
1	Sayyid Izzat Khan Barha	1000/800	Tuzuk, 246
2.	Sayyid Abdullah Barha	700/3000	Tuzuk, 159
3.	Ali Muhammad s/o Saif Khan Barha	300/400	Tuzuk, 159
4.	Bahadur Khan s/o Saif Khan Barha	400/300	Tuzuk, 159
5.	Sayyid Qasim Barha	1000/6000	Tuzuk, 163
Above 1000 to 2000			
1.	Sayid Abdul Wahab (Diler)	2000/1200	Tuzuk, 336
2.	Sayyid Bahadur	2000/1000	Tuzuk
3.	Sayyid Hazbar Khan Barha	1500/700	Tuzuk, 322
4.	Sayyid Ali Barha	1500/1000	Tuzuk, 138
5.	Sayyid Saif Khan Barha	--	Tuzuk, 138
Above 2000 to 3000			
1.	Saif Khan Barha	3000/1500	Tuzuk, 35
2.	Sayyid Jamaluddin-500 Ain		

Appendix – E

MANSAB GRANTED TO BARHA SAYYIDS DURING SHAHJAHAN'S REIGN

S.No.	Name	Rank	Source
Upto 1000			
1.	Sayyid Abdullah	600/400	Lahauri, 1, p. 71-379
2.	Sayyid Sulaiman s/o Qasim Barha	600/300	Lahauri, 1, pt. I, 320
3.	Sayyid Khadim Barha	1000/500	Lahauri, II, 232
4.	Sayyid Mansur	1000/500	Waris, 247(a)
5.	Sayyid Sherzaman	1000/250	Lahauri, II, 474
6.	Sayyid Munawwar	1000/400	Waris 265(a)
7.	Sayyid Shaikhan Barha s/o Diler Khan	1000/900	Waris 156(b)
8.	Sayyid Muhammad s/o Afzal Barha	1000/600	Lahauri, 734
9.	Sayyid Nurul Ayn, s/o Saif Khan	1000/300	Ama-I Saleh, III, 469
10.	Sayyid Salar Barha	1000/1000	Waris, 56(b)
11.	S. Ali n/o Khan-I Jahan Barha	800/400	Waris, 266(a)
12.	Sayyid Najabat Khan s/o Shuja'at Khan	100/500	Waris, 370
13.	Sayyid Shams-uddin s/o Jalal Barha	700/200	Waris, 268(a)
14.	Sayyid alawal s/o Kabir Barha	1000/700	Amal-I Suleh, III, 466
15.	Sayyid Shah Ali Barha	900/500	Amal-I Suleh, III, 470
16.	Sayyid Makhan	800/400	Amal-I Suleh, III, 470
17.	Sayyid Zabardast Khan s/o Hazbar Khan	800/400	Amal-I Suleh, III, 473

18.	Sayyid Sher Muhammad Barha	500/150	Amal-i suleh, III, 485
19.	Sayyid Karamullah s/o Khan-I Jahan	500/100	Amal-i suleh, III, 486
20.	Sayyid Alam b/o Salar Barha	500/100	Amal-i suleh, III, 486
21.	Sayyid Qutub, s/o Sayyid Maqbool Barha	500/100	Amal-i suleh, III, 487
Above 1000 to 2000			
1.	Sayyid Alam Barha	2000/1000	Lahauri, II, 199
2.	Sayyid Muzaffar s/o Shuja'at Khan Barha	2000/1000	Amal-i Suleh, III, 244
3.	Sayyid Feroz, n/o Khan-I Jahan Barha	1500/1000	Lahauri, II, 474
4.	Sayyid Hasan s/o Diler Khan	1500/1500	Waris, 262(b)
5.	Sayyid Salabat Khan	2000/1500	Waris, 204(a)
Above 2000 to 3000			
1.	Sayyid Hizbar Khan Barha	3000/1000	Lahauri, I, Pt.I, 183
Above 3000 to 4000			
1.	Sayyid diler Khan Barha	4000/3000	Lahauri, II, 484
2.	Sayyid Shuja'at Khan Barha	4000/4000	Lahauri, II, 162
Above 4000			
1.	Sayyid Muzaffar Khan	6000/6000	Lahauri, II, 235

Appendix - F

OFFICES HELD BY BARHA SAYYIDS DURING THE REIGN OF SHAH JAHAN

1.	Sayyid Muzaffar Khan Barha	1628-29	Qiladar of Gwalior	Lahauri, vol.I, Pt. I, p.24
2.	Sayyid Muzaffar Khan Barha	1634-35	Subedar of Agra	Lahauri, vol. Pt. II, p.76.
3.	Sayyid Mansur s/o Muzaffar Barha	1628-29	Dy Qiledar of Gwalior	Qazvini, 170
4.	Sayyid Diler Khan	1632-33	Faujdar of Barha	Lahauri, vol. I, Pt. I, 448
5.	Sayyid Shuja'at Khan Barha	1637-38	Subedar of Allahabad	Lahauri, vol.II, 201
6.	Sayyid Khadim Barha	1641-42	Faujdar of Mandsoore	Lahauri, vol.II, 232
7.	Sayyid Alam Barha	1645-46	Haris of Gwalior	Lahauri, vol.II, 474
8.	Sayyid Sherzaman, s/o Muzaffar Khan Barha	1647-48	Qiledar of Irak (Lahore)	Lahauri, vol.II, 736
9.	Sayyid Munawwar, s/o Muzaffar Khan Barha	1647-48	Qiledar & Irak (Lahore)	Lahauri, vol.II, 737
10.	Sayyid Salar Barha	1649-50	Faujdar of Gwalior (A.C.)	Waris, 56(b)
11.	Sayyid Alam Barha	1649-50	Faujdar of Gwalior	Waris, 56(b)
12.	Sayyid Sultan (Salabat Khan) s/o Bayazid	1652-53	Dy. Subedar of Punjab	Waris, 103(b)
13.	Sayyid Shaikhan Barha s/o Diler Khan	1652-53	Faujdar of Tarad	Waris, 156(b)
14.	Sayyid Hasan s/o Diler Khan	1653-54	Faujdar of Gurda	180(b)
15.	Sayyid Shahab Barha (Sher Khan)	1657-58	Faujdar of Mandsoore	Amal-i saleh, III, 272
16.	Salabat Khan Barha	1655-56	Subedar of Allahabad	Waris, 240(a)

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